SPAIN’S STRATEGIC POSITION

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume LXXII, 17 April 1939, Page 6

SPAIN’S STRATEGIC POSITION

IN a recent issue we commented that Germany and Italy possessed to-day many strategic and other advantages which they did not have less than a year ago. Apart from the gains of seized territory and the contents and products of that territory—including the military equipment and famous arma-ment-production plant of Czechoslovakia—there is now the inclusion of Spain in the antiComintern Pact to which Germany, Italy and Japan are the chief signatories. General Franco, a few days ago, gave a carefullyworded assurance of hoped-for friendly relations with Britain. If cabled news of activities in Spain are correct, and if it is not unreasonable to suspect that Franco is following the example of the German and Italian Dictators, his remarks may be assessed as diplomatic platitudes. The strategic position of Spain, which it was feared would be made available to Germany and Italy in return for their support of Franco in the Spanish Civil War, mattered little, when Spain was weak,

whether friendly or neutral. But if it is given new life and active support from Fascists and Nazis, it adds to the difficulties that would confront Britain and France if the present acute crisis resulted in conflict. Without any desire to be at all pessimistic or alarmist, but having in mind the perfidious methods adopted by the leaders of the Totalitarian States in recent months, revealing careful planning unscrupulously designed to avoid suspicion before a daring coup is effected, we view with disquiet the seemingly polite and orthodox intimation Germany has given Britain and ; France regarding the Spring exercises of a portion of its navy. We are told that those Governments have been informed by the German Government “that the customary Spring exercises of the German fleet would take place this year off the coast of Spain and would last about a month. The units concerned leave the home ports on 18th April. They consist of the three Deutschlands, three cruisers, a flotilla of destroyers, submarines and auxiliary vessels.” This may all be genuine, but recent experience causes grave doubts to rise. No doubt the British and French Admiralties are carefully taking full cognisance of the possible real significance of the Spring exercises, which are officially described in Berlin as “an extraordinary foreign training cruise,” reviving an old tradition of the German Navy. Forty warships are to participate and “some vessels might visit Mediterranean ports.” The cruise begins to-morrow. Britain has received assurances that Italian troops would be withdrawn from Spain. This withdrawal is regarded as a vital element of the Anglo-Italian agreement, as Mr Chamberlain told the House of Commons last Thursday. On that occasion, too, he announced that Signor Mussolini had reiterated his assurance that Italian forces would be withdrawn from Spain after participating in the victory march. When he gave that repeated assurance was the Italian Dictator aware of the fact, of which the world was informed on Saturday, that the victory march has been “indefinitely postponed?” The cables to-dav report continued ominous military activities by Italians and Germans in Spain and the concentration of troops sixty ’piles from her frontier is causing France much concern. How greatly the disposition of Spain affects vital interests of other nations in the event of trouble has been the subject of much published matter and speculation. it is well summed up in the “New Zealand Herald.” Soanish ports, it is pointed out, look out on the Bay of Biscay and the Atlantic, as well as on the Mediterranean. They could threaten the Atlantic trade routes to the Cape and South America from Cape Finisterre to the Gulf of Guinea. The route through the Mediterranean might be compromised at the very outset, if Gibraltar’s opposite at Ceuta in Spanish Morocco were not masked, or if the Rock had to withstand a land attack (for which preparations now appear to be in active progress). Further on, Spain possesses one of the keys to the Eastern Mediterranean in the Balearic Islands. Majorca, largest of these, is still occupied by Italian forces. The importance of neutralising Spain and her overseas possessions cannot therefore be over-estimated by an oceanic Power like Britain. France is even more closelv Concerned bv the threat a hostile Spain could offer to her vital communications with her vast North African Empire, from which she elies on drawing reserves of manpower, raw materials and food. Spain and her island Possessions lie athwart the short Mediterranean route between France and North Africa, and also all along •fie alternative route by the Atlantic. Finally, France has already to guard two land frontiers against aggressive Dictators; she would be sore-nressed if she had to man the Pvrenean frontier against a third Dictator, hand in glove with the other two. No doubt all these factors were taken into account before the ioint warning against further aggression was issued by Britain and France. The prospective bottlingup of Italy’s communications with her North African possessions such as Abyssinia and Libya, is also doubtless fully appreciated bv Italv. Moreover. Ttalv faces other dangers in the Mediterranean if she joins in further aggressive adventure. Naval power, in which Britain and France predominate, should be decisive in (he Mediterranean. As a comparatively minor item, but of vital importance to us. it may be asked again: Is New Zealand ready to play her part in defence if oc- , ’asion should arise?