THE TREATIES WITH ABYSSINIA

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume LXVI, 6 September 1935, Page 2

THE TREATIES WITH ABYSSINIA

HISTORY IN DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS ITALY' AND BRITAIN “SPHERES OF INFLUENCE" DEFINED The following; summary in. tlm “Economist" of the international agreements and negotiations which govern the 1 elations of Abyssinia with the League of Nations and the Great Powers is based on a memorandum compiled by the Information Department of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. The relations between Italy and Abyssinia were first regularised by the Treaty of Uceiali in 1889. when, in return for Italian support in his bid for the throne. Menelik of Shoa (later the Emperor Menelik) agreed to “avail himself of the Italian Government for any negotiations which he may enter into with other Powers or Governments." This was unilaterally denonneed by Menelik in 1893, owing to Italian encroachments; and after the Italian defeat at Adowa in 1896, the peace treaty of Addis Ababa in 1896 annulled the Treaty of Ueciali. Meanwhile, in 1891 and 1894 three AngloItalian agreements had recognised almost the whole of Abyssinia, as belonging r 0 the Italian sphere of influence. In 1902 the Anglo-Abyssinian Boundary Treaty gave Great Britain rights within the recognised Italian phere, and the Abyssinian Government undertook not to permit any operations diverting the Blue Nile Sobat or Lake Tana (Tsana) waters from their main Nile course. 1906 THREE-POWER TREATY In 1906. a tripartite agreement between Great Britain, France and Italy was accepted by the Emperor Menelik. It guaranteed the status quo in Abyssinia, as set out in existing treaties. Art. 11l states: “In no case shall one of the three Governments interfere in any way whatsoever” with Ethiopia “except in agreement with the other two.” If the status quo were disturbed, the three Powers “shall make every effort to preserve the integrity of Ethiopia. In any case, they shall concert together, on the basis of the agreements enumerated in the above-men-tioned article (defining the status quo), in order to safeguard:” (1) The interests of Great Britain and Egypt in the Nile basin, more especially as regards the regulation of the waters of that river and its tributaries . . . without prejudice to Italian interests in paragraph (2). (2) The interests of Italy in Ethiopia as regards Erythraea and Somaliland (including the Benadir), more especially with reference to the hinterland of her possessions and the territorial connection between them to the west of Addis Ababa. (3) The interests of France in Ethiopia. as regards the French Protectorate on the Somali coast, the hinterland of ibis protectorate and the zone necessary for the construction and working of the Jibuti-Addis Ababa railway. This tripartite agreement of 1906 is still in force. • EFFECTS OF THE GREAT WAR In 1915 under the secret Treaty of which brought Italy into the war on the Allies’ side, Italy was given the. following, undertaking by France and Great Britain: — “In the event of France and Great Britain increasing their colonial territories in Africa, at the expense of Germany, those two Powers agree in principle that Italy may claim some equitable compensation, particularly as regards the settlement in her favour of the questions relating to the frontiers of the Italian colonies of Eritrea, Somaliland and Libya and the neighbouring colonies belonging to France and Great Britain.” In November, 1919, “as part of a wider negotiations of a colonial character,” Italy proposed to the British Government, inter alia, the following offer:— (1) Italy would support Great Britain’s claim for a concession to carry out works on a barrage on Lake Tana “within the Italian sphere of influence” as defined in the tripartite agreement of 1906. (2) Italy would support a. British claim to construct a motor road from Lake Tana to the Sudan. (3) In return, Great Britain should support an Italian claim to a concession for a railway connecting Eritrea and Italian Somaliland and running to the west of Addis Ababa. ' (4) Italy would reserve to herself all rights in the Italian zone. This offer, according to the British Note to Italy of 14th December, 1925 (see below) “was not entertained at the time, chiefly owing to the strong objection felt to the idea of allowing a foreign Power to establish any sort of control over the headwaters of rivers so vital to the prosperity and even to the existence of Egypt and the Sudan.” Great Britain, Fiance and Belgium had proved to be the reversionaries of Germany’s African possessions. Italy could only settle her grievances piecemeal. Her dispute with France over the boundary between Libya and French North-West Africa was quickly settled. Her dispute with Great Britain over the boundary between Kenya and Italian Somaliland was settled by the cession to Italy of Jubaland by Great Britain on 15th July, 1924. Lastly, the disputed boundary between Libya and Egypt (then a British Protectorate) was settled by the Italo-Egyptian Agreement of December, 1925.

ABYSSINIA JOINS THE LEAGUE Meanwhile, these post-war alterations of the map of Africa had perturbed the Ethiopian Empress Judith, Menelik’s daughter, and the Regent and heir, Ras Talari. They feared encroachments upon Abyssinia under pretexts of “cleaning up” the slave trade and the means to that trade, the arms traffic. The Abyssinian Government consequently applied for League membership in 1923. The Sixth Committee, which examined her request, were divided. Australia, Great Britain and Switzerland were in favour of an inquiry into Abyssinian’s capacity to fulfil the obligations incidental to League membership. France and Italy were strongly of opinion that the admission ■of Abyssinia would pave the way to the abolition of slavery, and would strengthen the centralising hand of the Government in Addis Ababa. The Italian representative emphatically urged Abyssinia’s application, minimised the nature of slavery in Abyssinia,, and declared that Abyssinia had a right to import arms for her defences as an independent State. A sub-committee of seven was set up (British Empire, Finland, France, Italy, Latvia, Persia, and Rumania), and reported that Abyssinia was a sovereign State with a stable government and well-defined frontiers. But “in order to assist Abyssinian to overcome the difficulties which may in the past have been the obstacles to ... . fulfilment” of her eu-

