Nelson Evening Mail WEDNESDAY, APRIL 9, 1924 THE FAR-EASTERN PROBLEM

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume LVI, 9 April 1924, Page 4

Nelson Evening Mail WEDNESDAY, APRIL 9, 1924 THE FAR-EASTERN PROBLEM

IN the past, before tUc Washington Treaty came into operation. Great Britain upheld her rights in the Far East and in the Pacific. Ocean by maintaining a China Squadron based on Sydney. This defence was quite sufficient in view of the weakness of European and American navies in these distant seas and of the existence of the Anglo-Japaiie.se Alliance; which meant that Britain s Far. Eastern and Pacific territorial possessions and trade were doubly protected. Australia- and New Zealand were safe from invasion. But under cover of proposals tor the partial naval disarmament of the Great Powers, the United States, at the Washington Conference, effected a new nr. rangement as regards the control of the Pacific Ocean. Spheres of action were defined and limited in such a way that it was hoped that none of the three high contracting Powers—Britain, the United States, and Japan—could attack the others. It was attempted to accomplish, this purpose by restricting the right to establish naval bases to the spheres of action allotted to the Powers individually. Thus, the United States cannot establish a qjival base west of the Hawaiian Islands, Britain cannot- establish a- naval base within striking distance of Japan, and Japan cannot establish a naval base further south than Latitude 30. At first sight and to people not interested in Ear Eastern matters this may appear to be an admirable arrangement. No doubt it appeared so to the late President Harding and to Mr Hughes who framed it. But unless Britain is prepared to establish a naval base atSingapore, it means that- the custody ;;f the Ear East is given into the hands of Japan. The American navy cannot operate in the China Sea without some better base than exists at Manilla. Bri lain cannot bring her Navy into the same sea if she possesses nothing hcttci than the base winch exists at, Hongkong. Indeed, in ease of trouble in the Ear East it looks as if Britain and the United States could do little more than talk, lest they ’ should lose, the one Hongkong, and the oilier Manilla and the Philippine Islands. But this does not- reveal the ful woatcncss of Britain’s position in these waters. Japan undoubtedly is predominant in her own sphere of action, winch includes the whole China Sea and Hucoast of China Britain is not pivdnnnn ant in her sphere of action, which m

f .h„TOB not. only the Strait Srtllpmo-.t« and the groat trade route .between the Pacific and Indian Oceans, hnt Aostrada, and New Zealand, for the simple ven son that in these far seas she has no naval base where she may dock and repair her dreadnoughts, and supply her

Navy with the thousand rod mic re

cpiirements necessary to its effective operation. Thus it will be seen that Japan controls the destiny of China, not only because China is disunited and weak, but because, under the Washing ton Treaty and without a base at Singapore, Britain can play only a minor part in Far Eastern politics, and because tirn United States arc practically impotent to interfere. Is it, therefore, any wonder that Baron Malsui. Japan's Foreign .Minister, expresses himself as unite satisfied with the Washington Treaty, and more than pleased with the British Governments decision to do nothing in regard to establishing a naval base at Singapore? Japan s nredom mance in toe Far East- is established, and by Britain s tacit consent that- predominance strengthened and vested in Japan. this means that the, tuiiirc ot China necessarily rests iavgelv in the hands of Japan. and that Britain, while retaining the right of protecting China's inter ests and her own interests in the l‘ar Fast, does not intend to place herself in such a position as will enable her to protect those interests to the lull oMent of her power. Unfortunately, China is 100 weak to iirotrct herself: and her immense nude veloped mineral resources would make her a rich prize. Roth the Soviets ol' Russia and the Japanese nation would desire nothing better then to carve up ihc vast and inchoate Chinese llepuhlie, and tuin the labour of the Chinese to their own advantage. It would not mat far which of these predatory forces accomplished its purpose, or whether '.lie two of t litem divided China between them: the interests of Britain would tw oiost materially affected, and she would certainly he drawn into the quarrel. Novi', observe what that would mean to Australia and New Zealand. In ci:(•umstances such ns have I>pou outlined, Britain might become embroiled in war with Japan, and automatically Austi;: • lin and New Zealand would he open tr. attack by the Japanese Navy, because j Britain has made no preparation for do fending her interests in these waters l:y establishing a naval base, at some sucS place as Singapnie. from which they can be protected. In other words, the British Government can jeopardise ihrsc Dominions. by becoming embroiled in troubles which may on or ni the 1-nr East, hot it wid not assume responsibii ity For the protection of Australia and New Zealand in ease they are threaten s! bv Japan.

That is the position to-dav, ns created bv Mr Ramsay MacDonald and his con freres, by reason of their rejection of th e manciple that the foreign policy -f the British Empire, shaß be defined h\ the Premiers of the Empire in Conference, and be carried out by Britain witn the support- of the Dominions and India Tho Ccnferencc decided that the estab lislirnent of the Singapore base was ’>e cessary, for reasons which have bed sufficiently explui ed. and it was agreed that the base should be established, with the assistance of such Dominions as wore chiefly affected. This was the solution ot one of the problems of Imperial protection, and a feature which helped to shape the Empire's foreign policy. Today it is discarded or held in abeyance, not, l>y the decision of the Empire in conference, but by tho British Government. This creates a very serious situation. Either the component parts of tht Empire must- feci safe in the protection which the Empire affords, or they will desire to make such arrangements for themselves, irrespective of the Empire, as v.dll give them protection. Great Britain cannot direct the Empire’s policy without insuring protection to all its parts. Stic cannot, both refuse responsibility for the Empire’k protection and at tlie same, time direct the Empires foreign policy. The Dominions are now such important factors ot the Empire that, they must lie called in consultation in connection willi Imperial affairs. They have been so called in consultation. I hat principle was conceded by Great Britain long ago, and was put into practice during the Great War with great benefit. U cannot he abrogated in the manner in which Mr Ramsay MacDonald has attempted, if the good feeling which exists between the Dominions and the Mother Country is to last perpetually. The problem of the Far East, which is ever-present, with the people ot Australia and New Zealand, must be solved by Great Britain in eon junction with tho Empire as a whole, or it is inevitable that sooner or later Australia and New Zealand must seek a solution for themselves, and the results of such action might he both far-reaching and 10 gret table.