BRITISH DENIAL

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume LXXIII, 29 June 1939, Page 7

BRITISH DENIAL

ENCIRCLEMENT POLICY | STRONG NOTE TO GERMANY : REFERENCE TO RECENT EVENTS iU.P.A.—Hy Electric Telegraph—Copyright) (Received 29th June. 12 10 p.m.) LONDON. 28th June. The British Government in a strong Note to Germany published to-night formally denies pursuing a policy of encirclement. The Note denies that it is inevitable thaX Britain must always be hostile to Germany in the event of the Reich being involved in war. Denials are contained in the memorandum to Germany in reply to Germany’s denunciation of the Anglo-German | Naval Agreement. The text w-as issued bv the Foreign Office, and Sir Nevile Henderson, British Ambassador, delivered the Note to the Berlin Foreign Office this afternoon. The British text recalls Germany's justification for denunciation in the memorandum of 27th April and proceed: “It is not the case that in whatever part of Europe Germany might be involved in warlike conflict Britain must always take up an attitude hostile to Germany. Britain could only he hostile if Germany were to commit an act of aggression against another cc untry, and political decisions to which it is understood the German Government refers involving guarantees to certain countries by Britain could only operate if the countries concerned were to be attacked by Germany. Li the German memorandum claim is made to describe the British policy as a policy of encirclement. This description is without any justification, and indicates misunderstanding and misreading of what British purposes, which must be corrected. The German Government’s recent action to incorporate certain territories in the Reich, whatever may have been held by them Ij be justifying reasons, has undoubtedly resulted in a great increase of ;»i xlety in many quarters. The actions subsequently taken by the United Kingdom Government have no other purpose than to contribute to the removal of this anxiety by assisting si, aller nations to feel secure in the erijOymtnt of their independence to i which they have the same right as Fnair or Germany herself. ( OMMITMENTS LIMITED ‘‘Commitments which Britain recent1/ has undertaken in pursuance of this purpose are limited, and could only become effective if the countries concerned were victims of aggression. Nor has His Majesty's Government the intention or desire to restrict the development of Germany’s trade.” The Government points out that under the Anglo-German payments agreement a considerable supply of free exchange has been made available to Germany for acquisition of raw materials, and suggests that further measures for the improvement of Gf * any’* economic position can ue (Vs cussed if confidence and goodwill can be established. GOOD RELATIONS DESIRED "The consistent desire of His Majesty's Government, far from being the promotion of war with Germany, has been and is the establishment of AngloGerman relations on a basis of mutual recognition of the needs of both coun-t tries, with due regard to other nations H Turning to the Naval Treaty, the Government stresses that it was expressly stated to be of a permanent character and a contribution to the solution of the problem of naval limitation. The text refers to the Notes exchanged between Sir Samuel Hoare, Home Secretary, and Herr von Ribbentrop, German Foreign Minister, to this effect and fixing the ratio of 35/100 as a permanent relationship, and that the only provision contemplating a modification of the ratio was violent disturbance of the equilibrium of naval armament?. The German Government, howi ever, had not maintained that such conJ ditions exist, still less had they invited His Majesty’s Government to examine j the situation before taking their action, j though provision is made for such consultation. QUALITATIVE PROVISIONS Dealing with the qualitative provisions which presumably the German Government desires to remain unaf- | fee ted in principle, the Government i points out that the retention of these does not alone suffice to create a feel- ; ing of mutual security, which was the j purpose of the Naval Agreement, and j with which the provisions for exchange |of information were associated. His I Majesty’s Government, however, is alj ways ready to consider the possibility j of reaching, in the words of the Ger-

j man Note, "a clear and categorical unI Uerstandmg” on a sure bases. | The Government refers to the presj ent uncertainty w ith regard to cruiser j limits, but presumes that Germany Intends to adhere to 8,000-ton vessels and 0 1 inch guns, and asks for confirmation of this assumption. The memorandum proceeds to refer to the Government's past forecasts to Germany of the strength at the end of 1942-43, and says it is clear that no further forecasts are necessary, since they are designed merely to allow Germany j tc make full use of her 1935 quota, but |as Germany is no longer bound to the j limit of 85 per cent. His Majesty's Government can no longer be bound by i their forecasts of strength which must | be considered cancelled. ! Answering the last paragraph of the | German memorandum, expressing reaj d ness to negotiate future problems, the j British Government states that an exchange of views W'ould help to clarify a situation which in some respects is uncertain. For instance, besides the cruise. question it is desired to know whether Germany regards herself bound by all the articles of the agreement of 1937 outside those in part 111. If. however. Germany contemplates another agreement replacing the provision! that are now terminated His Majesty’s Government desires to know when in the German view discussions should occur. and secondly how the German Government proposes to ensure that any action in the *hape of denunciation or modification of a new agreement during its terms of validity should carry He consent of both parties.