FIGHTING IN PALESTINE

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume LIII, Issue LIII, 10 November 1919, Page 5

FIGHTING IN PALESTINE

ENDURANCE O?*"LIGHT HORSE. atoTy of the, fighting of the Australian Light Horae in Palestine, wjpeh is embodied in the report of Lieutenant-General H, G. Chauvel, the commander of* the Desert Mounted Corps, t 0 the Commonwealth Act-ing-Minister of Defence,' is a complete review of the three years’ operations under : extraordinary difficult Conditions, • which culminated in . the fall of Damascus and the capitulation of the entire Turkish forces. Id bis account of the first battle of Gaza,-:, General Chauvel says is failed through a fog delaying the infantry attack; for two hours. The second battle was even pmre unsatisfactory than the first, and the losses on both sides ilWere heavy, and the only advantage'gained was a slightly improved petition. The problem of tbe advancer in Palestine was - the eternal one of water. A fortnight’s wpvk. by the, Australian and Zealand Field Engineers, assisted by the men of the Second Light Horse Brigade, and the Imperial Campl Brigade, provided sufficient water for all cavalry divisions at Kalasa, ; and one cavalry division? at Aslpj, thyg rendering the proposed operations against the, east of Beershebap feasible... The actual battle lasted-' all day, and, the position was captured after a brilliant 'operation by-the Fourth Light Horse Brigade, under General Grand ,which charged over - eficcesive lines of trenches in the dusk, and galloped into the town before the - Turkish commander realised what had happened. In the extended- operations some of the Australians hor«es went without winter for'” 56 hours. Between October 31 and November 18 the desert corps had covered 120 miles, fought five genera l engagements, mid captured nearly 70QO prisoners, 50 . guns, and much other spoil. Dealing with the operations of the Australian troops in the Jordan Valley, General Chauvel etates that thev were informed that n 0 E iropean could live, in the valley after May 1, but it was decided to hold the valley, and combat, the disease. Although there were considerable losses from malaria the intense heat and dust, worse than hitherto experienced the result more than justified this decision. The duty of each brigade in the valley was shortened as much as - possible by ref! lie fa. ■■

As the tune drew near for the adcamouflage was adopted to .keep the enemy's- attention fixed oh ohr flank vance every conceivable form o f Dummy camps were constructed, and new bridgeheads were made across the Jordan. r . Thousands of dummy horse.were constructed to he left -standing out in -the lines when the cavalry moved out. For a fortnight before the attack the cavalry were being moved from the Jordan Vaßey to the orange groves by day. So well was this ruse carried out that a Turkish air reconnaissance on September 17, found afterwards among Liman Von Sanders’ papers at Nazareth, reported: "Far from there being any diminution in the cavalry in the Jordan Valley, there was evidence of 25 more squadrons.” •The battle on the Plain of Armageddon, ,for which the camouflage in the' Jordan Valley was a preparation, is closely - described by General Chauvel, as is’ also the great ride to Damascus- ' ,