Japan’s Dilemma RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume 76, 29 October 1941, Page 3

Japan’s Dilemma RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES

; The Japan.-c I’le-. lijmlly appears jusi i fin'd in characterizing as bin IT Hie I,Hem. lit by Hie Enilod Stale.- Srrnlan of the Navy, ('..huicl Knox, 11 1 a I America is .-alilicl that lie Japanese di I intend giving up I heir expansion plans, and dial if tln-y puisne them a : collision is ’inevitable. Colonel Knox j seems to have made a plain statement of the fact. that, relations between Hie : United Slates and Japan, which, with a few deceptive interludes of apparent concord, have been steadily deteriorating for more than in years, are m>w rapidly reaching a point where <l<s i-i\e action* will have to he la ken one way or a not her. The political correspondent of the “Daily Express” says that Hu* Japane-e genuinely want :r settlement with the ' United Stab's. Iml that President Roosevelt* insistence on the termination "L’ tin* China war i- exported to prove j an insuperable obstacle. That is the : crux of I lie matter. Japan’s Hat us in : China, whatever complications may j have been added by the European war. • | is at ■bottom the issue that divides Japan and the United States—and has ; been since, 10 years ago, Japan invaded Manchuria. Officially it was the League of Nations that calleTl Japan to account and ■ sought to impose restraint, writes Natlurniel i’effer in the "New ) ork Times.” Actually, it was the f nited States Unit look the initiative and I , forced Hie pace. In so far as there was ■ any hesitation on Japan’s part it was ; induced by unceriainty as to what the United States would do. Stimson Doctrine The efforts of l»«»ili the League "f Nations and the United States did not serve to deter Japan, and Manehukuo ! was brought into being by the Japanese Army, a puppet state. But American opposition did have certain permanent effects. The Stimson Doctrine —the declaration of refusal to recognize Man* cliukiio or any other change in the 1 Ear East brought about, by force—- : was to change the form and content 1 of Ear Eastern politics. For one thing, the Slims.m 1 >oe- ‘ trine and all the political implications 1 it carried with it- save Chinese irrei comilable-s solid ground <>n width t<> i stand. So long as America held out ij there was hope that China’s wrong could one day he redressed. Furthermore, the unequivocal Amsimilar sentiment in Europe and thus , drove tin* League of Nations and Hie major l’owers to ail uncompromising i position or at least the semblance therej „f. At any ran- llm Lcaalle Mr. Stimson’s lead, and passed a re- • solution binding members to withhold 1 recognition of Manehukuo. And till the formation of the Axis no great Bower : did recognize Manehukuo. ; Finally, the American stand drew the line's of political antagonism in i the Far East. In Japanese eyes America was the head and front of chi': struction to Japanese ambitions for ! empire, as in actual political fact ir, [ was. In the first instance, the Ear , Eastern struggle was a Chinese-Japan-cse issue, and in Hie second instance a Japanese-American issue. The first | may have been more direct, hut the second was more serious. | Invasion Of China ! For the next few years neither side L receded, but there was no occasion to : bring the conflict to a bead. Then came i 1937 and the invasion of China pro- . per by the Japanese Army. If the Japanese had any trepidation at all in . embarking on the war, it arose not . from fear of China, which, us they , ; now know, they underestimated, but 1 i from fear of America. With the bnck- . ground of the Stimson policy they had j reason for concern. Then, to their j boundless relief and still greater surprise, America did nothing. 1 ; The Japanese were grateful. They L thought America ‘•understood their '! true intentions,” as they put it. For 1 a period America’s stock was high lti ' Japan. There was less anti-American- -] ism than there had l>een for years. In 1 China itself the Japanese Army went out of irs way to avoid inconveniences < for Americans —especially after the 1 sinking of the Banay had terrified the - Japanese more than it angered the ‘ Americans. Then came 1939 and JapaneseAmerican relations returned to their • traditional form. America gave notice i of the termination of the commercial treaty, and beginning with the outbreak of the European war more direct measures were taken to ' penalize Japan. .Simultaneously more help was being given to China. Autij Americanism flared up again in j Japan. Relations Severed i, j Since then there has been steady ad- ' vance in the direction of war. With 1 1 every step taken by Japan the screws , have been given another turn, till [ with the Japanese occupation of all 2 i French Indo-China the United States ’ virtually severed all economic relations with Japan. Japan now stands poised, ready to spring either toward Malaya or to- ' wnrtl Siberia, but with the ground being cut from under her feet by American economic measures. She must i do one of two things—challenge America and risk war or attempt to reach j 1 an understanding. It is a dread choice for Japan, a j position on the horns of a dilemma Now that Singapore has been strongly fortified by the British the Japanese can have no illusions that mi expedition to Malaya will he a procession, as ; in French Imlo-Uhina. An expedition to Hie Netherlands Indies might he fatal, so long as Singapore was left in ' British occupation. As to an expedilion to Siberia, Germany has learned that the Russian Bear’s claws can : tear. Japan was left in no doubts oil i that score after the lighting iu the J Klialka River region in 1 from which Japan withdrew mauled and wiser. And always there is the • American licet. fruits Of Conquest ’ To come to an understanding with America would he more palatable to the Japanese if it could be had with- ; out giving up the fruits of all their easy conquests over weak areas. To renounce the opportunity to capitalize 1 on the defeat of the Netherlands and -! the preoccupation of both Great Britain and Russia would be painful I enough, for tlie opportunity may never recur. But China is Hie real stumblingblock. Japan cannot renounce China without renouncing the whole conception of her destiny, which in turn would email the social revolution of an overthrow of the military caste. On the other hand, an understand iiig which recognized Japanese hegemony or overlordship in China would, on America’s part, he an abandonment of mi historic position—ihe integrity of china and the open door to China for Am- rican trade.