SERVICE ENQUIRY

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume 77, 18 February 1942, Page 5

SERVICE ENQUIRY

RECENT CHANNEL ACTION STATEMENT BY MR CHURCHILL RESULT PROBABLY SECRET (Rec. 11.20 a.m.) Rugby, Feb. 17. A statement that a service enquiry was to be held into points arising from the escape of the German warships through the Channel, but that the results would probably not be made public, was made in the House of Commons by the Prime Minister, Mr Churchill. Mr Churchill said that in March last the two German battle-cruisers, the Scharnhorst and the Gneisenau. took refuge in Brest harbour where they were joined in May by the Prinz Eugen after the destruction of the Bismarck. The position of these three ships became a serious preoccupation for the Admiralty. They lay on the flank of our main convoy routes to the East. They could make a sortie at any time on Atlantic trade routes or into, the Mediterranean. Accordingly the Admiralty pressed for continued attack from the air in the hope of disabling them or preventing them from being repaired. This process was continued for more than ten months during which time the ships were undoubtedly hit several times and repair work was made very difficult. No less than 4AOO tons of bombs were dropped by bombing sorties on Brest by 3299 aircraft for the loss of 247 air force personnel and 43 aircraft. “As we were never in a position to know when some or all of these ships might put to sea the situation entailed almost continuous naval precautions in the hope of being ready at all times to meet the various threats these ships constituted. A further serious feature was the very grievous subtraction from the bombing effort against Germany. The bombing of these ships was so severe that the Germans evidently came to the decision that they could not maintain them any longer at Brest and that they must return to Germany. We jdo not know whether this was for the purpose of effecting final repairs or enabling them to work up full effii ciency in the shelter of the waters of i the Baltic. However that may be the i Germans resolved to try to bring these i ships back to Germany. This very hazardous operation could be done by sailing round the British Isles and returning via Norway or by a dash up the Channel. The Germans rejected the 1 plan of returning northabout and pre- j ferred to run the admittedly serious | risks of the Channel passage. ENEMY’S ALTERNATIVES “In the Atlantic they would run a j j greater risk of being attacked by air i reconnaissances from the shore and j from aircraft carriers, being slowed down by torpedo attacks or brought to ’ action against overwhelming forces as I was the Bismarck. The Channel route | on the other hand was a run of under 24 hours part of which could be made * in darkness, possibly by surprise, and I they had the opportunity of choosing j the weather which would be most favourable. The whole way through the Channel and along the Dutch coast they had the advantage of a powerful air umbrella. The danger of running past the Dover batteries under suitable weather conditions was not great. Our slow convoys repeatedly traverse the Straits of Dover and are repeatedly bombarded by guns on the French coast but this has not stopped our convoys. "One great danger was mines. This j they might hope to avoid by energetic sweeping. There remained therefore the action of surface craft and aircraft. Air reconnaissance would show the i Germans that neither heavy cruisers | nor even light cruisers were in the i narrow straits and therefore attacks of flotillas of destroyers and small torpedo boats was all that need be expected apart from the air. ABSENCE OF HEAVY SHIPS "Some people seemed to think heavy forces should have been stationed so as to have been able to intercept them in the Channel or the North Sea. Had we done so our ships would have been open to the same scale attack as the German ships at Brest. Further such dispositions would have dangerously weakened the preventive measures we have taken to safeguard convoys and guard the northern passage and deal with other i German heavy ships. Th? Admiralty) did not consider the attempt to run the Channel would be an impossible operation under the conditions which prevailed but this was certainly much less apprehended than that they break out on to trade routes or into the Mediterranean. “No one can doubt the vigour and courage with which the enemy squadron was attacked as soon as its movement was perceived and of course everyone was very sorry that these ships were not sunk. The only questions which are open are firstly, why was their movement not detected shortly after daylight? Secondly, was contact and liaison between th Coastal Command and also between other R.A.F. Commands and the Admiralty as close as it should have been. “At the suggestion of the Admiralty and the Air Ministry I directed that an enquiry shall be held into these points. The enquiry will be secret and I doubt very much whether when completed its j result will be suitable for publication, j I am not prepared to give any information about the inquiry or any undertaking that its result will be made public. If anyone is found guilty of dereliction of duty disciplinary action will follow.” —8.0. W.