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EPIC MARCH

GENERAL STILWELL IN BURMA THROUGH STEAMING JUNGLES FOR 20 DAYS One day late in May, when it had become apparent that the Japanese would push to conclusion their conquest of Burma, a scraggly-looking party of men and women marched out of the jungle and up to the Chindwin river in central Burma, They were a motley, cosmopolitan group; Chinese tribesmen from the Naga, Chin, and Shan tribes, Burmese native nurses and an odd assortment of Malayan and Indian, and South Asian mechanics and clerks. Their appearance, writes Gordon Walker in the “Christian Science Monitor,” bespoke the mountain-climbing, jungle-pierc-ing, river-crossing journey which had brought them on foot to refuge a bare few days ahead of the pursuing Japanese armies of invasion.

Their epic 20-day foot march will go down in history as one of the many remarkable feats of endurance to be chronicled in the present war. But remembrance of the incident will focus upon the tough, dauntless United States Army General who was largely responsible for pulling them through. CALLED “UNCLE JOE” Some call him “Uncle Joe,” particularly the troops under his command, who found time and again that though he was many years their senior he could still outmarch them on a day’s trek. To the Chinese, who pin no small amount of their faith on him to usher in the day when the last Nipponese soldier treads on ancient China’s soil, he is known as “General Sze.” In Washington’s War Department files, and particularly on communiques from the United States forces in Asia which he commands, his name is signed: Joseph W. Stilwell, Lieutenant General, United States Army. General Stilwell is no “brasshat,” as members of the Army hierarchy are sometimes dubbed. While pushing through the wild, uncharted jungle with his 400 polyglot troops and staff, he was at once company commander, guide, cook and arms-bearer. He democratically stood in line with native soldiers at mess; he loaded mules and helped carry those soldiers who couldn’t march by themselves. What was probably more valuable was his absolute conviction that the party would succeed in reaching destination and his ability to impart this confidence to those who were with him. The net result was that they succeeded, and without the loss of a single man. “THE STILWELL STRIDE” For three weeks the General pushed his party along at what came to be known as the ’"Stilwell Stride”—about j 150 steps a minute. This was necessary ‘ if they were to escape the closing pin- ' cer of the Japanese Army which was right behind them. General Stilwell knew that he had a big job on his hands awaiting him back in China.

The Japanese had overrun most of South-eastern Asia and the United Nations had known little but retreat. The armies under General Stilwell in Burma had tasted the strength of the invader and had been forced to withdraw. Back in the capitals of the United Nations some persons were ruefully painting the Japanese army’s strength in such terms as ‘colossal” and “unconquerable.” Others were wishfully seeking to minimise the effect of the United Nations’ retreats. But in the sun-baked capital of wartime China, where General Stilwell to-

reflects a viewpoint increasingly apparent here in which exception is taken to foreign press comparisons of Stalingrad and Verdun.

The writer points out firstly that Verdun had a system of modern forts, whereas the Stalingrad sector has not any defensive advantages. although German propaganda is trying to make it appear a powerful fortified zone. Secondly, against Verdun the Germans never used over fifteen divisions at one time, while thirty have been used against Stalingrad. Further the Germans are suffering incomparably heavier losses at Stalingrad. For example, the total German losses at Verdun amounted to 300,000, but the ratio of losses at Stalingrad is several times greater. The Germans are losing 3000 officers and soldiers daily in one sector alone in north-west Stalingrad. Thirdly, at Verdun, planes and tanks were nil, while in the present battle thous ands of each are employed daily. All told. Verdun is far behind, insofar as intensity of fighting is concerned. Moreover, the writer points out that the strategic value of Verdun was relatively unimportant, while the fate of the entire world depends on the result of the battle for Stalingrad.—P.A.

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Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/NEM19421006.2.94

Bibliographic details

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume 77, 6 October 1942, Page 5

Word Count
714

EPIC MARCH Nelson Evening Mail, Volume 77, 6 October 1942, Page 5

EPIC MARCH Nelson Evening Mail, Volume 77, 6 October 1942, Page 5