Nelson Evening Mail TUESDAY, JANUARY 11, 1944 HITLER HAS HIS HANDS FULL

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume 79, 11 January 1944, Page 4

Nelson Evening Mail TUESDAY, JANUARY 11, 1944 HITLER HAS HIS HANDS FULL

WITH complicated placenaines and the unfamiliar terrain of the vast Eastern front, many readers must find difficulty in building up a composite picture of Soviet strategy. A study of the map shows that the Red armies have made splendid gains and that they are now winning back much of the territory lost during the first six weeks of Hitler’s opening offensive. It does not, however, give the full flavour of the strategic brilliance by which these strokes have been planned and executed or an adequate impression of how they are maturing towards a crisis for the Germans. Marshal Stalin’s great offensives are no longer preventive or remedial; they are positive and smashing. He has long held the initiative and this has become increasingly backed by gathering weight and momentum. Now, in the south at least, if not over the whole front, a climactic stage is at length being reached. An amazing Soviet capacity for ringing the changes is being displayed. The Germans, compelled to fight the battles which the Russians dictate, are unable to formulate any very cut-and-dried plans in advance so their efforts—still very determined—are confined to keeping the invader at bay and their own armies intact.

The time has come now when it is doubtful whether they can do that. In the hey-day of his offensive, in addition to over-running territory and reaching the sources of precious oil and minerals, Hitler’s central objective was to destroy the Red armies. He failed in that because Stalin and his generals sacrificed great industrial cities and huge expanses of the best agricultural land in the Soviet Union rather than risk encirclement and destruction. This they accomplished with a high degree of skill so that, when the tide turned at Stalingrad, they were in a position to follow it up instead of being a broken force. Now the roles are reversed. It is the Germans who are retreating and the Russians who are intent on smashing the Nazi war machine as well as regaining territory. So successful have they been in the war of attrition that part of the task of destruction has been carried through while fighting defensive offensives. The test which the Rus-

sians passed with honours in their dark days must now be applied to the Germans: Can they withdraw under the pressure of smashing enemy blows so as to maintain a stout defence where it is most needed and still preserve their line?

The immediate application of this question is to the grim struggle going on in the Dnieper bend. Has Hitler lingered there too long to be able to ward off the threats which now encompass his armies? Unlike Stalin he seems to be ..unwilling to concede ground except when there is no alternative. Has he learnt anything from the Stalingrad disaster where his “no retreat” order resulted

in the bulk of General Paulus’s army of 330,000 being killed or captured? There are many more troops in danger in the Dnieper bend. Some time ago it appeared that the Germans would withdraw from the Dnieper to the Dniester, yet they hung grimly

on and fought to escape the Soviet pincers. Von Mannstein’s furious but short-lived counter-offensive in the Kiev sector was an attempt to relieve the position. It failed and now, with the risk confronting Hitler in a more imminent form, he finds himself struggling between even more distasteful alternatives. One line of action is directed towards keeping his Balkan satellites in the war. Along with that goes anxiety about loss of the Ploesti oilfields if the Russians drive on and invade Rumania. Further north is the threatened break-through from Poland towards the frontiers of the Reich itself. He does not know which alternative, if either, the Russian High Command will try to impose upon him. Then the risk of thrusts on other distant sectors of the long line must be guarded against. A stage has been reached where, even from the severely defensive point of view, he has his hands full. It is patent that the end in the Dnieper bend is fast approaching and this means another Stalingrad or a large-scale withdrawal. Even that may be difficult in face of the converging movements of the Russian armies. Eight or nine weeks remain before the southern front becomes bogged down in the spring thaw. The Red armies are investing their offensives with even more fury, leaving little opportunity for the Germans to regroup their roughly handled forces. And all the time Hitler's mobile reserves have to be disposed with the prospect of the early opening of the assault from the west against the Atlantic Wall and probably with additional thrusts from the south. Hitler is in the unenviable situation of a commander who is loath to give way anywhere yet realises the physical impossibility of holding out much longer on his present perimeter.