Nelson Evening Mail WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 11, 1942 LONG-SIGHTED PLANNERS

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume 77, 11 November 1942, Page 4

Nelson Evening Mail WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 11, 1942 LONG-SIGHTED PLANNERS

IN his Mansion House speech Mr Churchill confirmed the general impression that military operations now proceeding at both ends of North Africa were planned as part of a great joint enterprise. The Prime Minister concerned himself mainly with a review of the achievements of the Eighth Army in its victory in what he named the Battle of Egypt. He did not dwell on the details of what was going on in the French colonies but was generous enough to name President Roosevelt as author of this undertaking, casting himself in the role of an active and ardent lieutenant. What he did not say, but what the world should know and acknowledge, is that, in Egypt, the roles were reversed. Anyone who reads the writings of Churchill will be struck with the emphasis he has always placed on the Mediterranean in world strategy. It was his decision which sent an Imperial army to Egypt in 1940 when hard-pressed Britain could so ill spare it, for the Prime Minister and his advisers knew full well that the cross-roads of Empire had lost none of their historic significance. In that undertaking he was author, while President Roosevelt joined in later as an able lieutenant-

There will be no disposition on the part of either leader to waste precious time parcelling out the credit which comes from success. These two form one of the happiest and most fortunate combinations in modern history. President Roosevelt has played his cards with skill and judgment, and, like Mr Churchill, has often had to keep his lips sealed in face of the critics. One of his greatest accomplishments is the way he has steered his country out of isolationism into willing participation in any of the far-flung theatres of war. Pearl Harbour helped immensely, of course. American troops have been pouring into England and Northern Ireland when many Americans said they should be going to the Pacific or be kept at home. The great pains taken to maintain diplomatic relations with Vichy long after she had drifted into Hitler’s camp were construed as a sign of weakness because the motives were not understood. It is clear now that the President had * ideas about French North Africa in mind a long time ago. He could not speak of them, but only last week, before the American phase of the North African enterprise opened, Mr Cordell Hull, answering in particular a pungent attack by Mr Wendell Willkie, made this rather remarkable statement:

When the records are unfolded and the public understand facts now necessarily withheld, there will be less criticism of the continued recognition fof Vichy] and of other foreign policyThe pages are now being turned back, the broad pattern of the joint undertaking is being revealed and the forecast of Mr Hull about the critics must be already coming true. Mr Churchill, as the other main partner to the great secret, has had to run the gauntlet of even more criticism by amateur strategists. The welter of agitation for the immediate opening of a second front in Hitler’s Europe has not died completely away even yet. The Prime Minister perhaps heard those noisy demonstrations within earshot of Downing Street. He has constantly had to parry pertinent questions on the, floor of the Commons. There has been the anxiety of Russia until the Moscow visit allayed it, at least in the mind of M. Stalin. Obviously Mr Churchill could not say precisely why General Auchinleck had been superseded in Egypt or why Admiral Cunningham had gone to Washington, any more than, when speculation by both friend and enemy suggested the imminence of an American move on Dakar, President Roosevelt could shout, “You’re wrong; we’re not going to Dakar first but to Algiers, Oran and Casablanca instead.” Embarrassing though these agitations and speculations were to both leaders, they could not talk of what they knew and what they had planned together. As events have turned out it may at least be said that they have proved truer friends of the Soviet

than the noisy elements which call themselves by this name. In Churchill’s case there was a determined attempt to rob him of the powers attaching to the Minister of Defence, an office which he holds conjointly with that of Prime Minister. Churchill, said some critics, both in and out of Parliament, was trying to run the war on his own—a task too big for any one man. The Prime Minister wasn’t trying to do any such thing but refused to be divested of any of his powers, maintaining that, if he was to carry the main burden of responsibility, he must be. clothed with the requisite authority of direction—authority which President Roosevelt possesses by virtue of the office of Commander-in-Chief. After a period of intensive preparation, during which the strain of waiting must have been at least as great on the two leaders as it was on those crying for precipitate action, the first fruits of the joint enterprise are being reaped. They are significant enough to add considerably to the strategic stature of these two leaders of Democracy as well as enhance their reputations as statesmen.