Nelson Evening Mail TUESDAY, JULY 24, 1923 THE SINGAPORE BASE

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume LVI, 24 July 1923, Page 4

Nelson Evening Mail TUESDAY, JULY 24, 1923 THE SINGAPORE BASE

THAT the attempt made in the House of Commons to reduce the Naval Estimates failed signally, augurs well for the cause of Imperial defence. Had the critics of the British Government’s naval policy been successful, the project for creating a naval base at-Singapore would have had to be abandoned, and with it wouid have gone the possibility of formulating and effecting an adequate plan of Imperial defence. Singapore is now definitely fixed upon as the British Navy S chief base in the Far East. True, ten and a-half million pounds will have to lie spent before, the new naval base is completed, but no political wiseacres can now hope to delay operations. In the past. British naval strategy has been eased on the idea of danger in Europe: this is revealed by the fact that the Navy’s principal bases were and are in European waters. With the decision to create a first-class naval base at Singapore, the Admiralty discloses the fact that, it has entered on a comprehensive scheme of Imperial defence: that it is preparing to defend the Empire as a whole; and that the danger-points, if there is a danger-point, is no longer in Europe, hut in the Far East. But it must not he thought that the creating or a base of Singapore will complete the new plan of Imperial defence. Singapore h a mighty integer in that plan, but there are many other integers. The First Lord of the Admiralty has made a great point of the great distance of Singapore from Japan (about 3000 miles), preeiuding any aggressive movement being made directly from the proposed new base against Yokohama. In the same manner it may be shown that an isolated base at Singapore can be of limited usefulness unless it be connected with other such bases within supporting distance of it and of one another. In this regard the Empire is happily situated in having m its Dominions excellent facilities for creating just the. sort of subsidiary liases The policy of the Admiralty itself building the base at Singapore is

as sound politically as it is sira logically. If any particular Dominion considers a naval base should he made in one ot its ports, it can provide, such a base which, though it might ho subsidiary, would necessarily form a valuable factor in the comprehensive plan of Imperial delence which the British Government evidently has in its mind. For instance, there recently appeared in one of our southern contemporaries an able criticism of the Singapore project by Lieut.-Commander Rolleston. retired, who argued strongly that the most suitable place at wljieh to form a naval base for the protection of Australia is Port Stephens, a few miles north of Newcastle, in New South Whiles. Whether or no there is any sound reasoning in this critic s argument, it, must be plain to the dullest mind that if the Australian Government were to agree with Lieut.-Commander Rolleston and were to create a subsidiary base at Port Stephens, it would be a valuable factor in Hie plan of Imperial Defence, since every such base enlarges the scope of the Navy’s operations.

The same line of reasoning applies with increased force to the Union of South Africa. In event of the Mediterranean Sea being rendered impassable to British ships in time ol war—a contingency which is considered more than possible by eminent naval strategists- all British commerce between Britain and the Far East would be obliged to pass round the Cape of Good Dope, which would be the shortest available roule. The importance of the Cape of Good Dope, as a strategic point, immediately comes into prominence, both in the matter of defence and offence. Nothing is more possible than Unit in such circumstances the. South African Government may determine to create a naval base, at Simon's Bay, or at some other suitable port, whence protection might he given to the, shores of South Africa, and also 'to British (that is. Imperial) maritime trade passing round tlm Cape of Good Dope. No doubt such matters as these will be discussed at the forthcoming Imperial Conference. But il is an absolutely right thing that the Admiralty’s decision as to the matter of the Singapore base should be closed and settled before that Conference meets, since it would be fatal to leave the formulating of an Imperial naval delence scheme to a gathering of politicians, however patriotic and assiduous they may’ he; whereas with the. matter of Singapore fixed, the rest of the projected scheme can he completed by the Dominions’ Premiers agreeing, «.ncii on behalf of bis Dominion, to carry out their several parts, subsidiary perhaps, but complements of the c.nretully reasoned plan which is likely to he as perfect as any plan of Imperial naval defence can be. Sir Francis Belt has told our Legislative Council that the subsidiary naval base for the protection of New ’Zealand, should lie placed as far north in the North Island as possible. Here we have an example of a Dominion’s scheme of naval defence being subsidiary to the general scheme of Imperial naval’ defence, and yet- a complement of that scheme, for it is palpable that cruisers and submarines and destroyers and aircraft, stationed at the extreme north of New Zealand, could co-operate in the defence of Australia and of New Zealand much more effectually than it they were stationed in Cook Strait, for instance.

The Empire is preparing for emergencies; it is not preparing for aggression. As has been truthfully stated in the House of Commons, the establishment of a naval base at Singapore is more calculated to prevent than to create war. So with subsidiary naval bases which may be established in the individual Dominions. ’’When a strong man armed keepeth his house bis goods are m peace." It is so with the British Empire. In devising and adopting a plan of defence, it is menacing no one, but is exhibiting its desire to live in peace.