FATE OF FRANCE

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume LXXIII, 30 November 1940, Page 12

FATE OF FRANCE

PEOPLE INDIFFERENT 1 c INFLUENCES BEHIND VICHY \ A problem lor all who think about ' it is how to explain the amazing mental attitude which seems to prevail to- j day in France. Most Frenchmen seem , to regard the total collapse of their ] country with a resignation that has the j appearance of indifference, writes a special correspondent of “The Times” , lately in France. £ They are, indeed, dazed by the ( rapidity of the collapse, but register no , violent reaction to so great and unex- j pected a shock. Soldiers in consider- . able numbers are being demobilised , and returning home,' and so, it is felt, j the catastrophe cannot be too appalling. . The German propaganda machine is . working on this state of mind. The , R.A.F. attacks upon the aerodromes in the occupied region are used as evidence that the British, who have already deserted their Ally, are now making direct onslaughts on the Frenchman’s ' home. There is little interest among the ordinary people in the manoeuvres of the Petain Government. The Marshal ' himself is not looked upon with any . enthusiasm. His achievements as a soldier in the last war are generally re- | cognised, but his last-minute entry into | politics makes little stir in the French- | man’s heart. REAL RULER OF FRANCE On the other hand, Laval, who has never been popular, excites almost general distate. It would appear that Doriot is the only public figure who inspires any confidence at the moment, and that is because he is thought to be a man of the people. Few realise that it is Abetz, a man who was asked to leave France only a year ago for his anti-French activities, who now rules France. His orders are given *at the frequent dinners which he enjoys with Laval in Paris, dinners which are matters of public comment, and the objects of which little effort is made to conceal. • Vichy for a nation which has reached the nadir in its history, gives an excellent picture of a certain French state of mind. Naturally, the place is crowded beyond capacity. It is full of well-to-do refugees from occupied France, as well as French officers, immaculately accoutred, and political aspirants. They crowd the cafes, hotels, and boulevards. There is adequate food for those who can afford to buy it, always provided that you are not a butter lover or do not expect to find a wide selection of luxuries in the shops. Here is little evidence that France has suffered one of the greatest defeats in her history. Outside the boundaries of this temporary capital food is not so plentiful, yet, in a minor degree, the same spirit of indifference exists. The men are returning fairly quickly to their homes and to the harvests, which have been in many cases ruined by inattention. But it is hard to discover any serious attempt to meet the formidable problems which are threatening the Vichy Government. The opinion is often expressed that occupied France is in a much better shape, in spite of all the devastation, than the unoccupied territory. The Germans for many reasons are trying to whip into shape that, part of the country which has fallen into their sphere of influence. THE NORTH A DESERT Their problem is especially serious. North of Paris there exists a desert. Towns like Abbeville, Amiens, Cambrai, Arras, and scores of others, are very largely destroyed, though in most places the churches and the cathedrals seem to be intact. The villages are deserted, the farmsteads empty. Crops are rotting on the ground. The first wave of the German Army consumed everything. It was, in fact, a land of the dead, metaphorically and literally, since the corpses of men and animals still littered the ground. Now the people are slowly creeping back, only to find that there is little to eat and less to do. Everywhere, the first pick of what is g ing falls to the army of occupation, the second to those who work for their German masters, the scanty crumbs that remain are left for those who fulfil neither of these conditions. Nevertheless some attempt is made to regulate on a fixed scale the inadequate amount of consumable goods which are available. There is no lack of cash—marks printed by the presses follow the troops. These naturally are in the hands of the German soldiers and the folk who work for them, but they result in ready sales for anything on offer. The backing for this spurious currency is said to be not the counterfeit capitalist backing of gold, but the more solidly founded reserve of work done. As a temporary measure it may be all very fine, but marks printed even with such a basis, cannot produce the food and necessities of life which simply are not there. The gloomy fact is that in time, unless something radical is done, there will be nothing to buy at all. The Germans are aware of this. Already their propaganda is putting the blame in advance upon the British blockade. They have immense faith in propaganda, not so much as a panacea to solve all the riddles of the situation, but as an excuse when the inevitable failure comes. The German army is a propaganda machine as well as a fighting force. The storm troops, those who have borne the brunt of the heavy fighting and made victory so swiftly possible, are propagandists to a man. They have a fanatical belief in Hitler and an fanatical hatred of England. They sweep through to their victories, grim-faced young men, without any feelings except those con-

