NAZI CLAIM FOR COLONIES

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume LXXII, 29 November 1938, Page 6

NAZI CLAIM FOR COLONIES

WILL BRITAIN CONSIDER RETURN ? STRATEGIC VALUE OF TERRITORIES USELESS AS SOURCE OK RAW MATERIALS Now that the Czechoslovakian crisis ha.» been “solved’’ the British Government is faced with the problem of what to do about German demands for the restoration of the old colonial empire. The principal colonies of the old German empire were in Africa. These, with area, present population and mandatory power, include the following:— Areas in I’opu- ManSq. Miles. lation. date. Tanganyika 366,632 5,138,080 Britain British Cameroons 34,031 817,616 Britain British Togoland ... 13,041 341,254 Britain South-west Africa 317,725 359,196 S. Africa French Cameroons . 165,980 2,300,000 France F rench Togoland ... 20,072 762,000 France Ruanda Urundi 21,230 3,500,000 Belgium In addition to these, says a correspondent in the “New York Times,” a group of former German islands in the Pacific Ocean south of the Equator, including Samoa, New Guinea and Nauru, was distributed among Australia, New Zealand and Great Britain to administer and a group north of the Equator was assigned Lo Japan. One tangible contribution which Britain has made to a solution of the co lonial question was the offer made by Sir Samuel Hoare at Geneva in September, 1935, to aid in a general scheme for the “free distribution of raw materials.” So far as is known, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain adheres to the now time-worn statement of British policy that the return of the colonies stripped from Germany by the Versailles Treaty can be considered only in connection with a “general settlement” of European problems. SURRENDER DIFFICULT Even though it were part of such a general settlement, the surrender of Britain’s share of the spoils of the World War would not be easy. For one thing, though the British flag flies over about half the million square miles of territory taken from Germany, the Parliament at Westminster has no control over the former German South-West Africa, the second largest and probably the most valuable prize obtained by the second Reich ii the scramble for Africa. Not only was the League mandate over South-West Africa given to the Union of South Africa but Australia took over New Guinea and New Zealand acquired Western Samoa. Emphatic assertion of German claims to these Pacific islands probably will await the building of a more powerful fleet, but the problem of South-West Africa already bulks large because of continued Gorman immigration since the war.

Though there is reason to believe that because of racial affinities with the Dutch settlers of the Cape, Germany might be prepared to accept other territory in compensation, the South African Government has taken energetic steps tn control Nazi propaganda in SouthWest Africa.

In any case, there is no question about Britain being perfectly free to hand back the former German East Africa, renamed Tanganyika, as well as the BriV is!, share of Germany’s former holding* of the Cameroons and Togo. It certainly would not be beyond the resources of British diplomacy to obtain League approval of the surrender of the mandates. But does Britain want to surrender them? USELESS TO BRITAIN At first glance there would seem every reason to do so. Quite apart from the lasting benefits that one might hope would result if Germany became a “satisfied ’ Power, the old German colonies are virtually useless to Britain. Bismarck’s original view that they would not justify the expense, still less the resulting international complications, have been borne out. Not only are they a burden upon the Biitish taxpayer but they are practically useless as asource of raw material. Look down the list of the six “basic materials of modern industrialism” once promulgated by Dr. Goebbels—coal, iron, oil, cotton, rubber, copper—then consult the meagre production tables of Germany’s former holdings in Africa. South-West Africa, which once produced six-tenths of 1 per cent, of the world’s copper, now produces no copper and none of the other five. It supplies one-tenth of 1 per cent, of the world’s lead, three-tenths of 1 per cent, of the silver, one-half of 1 per cent, of the peanuts. l'roin Tanganyika comes just ouetenth of 1 per cent, of the world’s gold production and only trifling amounts of the copra which might relieve the German shortage of fats and the cotton which now is imported from the United States. The Cameroons and Togoland are even less important. VANADIUM AND SISAL The only raw materials produced in considerable amounts, in fact, are vanadium from South-West Africa and sisal from Tanganyika—neither essential. Despite League restrictions upon the mandatory Powers, Britain does control most of the trade of her mandated territories. But ii relation with the resources of the British Empire, which ranks second only to the United States in self-sufficiency, Tanganyika, the Cameroons and Togoland together could be wiped out without causing more than a passing disturbance. Nor are they any more useful as outlet; for surplus population—if anything beyond the thousands of square miles of vacant land in the British Dominions were needed. The climate of Togoland and the Cameroons is unsuitable for white settlement. It is slightly better in Tanganyika and South-West Africa, but “planters” are still forced to use native labour for practically all manual work. Yet Imperial, or at least Imperialstrategic, motives supply compelling reasons for the tendency “to have and to hold” these expanses. The Cape route to India is more Important now than ever as a result of German and Italian influence on the advancing Spanish insurgents. Already, despite the diflereces over the protectorates, the British Government is moving to improve relations with South Africa, and South-West Africa is important, too. RHODES’S DREAM There is little to be said in favour of

Togoland and the Cameroons, but a glance at the all-red strip on the map of Africa, stretching from the Sudan to the Cape, shows the strategic value of Tanganyika. If ever Cecil Rhodes’s dream ol an all-British railroad the length of Africa is to be carried out, Tanganyika must he held. All these territories have an even more important negative strategic value. For if they would he, economically, more value to Germany than they are to Britain, they likewise would he still more valuable to the Third Reich for naval and air bases. And since history’s unfailing lesson is that a colonial Power has to build a strong navy in order to protect and enlarge its outlying possessions, many Britons think that holding on to German colonies will defer construction of another great German fleet.

There are certain indications, too, that even the most violent partisans of an “understanding”—at a price—with Herr Hitler would draw back at the crucial moment of surrendering a British possession. The negotiations Britain was carrying on with Germany, almost up to the outbreak of the World War, over the “lights of inheritance” to the Portuguese colonial empire, are an instructive bit of history. But many in London, marvelling at the dynamics of the new German State, arc convinced that some sort of “adjustment” favourable to the Nazi regime is inevitable. Britain will do it, if possible, without loss of her own possessions. But if there is reasonable ground for believing peace will be preserved for a time by fairly minor cessions of territory, one may expect that even this radical solution will be attempted.