gagenients, her admission to the League should be made subject to her signature of a declaration containing three articles:— In Arts. I and 11, Abyssinia undertook obligations contained in the 1919 St. Germain Arms Convention. This convention amended the provisions ot the 1885 Berlin Act and the 1890 Brussels Act, both relating to the African slave trade and, in particular, to the supply of arms for the express purposes of that trade throughout the whole of Central Africa. (But the 1919 Convention and the succeeding 1925 Genova Convention on the Supervision of the Traffic in Arms were never ratified. This led Britain, France and Italy in 1930 to regularise Abyssinia’s position, as a sovereign State and a member of the League, with regard to the supply of arms. See below.) In Art. 11l “Abyssinia declares herself ready now and hereafter to furnish the council with any information which it may require, and to take into consideration any recommendations which tlie council may make with regard to the fulfilment of these (the above) obligations, in which she recognises that the League of Nations is concerned.” On Abyssinia’s signature of this declaration, the League Assembly unanimously adopted her application for membership by 45 votes on 28th September, 1923. She thereupon assumed all the obligations set out in the Covenant and became a member of the 1.L.0. 1925 ANG LO-ITALIAN AGREEMENT In 1924 the, British Labour Government entered into negotiations with Abyssinia over Take Tana, without result. The succeeding British (Conservative) Government, on their own initiative, concluded an agreement with Italy in December, 1925, under which, according to the British Note, of 14th December, 1925 (see above), the British Government undertook, in return for Italian support in obtaining a concession from Abyssinia for a barrage on Lake Tana and a motor road from Sudan to Lake Tana, to support an Italian request for the power to build the desired railway from Eritrea to Italian Somaliland, via territory west of Addis Ababa. Further, if Great Britain obtained the j.ake Tana concession and if Italy inderzook mb to tamper with tlie flow of water into the main Nile, the British Government would promise to “Recognise an exclusive Italian economic influence in the west of Abyssinia and in the whole of the territory to be crossed by the above-mentioned railway. They would further promise to support with the Abyss,niau Government all Italian requests for economic concessions in the above /.one. ’ This Anglo-Italian Agreement ctliflicted, on the face of it, with tlij terns of the 1906 tripartite treaty; but on 2nd August, 1926, Sir Austen Chamberlain told the House of Commons that he believed that ‘‘the French were entirely satisfied with the explanations received.” Meanwhile, however, quite apart from France’s preoccupations, the Abyssinian Government strongly protested to Italy and Great Britain against the Anglo-Italian agreement and its terms; and they finally protested to the League. The matter never came before the council. For Great Britain and Italy published modest “interpretations” of their 1925 agreement, which, according to these explanations, merely secured Great Britain against Italian rivalry in the obtaining of the Lake Tana concession, and secured Italy against British commercial competition in the zone of Italy's “exclusive economic interests.” 1928 ITALO-ABYSSINIAN PACT On 2nd August, 1928, Ras Tafari signed a 20-year Pact of Friendship arid Arbitration with Italy. By Art. II of that pact, both Governments pledged themselves not to take any action detrimental to the independence of the other. Art. V runs : “The two Governments agree to submit to a procedure of conciliation or arbitration any questions which may arise between them and which it has not been possible to settle by tlie usual diplomatic means, without having recourse to the force of arms. By common agreement, notes shall be exchanged choosing arbitrators.” ABYSSINIA AND THE ARMS TRAFFIC In August, 1930, Ras Tafari entered into a treaty with Britain, France and Italy (now in force), concerning the traffic in arms. Neither the St; Germain nor the 1925 Geneva Arms Convention had received sufficient ratifications to enter into force. Great Britain, France, Italy, and Abyssinia therefore regularised the position among themselves, with the double object of enabling the Emperor of Ethiopia “To obtain all the arms and munitions necessary for the defence of his territories from external aggression and for the preservation of internal order therein,” and of preventing acquisition of arms by unauthorised agents. Tlie 1930 treaty empowered Abyssinia to order arms abroad, but laid down that imports into Abyssinia should only be allowed under signed and sealed order of the “Emperor or his authorised representative.” 1935 FRAN CO-ITALIAN AGREEMENT On 7th January, 1935, M. Laval and Signor Mussolini in Rome came to an agreement over Franco-Italian disputes concerning their respective spheres of interest in North Africa. France gave Italy 2500 out of 34,000 shares held by France in the Jibuti-Addis Ababa railway; a strip of territory adjoining South Libya; and another strip adjoining the southern frontier of Eritrea, This agreement was greatly to tlie advantage of France, especially in her European policy, and it was credibly reported that France had come to a clear understanding with Italy over Italian aims in regard to Abyssinia. On 19th July last, however, M. Laval, before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chamber, categorically denied that the French Government had agreed to leave Italy “a free hand” in Abyssinia.