Nelson Evening Mail. THURSDAY, DECEMBER 5, 1940 AFTER FIFTEEN MONTHS

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume LXXIII, 5 December 1940, Page 4

Nelson Evening Mail. THURSDAY, DECEMBER 5, 1940 AFTER FIFTEEN MONTHS

IN any estimate of the fortunes of the war at the end of its fifteenth month several factors are indeterminate. The Balkan situation is one of them because the intentions of Hitler there remain obscure- The gallant Greeks have accomplished more than even they themselves could have expected, and Italy’s name as a fighting nation can never have been so low as now. But the Greek successes do not clinch the issue in this theatre of war. Much may happen there even before the spring. In the Mediterranean, Mussolini has been robbed of control of “our sea,” and decisive shrinkages have been made in his naval strength. On the African front there is stalemate. The Italians do not appear to be able to make any headway at all. Britain has marked ascendancy in the air and the position there seems to be very satisfactory. In French Africa there are to be discerned decided leanings towards De Gaulle and Free France. Among the non-combatants in the Mediterranean there is chaos in Rumania, determination to defend her neutrality in Yugo-Slavia, and close co-operation with the Allies in Egypt and Turkey. Bulgaria is eager to keep out of war, but may doubt her ability to withstand Nazi pressure. The two decisive developments arising out of the fluid situation in the Near and Middle East are the decisive hammer blows of the Greeks

in Albania, opening up a possible ‘ back door for attack on Germany and the serious blows at Italian sea | power. Both of these may weigh j heavily on the ultimate outcome of | the struggle. j On the debit side, so far as the ’ Allies are concerned, two threats stand out: The menace of the night bomber and of the submarine. In a recent popular straw vote in England these two dangers were, by a big majority, considered the most serious 1 facing us at present- The night bomber menace is double-edged. If the i Germans are wreaking great and conj tinual havoc over England, so are the ! British over Germany and the occupied territories. If no counter is soon forthcoming it may be a case of who can hold out longest and the people of Britain seem to have answered that question in advance. But in the under-water and air attack on our merchant shipping the odds are at present with the enemy. We retaliate whenever there is the slightest opportunity, but no Axis ships now sail the seas except those that hug their own fortified coasts, or the shores of the countries they dominate. Even these get unpleasant reminders occasionally of who controls the sea. But Germany is a land power and does not need shipping to sustain her, in the short run. Britain is a sea power and her life blood comes through the arteries of her sea lanes. With the submarine co-operates the spotting plane and their combined threat has not so far been satisfactorily answered. But on the credit side there are several factors in the war at the present stage which are very heartening. One is something that we are inclined to forget: Britain rules the waves. This has been so from the beginning, despite the submarineaeroplane threat. Sea power, plus air power, has so far stopped the invasion of Britain. Naval -supremacy alone makes it possible to use the substantial American help, which is ever-growing, and which is another of those decisive factors which is bound to influence the final reckoning. It makes it possible also for this to be an Empire war- Without control of the sea, how could Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, the Colonies, or even Canada assist, except to a limited extent by air, in the last-named case? Sea power, too, makes possible the blockade; that silent weapon which is slowly but surely squeezing the enemy in its vice-like grip, and which again will be one of the main instruments in making him cry for mercy. Then intangible factors are working to our advantage. There is an appreciable hardening of feeling against tttfc Axis powers in all the occupied countries, and encouraging signs of overt hostility in some. Vichy —perhaps soon to be Versailles—remains a mystery, but the scales are falling from the eyes of the people of France. Sabotage is on the increase there. In Albania Mussolini’s picture has been torn from the walls and trampled in the dust. In Belgium and France the Germans are accusing the British of paying for Communist propaganda, which apparently has a lively circulation there. In Holland, Denmark, and Norway there are definite signs of hostility. A Dutchman was recently sent to gaol for inciting his countrymen not to go to work in Germany, where he had been. In Holland, too, it was reported that many Germans have fallen into the canals and now they are beginning to do the same in Norway! But much more than that has been happening in Norway. After an attempt on the life of Major Quisling, who has given a new word to the language, tension seems to be running so high that civil war is possible. Such instances of destruction from within may be expected to become more common as pressure against the Axis increases from without. One of the favourable omens after fifteen months of war is the attitude of Russia. If she is not proAlly at any rate the fear of her throwing in her lot with the Dictators lessens as time goes on. And the attitude of Russia is of crucial importance in any survey of the war situation. On balance, and allowing for heavy debit factors, it can be said that the outlook at present is definitely better than at any time since the fall of France. This is a satisfactory position in the second winter of what i Britain picked to be a long war. Apart from the immediate major threats mentioned, one other consideration overshadows the whole issue: the giant Nazi war machine, built up and sustained with such loving care, still remains practically intact. That is the main reason why we must temper rosy estimates of the future with caution, though not necessarily with pessimism.