ditioned into them; old warriors with the minds of infants. After them comes a different type of soldier, older, less fanatic: Austrians, Bavarians, and East Prussians. Each • company of these has its pep talker, who interminably dins into their ears ( that England is Jew-ridden, a cesspool t of international capitalists and Com- I munists, a Moloch who wants the 1 world so that she can devour it all for ’ herself. They may not believe all they i are told, but they, too, have a faith in Hitler. Their hostility to England is not very deep rooted. The unexpected delay in the much ! advertised attack upon England has also been having its effect upon the German Air Force. A neutral observer who was privileged to have a squadron , parked in the woods near his home, and who constantly came into contact with both officers and men, disclosed a . little about this vital branch of Hitler’s army. He found that on the whole the officers were fine physical types, courageous and decent. AIR ATTACKS ON ENGLAND In recent weeks he had noticed a considerable increase in the number of very young pilots joining the squad-1 ron. There was, however, no suggestion that these new arrivals had any connection with heavy pilot losses. For the system in the German Air Force tends to conceal from the serving officer and man all accurate knowledge of casualties. The squadrons do not operate as units; a few planes from squadrons all over the country make up the German battle flights. Further to fortify this policy of concealment of losses, pilots and crews are almost continually transferred from one unit to another. While individual pilots would express admiration for British R.A.F. fighting qualities, the squadron as a whole believed implicity in the German machines and men. Such faith in their own invincibility has brought about a noticeable impatience with the prolonged delay in the promised attack upon England. This belief in their own superior qualities comes largely of intensive propaganda, since visible proof is too often lacking. The British bombing raids on Belgian and French air bases are carried out with the greatest success. An informant who had occasion to be on the Channel coast, near Calais, could observe the effect of the British bombing on the gun emplacements which have been and are being constructed at regular intervals from Dunkirk southwards. The closing of this coastal zone to a depth of from 20 to 30 miles inland is in part due to these raids, as well as to screen from prying eyes the concentrations which the Germans are making there. The people of this district are still mostly] pro-British and consequently potential spies; peasants of Picardy and Artois have bravely helped British soldiers and others to escape, running grave risks themselves. To break down this feeling the Germans plan all they can I to discredit the British. , BRITISH PRISONERS One case of refined cruelty was wit- | nessed at Malines, where a body of British prisoners were being marched ’ east. They were in full uniform except for their tin hats. These had been replaced by a variegated assort- ; ment of every kind of headgear, male or female: bowler hats, toppers, caps, [ homburgs, women’s bonnets, berets, \ plumed Ascots models. A pathetically I ridiculous spectacle. Its only pur- ’ pose could have been to make the weary men look clownish or to suggest to the French inhabitants that British troops had been looting the shops. ' Other tales of discrimination between • British and French prisoners of war are common. Nevertheless, on the ! whole, the treatment of prisoners II whose care is left to the second-line 3 troops is not too bad. ■ From other parts of occupied France 3 come reports that the Germans are getting down to the question of the • British subjects still in residence. At first they were left alone. Now it is ’ learned that the residents in the ; Bayonne-St. Jean de Luz districts are ’ being gathered and put under some ' sort of surveillance. t The first intention was to put them • into a concentration camp, but finally 5 the German authorities requisitioned a ’ hotel and are now keeping them there ’ under fairly reasonable conditions. As 3 yet southern France has not suffered ' from any great shortage of commodities. It is even suggested that the 5 fate of British residents in German- ’ occupied France is more pleasant than 3 under the Vichy Government. : French people may be indifferent, 5 but the official is often hostile. The : virulent attacks which the “Gringoire” 3 of Marseilles maintains daily against *■ England are certainly not entirely » spontaneous. A similar trend is ob--3 served in most of the Press in un- ‘ occupied France. It may not have any ; great effect upon the feeling among : the ordinary people, but it does offer 7 a:, excuse for official hostility to the 1 British.