Nelson Evening Mail MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 3, 1934 AIR ATTACK AND DEFENCE

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume LXVI, 3 September 1934, Page 4

Nelson Evening Mail MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 3, 1934 AIR ATTACK AND DEFENCE

THE recent manoeuvres of the French Air Force would seem to demonstrate the advantage which attack has over defence in aerial warfare. In all, the cablegram from Paris said, 652 ’planes were used in the manoeuvres, and of these the defenders employed 476 (310 scouting and 166 bombing, ’planes), and the attackers had at their disposal 176 ’planes. The object of the manoeuvres was t 6 determine if the attacking force could bomb the aerodrome, etc., at Le Bourget, near Paris, which means that it was aimed to demonstrate whether the French capital can.be defended against aerial attack by a defending force more than double that of the attackers. Apparently the manoeuvres began somewhere outside a radius of fifty miles from Paris. The day was cloudy, and therefore more favourable to the attackers tlran to the defenders, for the report says that “the defending air fleet wandered about the clouds vainly searching for the attackers,” of whose force only one was destroyed, theoretically, while the rest of the attacking ’planes succeeded in dropping bombs weighing in the aggregate 20 tons, which in actual warfare would have been sufficient tb turn Paris into “a blazing ruin,” and to kill tens of thousands of it's inhabitants. True, the weather was favourable to the attacking force, but it is to be noticed that it was out-numbered, more than two to one in ’planes. It appears to have almost completely evaded the defenders, and undoubtedly demonstrated the possibility of destroying Paris from the air, under weather-conditions favourable to the attackers; and as with Paris, so it would be with Berlin and London, in similar circumstances. Attack from the air, as Mr Stanley Baldwin said, some few years ago, had best be ruled out by civilised nations, but it will be remembered that the British statesman received little or no encouragement from the Great Powers of the European Continent. Iti is quite clear that, in the interests of civilisation, aerial warfare had best bo abolished, otherwise it may happen that it will abolish civilisation. This fear especially applies to Europe, whose nations are not only those which are best equipped, scientifically speaking, but unfortunately are also the nations which are most at variance. When, twenty years ago, they were brought into active contention, they succeeded in avoiding a general disruption by a very narrow margin. At that time the use of the .aeroplane was not fully developed. Trno, it was used with admirable effect for the purposes of reconnaissance, and for certain specific purposes which were of a. purely military character, but the civilised nations refrained from using the aeroplane in wholesale fashion against open or defended cities. Tim air-raids on London are still remembered by hundreds of thousands of its citizens, but it is recognised that in these days the horrors of such raids would be infinitely greater. The raids made by German airships against England were more for the purpose of terrorising her people than of •

actually destroying her cities; but today it seems clear enough that, with the development of aircraft, aerial warfare in Europe would be so destructive to cities and their inhabitants that the contemplation of terrible effects staggers the imagination. The French Government has done wisely in publishing the results of the recent manoeuvres of its Air Force, for it has allowed the European nations to receive some indication of what war in Europe will mean, if its nations again strive to settle their differences and rivalries by means of war, instead of by arbitration and agrecnm” 1 The manoeuvres of the French Air Force seem to show that under. certain weather-conditions (which will frequently occur in the future) defence against aerial attack is most difficult, if not impossible, and that no combatant nation would be immune from the terrible effects which the French manoeuvres have demonstrated to be possible. The British Government clearly understands the position, and has endeavoured to bring the nations to a sense of their responsibilities unless aerial warfare is abolished by mutual agreement. Its overtures were not successful, and in consequence it decided to take the next best step, which is to provide Great Britain with a strong aerial force for the purposes of defence, but it is now shown that in certain conditions of weather such defence may very well be useless, and that the raiding of London from the air might be accomplished successfully, with little or no loss to the raiders, but appalling loss of life to the Londoners. What, then, will be the British Government’s expedient for meeting such an emergency? It has failed in outlawing war in the air: it has fallen back upon the equipment of a vast Air Force. Seemingly that expedient may not necessarily confer immunity. Will it try again to persuade the Continental nations to abolish aerial war? Or will it seek to band together the Great Powers Great Britain, France, and Italy—in an alliance, in order to maintain peace in Europe, preferably by agreement, but by force ff necessary ?