LOSS OF KOS AND LEROS

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume 78, 25 November 1943, Page 5

LOSS OF KOS AND LEROS

MR ATTLEE GIVES DETAILS STATEMENT IN THE COMMONS London, Nov. 24. Mr Attlee, Deputy-Prime Minister, in the debate in the Address-in-Reply in the House of Commons, made a statement on the Aegean operations, which, he said, should be considered in the light of the general strategy of the war. Week by week Allied armies moved forward in Italy though the country was mountainous and the ways of approach narrow and winding. The toll of U-boats had maintained a high level. A heavier and heavier weight of bombs was dropped on Germany from the west and the south. With the growing effect of the war on industry and morale the enemy must divert a large part of his air force to purely defensive operations, which also made heavy demands on his manpower. Guerrilla activities in the Balkans and Greece steadily increased, and in all occupied countries resistance grew. The Russian summer campaign passed without pause into an autumn and also a winter war, with no slackening of the offensive.

These operations, sustained with great valour and skill by our own and Allied forces, were not disconnected efforts but each had a bearing and effect on the others. Hitler must see them as part of a concentric attack and dispose his forces to try and parry the blows. If he sent more aircraft to western Europe, Italy or the Aegean he would have so much less on the Russian front, and to the extent that he had to keep extra divisions occupied in Europe he would have so much less on the fighting fronts. Every commitment was an added weight against his forces, already taxed and strained.

Coming to the Mediterranean, Mr At lee recalled the hazardous enterprises at Salerno, Sardinia and Corsica, undertaken beyond the range of fighter protection, and said risks must be run to obtain commensurate advantages. The Aegean action had a two-fold objective: (1) To help the attack on Italy by causing the Germans to disperse their forces; and (2) to take advantage of the fleeting opportunities which the collapse of Italy brought. Early in September Crete was held by 55,000 troops, including 30,000 Germans, Rhodes by 9000 Germans and 40,000 Italians. There were Germans on other Aegean Islands, and only Italians in the Dodecanese except Rhodes and Scarpanto. Here was an opportunity to extend and harrass the Germans and obtain strategic gains of great value. The night when General Alexander landed at Salerno General Wilson dispatched a small party to Rhodes. NO EFFORT BY ITALIANS Despite overwhelming numerical strength the Italians made no effort to deal with the Germans and nothing could be accomplished. Attention was then given to Kos and Leros, though well within the range of enemy fighter activities. Kos was important as an airfield and Leros as a naval base. Very good work was done by the Navy. First-line aircraft which might have been used in Italy, Sardinia and Corsica were retained in the Aegean where some 35 per cent of the German Air Force, including some brought from the eastern front, had been used. Kos was lost only by a narrow margin, but the loss affected the defence of Leros, which might have been evacuated, but with the knowledge of the effect of such a course, the Commander-in-Chief in the Middle East, with the support and approval of the Government, decided to hold the island. Unfortunately unfavourable weather curtailed ian air attack by heavy bombers. Mr Attlee said the British garrison at Leros numbered 4000 and counterattacks which at first succeeded later failed in the face of constant air attack, and incessant attacks by German troops landed at night created weariness too great for the garrison to resist. The loss of Leros was a matter for profound regret, but the operation contained enemy forces during a critical period of the invasion of Italy and inflicted serious losses on the enemy. Had the attack not been made we should have been blamed for lack of enterprise in not trying to exploit a situation which offered opportunities. Arguments against operating beyond the range of really effective air cover were considered, buit were disregarded because other considerations and hopes were held to outweigh them.