Nelson Evening Mail FRIDAY, OCTOBER 23, 1942 SMUTS: SOLDIER AND STRATEGIST

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume 77, 23 October 1942, Page 4

Nelson Evening Mail FRIDAY, OCTOBER 23, 1942 SMUTS: SOLDIER AND STRATEGIST

GENERAL SMUTS is no firebrand-j He never exaggerates or throws; words about loosely. Much of the | i trust which is reposed in him is i due to his appeal to the head rather than to the heart. No one could t read or hear his London speech without being impressed by its in-cisively-reasoned argument. its finely-chiseled phrases, sharpened here and there by rapier thrusts, and lightened with occasional' touches of humour. It was the product of a finely-tempered mind. Every word deserves to be weighed, ~ carefully. After twenty -four years I in which to see the contribution of General Smuts to the last war in perspective, Mr Lloyd George on Wednesday singled out for special mention his qualities of calmness and discernment, in which. said "The Wizard'’ of the first act of •‘this continuing drama,” he was exceeded by no one of his age. From 1916 till the peace the two worked in double harness- Smuts won the confidence of the then British Prime Minister—no easy task. Mr Lloyd George has recorded in his memoirs and acknowledges again now the value of his experience and judg-. ment in those eventful yearsFollowing precedent Mr Churchill has called him to share again in Allied counsels- Yesterday we j commented on the General’s emi- , nence as a statesman of the Com- , monwealth but no one imagines that; lie came to London solely to make his great speech as the first Domin- ■ ion Prime Minister to address the I combined Houses of Parliament. It ■ is also as a soldier and strategist that ■ his advice is being sought in this I critical stage of the war. Of that I part of his mission he said little,, I] preferring to leave speculation to ■I the “amateur strategists,” but there B is no doubt that his opinions will’ ■ be reflected in future plans of ac- — tion. The General really explained g* the timing of his visit by saying; that one phase of the war was end- 1 1 ing and another beginning. That’ j marks the change-over from defen- % sive to offensive strategy. Smuts j is a strategist of the offensiveH Doubtless his judgment about the M future will be as sound as it was H shown to be in his speech when he < § picked out the highlights from the 1 crowded canvas of events of three« § years of war. These should serve, H to correct impressions which, under, J the disappointment which attends, U ill-fortune, have been apt to get out j J of perspectiveH Linking the two wars as part of j the same conflict, he went on to j show how our preconceived ideas s of strategy were thrown out of gear § by the fall of France—“an awful §f moment in history.” This crash re--11 verberated on the other side of the I world and, aided by the duplicity of §f Vichy, opened wide the door to the ; 1 Japanese in Indo-China. whence H flowed the dire consequences as we H know them now in the Pacific. j |j Nearer the centre of conflict he ex- | plained how disaster had been ward-1 1 ed off by Britain’s efforts when she j M stood in magnificent isolation, helped: 1 to a remarkable degree by Hitler’s; 1 “colossal mistakes.” He confirmed 1 what is now generally accepted: that! §1 Hitler blundered badly (for him) ; when, having brought France to her jj knees, he chose Paris instead of Lon-j f| don as his next objective, thus al-j U lowing Britain a breathing space. Following that, defeat of the Lul’t- _ waffe by “those strong, young '''if hands,” in the opinion of Genera) if Smuts, saved not only the whole of §f the Allied cause but the future of M j the world. That is a supreme tri- j % j bute, but history is already showing 1 I that it is not exaggerated. HI Then another step which marked: |§ the climb of the democracies out ofj f§ the abyss was another Hitlerian, 1 blunder: his treacherous attack on! §1 Russia, the consequences of which, E General Smuts said, might yet prove more fatal than the Napoleonic dis--1 aster. There is no doubt of what his H attitude will be towards help for f§ Russia, “who is already bearing more | than her share of the common burfj den.” All aid oau/st - be given her! H with the utmost speed and, when if the time came to take the offensive,, g it would be folly to hesitate. Pearl I Harbour was named by the General = as one more step up the ladder leadE ing out of the abyss and as an Axis §l blunder. Personally he did not dell plore Pearl Harbour. The price „J§ paid was not too high to gain Ame-

rica’s complete co-operation in the -vor. The General went on to pose the question of whether a fourth Axis blunder would yet be committed in the shape of a Japanese attack against Siberia. When the decisive moves of the war are lilted from the confused tangle uf events and allotted their relative importance by a strategical authority it is comforting to see that we have not made all the mistakes. General Smuts shows us clearly that among the many things for which we have to be thankful, are the blunders of our enemies and lie is confident they will prove fatal.