Italy Across The Sea ARMIES IN JEOPARDY

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume LXXIII, 18 November 1940, Page 8

Italy Across The Sea ARMIES IN JEOPARDY

Apart from the minor fighting in t-lie Kascvala-Gallabat region on the Sudan- . Abyssinia frontier, military oi>erations in Africa appear to lie at a standstill. There is /still no indication of any offensive by Marshal Grnziani, who has been marking time at Si(li Barrani for about eight weeks. It is quite possible that he will have to “hold his horses” for a long time. The Italian offensive against Greece has gone awry and. on present appearances, it looks as though the enemy may soon be very much on the defensive in Albania. For the present, the centre of gravity in the Middle Bast has swung across to the north side of the Mediterranean. In any case. Italy is now committed to two considerable military operations overseas. Kvcn before the Albanian adventure. Italy was faced with the prospect of attempting a major offensive from Libya while not holding command of the sea across which suitplies and reinforcements had to pass. Now, she is confronted with the equal-ly-grav© problem of waging a campaign against Greece, while her only line of communication —that across the Adriatic—ls open tv continual attack by British naval and air forces. 'The <lestruction at Taranto of one-half of Italy's battle fleet assumes grave proportions in view of her military commitments across the sea.

The War In Africa Discussing the position in Northern Africa, a writer in the "Manchester Guardian” says most of the environmental advantages are on the side of the defending forces. Egypt and Ethiopia, strongholds of British ami Italian power respectively, are each enclosed and largely isolated from the continental interior by great stretches of desert' or poor scrubland where an invading army will tiud it impossible to live on the country. So far each of these strongholds has proved to be easily defensible, if we except sporadic air-raidiug on both sides. In this war. as in those of the past which have involved the Mediterranean Basin, the Lower Nile Valley offers the richest territorial prize. A victorious I’ower would uor. merely gain control of the only land in Northeast Africa capable—because of adequate water supplies—of intense cultivation throughout the entire year, but would also dominate the canal-aucl-sca route to the Indian Ocean, thereby strangling the British seaway to the Far East. Italy’s Weak Points Fortunately the enemy’s position is weakened by the wide separation from each other of the two groups of Italian colonies, and the Anglo-Egyp-tian Sudan interposes a wedge uearly 900 miles wide between the Libyan and Ethiopian frontiers. Moreover, the recent extension of Italian rule over Ethiopia has not much affected the strategical situation because /Of the enemy’s complete dependence on the home country for reinforcements of men and all war material.

No part of Italian Africa produces, even in time of peace, sufficient food and other commodities for the resident European population; virtually everything must be brought across the Mediterranean, and particularly is this true of petrol, coal, and manufactured goods of all types. The Italian Empire was till 1936 au empire of desert only, and the annexation of Ethiopia has been too recent, to permit of any important agricultural or industrial development.

Italy lias found that her air fleet cannot solve her geographical problem. Transport planes are of little use for the carriage of heavy military equipment in view of the enormous distances involved. From the main Italian bases on the coast of Libya to Adis Ababa, capital of Italian East Africa, nearly JOOO miles have to I>e traversed. Add to this the difficulty of transporting supplies from Italy to Libya, in the teeth of a relentless naval blackado by Britain, and the reinforcement of armies in Italian E.ast Africa is seen to be a virtual impossibility. Ethiopia is besieged, and its Italian garrisou will be starved out unless Mussolini is able to conquer Egypt.

Meanwhile the attack on the Nile Valley hangs fire, and the delay is attributable to the difficulties which geography imposes. In face of the British Navy’s supremacy in the Mediterranean—which is now assured—the Italian army in Libya, certainly not less than a quarter of a million strong, cannot lie regularly supplied from Italy. Its very size is a burden. Being Intended mainly for offensive action, it is too large for garrison purposes only, yet as soon as it moves eastward toward Egypt its problems of supply are multiplied. The Libyan Desert

Much the greater part of Libya is irreclaimable desert, and its vast size on the map must not deceive us as to its small economic value. Italian military power there is concentrated within the narrow Mediterranean fringe where a small winter rainfall is received.

The narrow but comparatively fertile northern margin of Libya provides the obvious route, with the most abundant supplies of water, for au army moving on Egypt, but its maritime position lias given the British fleet full opportunity of hammering its lines of communication. Consequently the enemy’s strategy does not rule out one or two ullernative routes farther south, iu the desert proper and outside the range of naval guns.

All routes to the Nile are dependent upon the oases which occur but rarely throughout the sandy aud waterless Libyan Desert. Between tbe oases stretch vast areas of sand-dune, a terrain which provides the hardest possible going for au army, aud, because tbe going would be slow, water would have to be carried. In the cases of the two main mutes the distances between tbe oases are excessive for a large, heavily equipped army. The northern and most feasible way would be from Jagh-bub to Siwa. just inside Hie desert frontier of Egypt, aud then on by various possible tracks to reach the Nile downstream from As.siut. The distance from the Libyan frontier to tbe Nile by this route is approximately 500 miles. Campaign In Danger

The argument has considered only the physical difficulties confronting ac Italian offensive adventure. We have not taken into account, the strength of 11 lie Anglo-Eyptian defending forces. Vet that strength will grow till by its j very counter-offensive power tbe 'ltalian attempt will be doomed, even ;if tbe euemy’s overseas and trans-de-sert communications were more secure than they actually are. The events of toe last few days have <ho\vn in the most, decisive manner that Italy’s overseas communications ire iu the gravest danger of being cut •owpletely. British sea power in the Mediterranean doubtless will decide ih© fate of Italy's armies in Albania is well as in Africa.