Nelson Evening Mail THURSDAY, APRIL 10, 1930 THE MEDITERRANEAN PROBLEM

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume LXIV, 10 April 1930, Page 4

Nelson Evening Mail THURSDAY, APRIL 10, 1930 THE MEDITERRANEAN PROBLEM

THOUGH the British Premier is still endeavouring to persuade M. Briand that France’s safety against aggression is sufficientjy guaranteed by the provisions of the League of Nations’ Covenant, it j remains to be seen if the French, will consent to a further limitation of their ; naval strength. The cause, of their op- ! position to such a step is to be found, ! not in the Atlantic Ocean, not in the i English Channel, not even in the North Sea, but in the Mediterranean. No less than nine important nations —Great Britain, France, Italy, Spain, Greece, Turkey, Egypt, Jugo-Slavia, Russia —are . more or less vitally interested in the latter sea, since they depend on it as the ! main highway of their commerce, or find in it a factor of paramount importance in relation to their national safety. It has been described bv an English publicist as “a veritable Piccadilly,” meaning of course that it is congested with the traffic of the nations. Through it passes no less than one-third of Great Britain’s sea-borne trade. It forms her shortest route to Asia—to India, to Singapore, to Hongkong, to the ports of East Africa, I to Australia—and with the Suez Canal is

•'absolutely essential to her commercial and political welfare. To safeguard her interests within this sea she holds Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, and Port Said. Indeed, until recent years Great Britain was looked upon as Hie policeman of the Mediterranean, and all the nations, whose coasts bordered il, seemed to be satisfied with that guarantee of their maritime interests. To day at least two of those nations have decided lo do their

own policing. Franco lias important interests in Northern Africa. She controls its coast from Tunis to Morocco. Her African Empire stretches from Algeria across tho wide expanses of tho Sahara Desert to Senegal, Nigeria, and the Gold Coast. It is part of hoi- political plan to develop this Empire in such a manner that it inav strengthen her position in Europe, both commercially and in a military sense. It necessarily follows that the inviolability of the sea-route between her south const and her ports in Northern Africa is as essential to Franco, as is the safety bf the Gibraltur-Port Said route to Great Britain. Until recent years France has not displayed great anxioly for tho safety of her trans-Medi-terranean route to Africa. But since, under the dictatorship of Signor Mussolini, Italy has embarked on a policy of expansion, the French have shown a sensitiveness in relation to their lines of communication with Northern Africa, which has created in the Mediterranean a feeling of tension hitherto unknown there. Italy, moreover, lias her own problems in that sea. She must preserve her communications with Tripoli, and her interests in tho Adriatic, across whose waters lies tho coast of Jugoslavia, by whom she has been regarded with suspicion ever since she seized tho port of Fiume. Jugo-Slavia is building submarines. Greece lias an efficient, though small, navy trained on the British model by British officers. Turkey lias by no means abandoned tho idea of resuming her importance as a naval Power. And in tho background is Russia’s Black Sea squadron, which may or may not be permitted to pass through the Dardanelles.

It will thus be seen how complicated is the situation in the Mediterranean.

France’s anxieties, moreover, are increased bv Signor Mussolini’s demand that Italy shall enjoy naval parity with France. The latter’s reply is that, whereas Italy’s navy is stationed entirely in Mediterranean waters, her own navy is pecessarily divided between the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, while her northern coast also needs protection. Of course it might have been hoped that the articles of the League’s Covenant, which both France and Italy have signed, would allay all uneasiness between the two countries; but, on the contrary, Italy’s renaissance under the Fascist regime, and France’s expansion in Nortli-

wmcti both iU-ance ana itaiy nave signed, would allay all uneasiness between ' the two countries; but, on the contrary, Italy’s renaissance under the Fascist regime, and France’s expansion in Northern Africa have created ; rivalry between the two countries, which lias. shown itself only too clearly at the Lon-1 don Naval Conference. | That, then, is the situation with which Mr MacDonald is faced. The United States very naturally declare that they are not involved in the Mediterranean problems. When France asks them to guarantee her security, they point to ihe .Monroe D.htrine. When France demands security of Great Britain, the latter points to the League’s Covenant, which already gives that se- j curity, and should give mutual friend- j ship to France and Italy. If those two, countries would but sink their rivalries, | all would be well—a Five-Power Treaty , could be signed at once. Per medium of the League’s Covenant, Great Britain is the protector of France and Italy, alike. | It is difficult to see how she can give the former special guarantees of security, without offending the latter. If the League’s Covenant does not suffice,'it looks as if France, and therefore Italy, J will not sign the London Treaty.