WAR OPERATIONS AT SEA

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume LXIV, 4 August 1931, Page 5

WAR OPERATIONS AT SEA

THE DEBT TO LORD JELLICOE The fifth and last volume of the British official history of operations at sea during tlie Great- War lias been published. It opens in April, 1917, when the German submarine campaign against commerce was endangering the British Empire and the Alliance; and the Admiralty’s appreciation of the danger is described at great length. “It would appear, however, that in April, 1917, the Admiralty Staff and the Fii'st Sea Lord hesitated to adopt the measures which afterwards proved decisive, and that they had grounds for hesitating, ’ says “The Times” review. “It is now a matter of common knowledge that tho convoy system proved to be the final strategic counter to the submarine campaign ; but in April, 1917, the wisest and most experienced seamen in the Navy were doubtful as to its efficacy. Lord Jcllieoe, however, decided to try tlie system. It might now he argued that the convoy system could have been tried before; but it is hard to conceive that at the time any responsible persons would have ordered its institution earlier. Indeed, when adjusted to the circumstances in which it was made, Lord Jellicoe’s order that a convoy system should be tried Heads like the decision of a great commander. He was being pressed by persons on vvhise judgment he could not possibly have relied; apd his own advisers were more than 'doubtful. His decision relieved tlie country of an extraordinary danger, and generations of Englishmen should be grateful to him for deciding wisely in circumstances of extraordinary difficulty-” THE LESSON OF THE WAR “Now that the whole record of the war at sea is before us, it is only right to say that the record proves how just and prophetic was the strategic doctrine of the first official historian —Sir Julian Corbett,” “Tlie Times” review concludes. “Throughout- his life Sir Julian endeavoured to show that a naval battle was an incident in a far greater operation--the control of maritime communications. We have now before us an elaborate proof, in five closely written volumes, that the Battle of Jutland did not divert tho war from its course, and that, if tlie convoy system had not been instituted, Great Britain would have been defeated at sea. It would be difficult to find a better illustration of Sir Julian Corbett’s doctrine. And it should never be imagined that this is a mere philosophic abstraction which is only of interest to scientific students of war. Public interest in naval affairs and a general com prehension of what constitutes maritime security is essential to the safety of an island Power which is ruled hv freely elected Governments; and the message of those five volumes of official history is as clear and as incisive as the teachings of a i text-book in logic. If the history of the naval war proves anything, it proves that a proper defence system against submarine war must henceforward bo considered as (lie main defensive system of the British Empire. Tf we possess enough forces to repeat tlie achievements of the last- two years of tlie war we may say that our naval forces are a sufficient defence against the greatest danger that can overtake us; if we possess less than this we are exposed to a repetition of the extraordinaiv nniil which Lord Jellicoe just averted.”