Nelson Evening Mail WEDNESDAY, APRIL 12, 1922 HISTORY FROM THE SOURCE

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume LVI, 12 April 1922, Page 4

Nelson Evening Mail WEDNESDAY, APRIL 12, 1922 HISTORY FROM THE SOURCE

A hook by M. Poincairo on “The. Origin of the Great. War” is bound to command the attention of the world. But he makes no sensational revelations, i’oi the archives have been so keenly investigated by French and German revolutionists that the responsibility for the war has already been firmly placed on the right shoulders. He, however, vin. dicates the good faith of the French Ministers, who have been accused freely, though without much probability of liaving taken too little trouble to preserve the peace. His own pacific intentions prior to the Great War' are demonstrated by the events which led up to the Balkan wars and by the history of the tragic days that followed the death of the Archduke, and the despatch of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia. M. Poincare’s account of his relations with the Eussian statesmen are reviewed by one critic in conjunction with an article in a recent number of I he Quarterly Review by Professor Ileadlam-Morlcy. Professor HeadlamMorley, on an examination of recent documents not as yet translated into English, argues that, although Russian statesmen may not have done their utmost to prevent an outbreak of war Horn 1912 to 1914, the ultimate sponsibility for their policy rests with Germany and Austria, chiefly with Germany. M. Poincare supports him by his account of the Herzegovina crisis in 1908, and its immediate sequels. But when lie speaks of the events in which lie actually took part his conclusons are- not so plain. It is clear that French statesmen. were desperately afraid that a; general war might spring from the intrigues of the Balkan States, and from their campaigns key. They were alarmed by the proposal of Bulgaria to place a loan for a largo amount on the 'French market, and they questioned M. Isvolsky, the Russian Ambassador,’ who supported the proposal, but could, or would, tell them nothing of its object except, that the! policy of the Balkan League was bound to die pacific. However, the Fiench Cabinet, in its anxiety, sent M. Poincare to St. Petersburg to make inquiries on the spot. His report, extracts from which tire re-priuicflj is convincing answer to the German version which has made, of this visit ail intentional prelude to the war. He met IVL Sassanot, and informed him that France was not able to understand why the Balkan treaties, which had been prepared with the knowledge and conniv anco of Russia, had not been made known to France. He. understood better later, when the- Serbo-Bulgarinn treaty was read to him. “I could not prevent myself from exclaiming: ‘Why, it is a convention do guerre.’ Ihc. Minister did not appear to bo astonished at my remark, and ho even replied: ‘You are using exactly the same expression as our Minister in Sofia when ho communicated the text of the convention to us.’ But,’ I asked him, ‘how could you ask us to sanction it by issuing a Bulgarian loan on' the French maiket. The Russian answer was that they had not at first known of the convention, and could always veto a war; but the loan was refused, jiud M. Poincare be<mn to work in conjunction with the British Government, first to prevent a war and afterwards to circunisciibe its area. The, chapters dealing with the Balkan crisis are the most important in the book, because they contain new and authentic material. They describe the policy of Austria, which was at fust quite reasonable, and the groat and successful efforts of Sir Edward Giey to bring about a settlement. Xn describing the events immediately pieccding the war M. Poincare is on more familiar ground, for he. relies mainly on the telegrams set out in the various books, White, Yellow, Red, and Green. He lias also,, however, at his command the four volumes of diplomatic documents collected from the Gorman Foreign Office by Karl Kautslty, and con-

taining the extraordinary series of marginal notes by .the late Emperor. Thereis no better evidence of the overbearing temper, the intolerance and the ini. penetrable vanity' which made war certain. M. Poincare reproduces several of them. “What gigantic British impudence ' is the note on Sir Edward (trey's first interveuiion. “Humbug, ’ again lie says, when the Kalian Minister protests, Italy has always tried to cheat in Albania." “Who authorised him to do this/ 1 he writes, when the Ambassador at V ienna stales that lie is urging nmderalion on the .Austrian Government. It is a most striking contrast to these Notes to read of the efforts for jiea.ee. made by MM. 1 (tinea re. and \ iviani during tlicii retain journey from M. Poincare s, presidential visit, and subsequently in Paris, ihey are .summed up in a telegram fiom the German Ambassador to Ids Government, which wits deciphered during the wai. it was sent on ono of the last days of peace, in the following terms: “M. Viviani (then Premier) docs mot wish to abandon the hope that peace may he maintained, an end that 1 is earnestly desired here.” M. Poincare hopes, when J„. has more leisure from dealing with the. Peace- Treaties, to publish a more elaborate treatise, from the documents i„ his possession, and from his recollection.