Britain’s Black list

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume 76, 4 August 1941, Page 3

Britain’s Black list

i .s.a. co-operation Ai: rfl'ectivc weapon in Civ.u Bn in in's economic warfare again*.; ilx A\ i < Power.*, i- the Si:iinlor.\ Ih.oU l-ist. 1 1 s edge lias been sliar; ued bv tile eo operation of the I liiteil Slates rile Minister of Eeommiie Warfare. Dr Dalton, stated in the House of Com mens the Ollier da> that I’n-sideiu Roosevelt had authorized the ]• ’epara lion of n Black I.id (o include persons and firms believed to lie engaged in ae tivilics helpful to DYrmaiiy ..r Daly, and of t hose j,. w Inmi tln e\p -rtatioii of anv article or materials from Dm railed Stales was deemed to be detrimental to the interest of Ameriean nn tioual defence. Any person whose name npi*eared on tin* list would be treated as if lie were a national of Uortnaii.v or Italy, and would be debarred from obtaining, except under special licence. United Stall’s undue!s subject to export control. Invisible Weapons The Minister of Economic Warfare said ;he United Suites <iovernmeut already had issued a black list of names of is:n persons in South America. The ‘nuijority of these also appeared in the British Statutory Black List and be was consulting' the United States Government in respect of co-ordination of the two lists. Welcoming the list as “this striking act of American cooperation,” Dr. Dalton said it would be of the greatest value to Britain's economic warfare. mie pressure that, brought about tlie collapse of Germany in November, 1918. Yet it. was not till January, 11)19, when the war had been in progress for nearly 17 months that the machinery of economic pressure was strengthened and co-ordinated by the creation of a Ministry of Blockade. The inconvenience and loss rising from the detention of neutral ships and their cargoes under the Order in Domicil of March 11, 1915, outweighed the profits to be derived from the contraband trade and it; gradually became a regular principle for all proposed shilaments from the United States to be •submitted in advance to the British in Washington which, obtained by cable the opinion of tin Contraband Committee as to whether the shipment was likely to lead to difficulties. The Contraband Committee was guided by the War Trade Intelligence Department and the application of the rationing system to all exports from the United States to Scandinavia became comparatively easy. The Navicert System, as it was called, from the cable code word employed. became in fact one of the chief instruments in the prevention of enemy trade, an'd during 1919-18 it "in extended to United States exports to Holland, and in a modified form to many shipments from South America and Spain. The Ministry of Economic Warfare came into being at the very outset of the present war. and put into operation many of the well-tried measures of 1914-18, including the Navicert System and the Black List. The JSlack List 'The position of London a> the greatest financial and insurance centre in the world provided a powerful weapon, the use of which was greatly developed earlv in 1916. A Statutory Black List of person* and firms in nenrra! countries with whom all commercial transactions was forbidden was issued in February, 1916. This list included both firms of enemy nationality domiciled in neutral countries, and neutral firms known to be engaging in enemy trade. On May 10, 1910. a regulation was issued under the Defence of the lieu tin Acts prohibiting all banking and financial transactions with persons and firms on the statutory Black List, and a little later insurance was added to the list of prohibited transactions. Tlie effect of these measures was to prevent black-listed persons and firm* from exporting to or importing from the United Kingdom, from shipping goods in British ships, and from receiving credit or settling balances through British banks. Further, they were gravely hampered in obtaining goods, markets, tonnage, or credit, facilities in neutral countries, since neutral shipowners feared that the carriage of goods for black-listed firms would result in the denial of bunker and other facilities to their -hips, and neutral merchant* and banks were anxious to avoid any transactions which might lead to their being themselves placed on the Statutory Black List. General Success Against this policy the United States strongly protested in 1910. on the ground that it constituted nn unwarrantable interference with neutral rights: but the British Government strongly maintained their attitude, pointing out that the Trading with the Enemy (Extension of Powers) Act. on which the Black List was based, was n piece of purely municipal legislation, and that there was an inherent right in sovereignty and national independence for a State to prohibit transactions by any of its citizens which were contrary to the public interest and safety. The Statutory Black List was maintained and from time to time bankers and traders were informed confidentially as to the status of firms not on the published list, with whom it was undesirable to do business. Of the general success of the Black List as a powerful instrument of the blockade there was no doubt. The business of black-listed firms in South America and elsewhere showed an extraordinary decline. Also, not only wen* Die Central Powers gravely hampered in obtaining the very restricted supplies now available to them, but a severe blow was struck at many of the enemy agents abroad who were notorious for their efforts to foment trouble between the British and neutral governments and to destroy by arson or otherwise factories and ships employed in the interests of the Allies. Japanese Ships Listed There is no reason to doubt that flic Statutory Black List has been an even more powerful weapon in this war. An illustration of its application was given as recently as Mav *23, when the British Consulate in ‘ San Francisco announced that “by reason <>f the contravention of British regulations, the British Government will impose till disabilities in their power” on the trading operations of 11 large Japanese tankers and 81 smaller craft in the Pacific. Two of the larger ships listed wen whaling factory ships, one of 19.310 tons and the other of 17.549 tons, which recently carried cargoes of oil from San Francisco to Japan. In San Francisco shipping circles it was believed that the British action was evoked by the reported employment of Japanese tankers and whaling ships to refuel German raiders in midocean. Tr was observed also tint tinkers and whalers were equipped with powerful wireless installations which could lie used to report to enemy raiders the movements of British nien-of-war and merchant ships.— (S.D.W.)