Nelson Evening Mail. FRIDAY, JULY 11, 1918. THE RETIREMENT OF KUHLMANN

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume LII, Issue 167, 12 July 1918, Page 4

Nelson Evening Mail. FRIDAY, JULY 11, 1918. THE RETIREMENT OF KUHLMANN

THE compulsory retirement of Dr von Kuhlmann, Germany's Foreign Minister, as a result of his recently delivered speech brings into prominence

once more the genral political as.pct of the war. An excellent article appeared in the Daily Telegraph recently reviewing the position arising out of the famous speech, and readers will find the remarks of special interest in view of wh.at has now happened to Kuhlmann. The most satisfactory element in Herr von Kuhlmann's speech in the Reichstag, and its reception by that body, it says, is the indication that it presents of a genuine line of cleavage in the German Government, where a split between the Foreing Office and the War 'Ministry has long been suspected-. Hitherto the military leaders have been ■strong enough to suppress the misgivings of the Foreign Office whenever littered. The collapse of Russia added an

enormous accession of strength to the

if Pan-Germans and ! the military party !' generally. Von Bethmann-Hollweg, who jj had resisted the "unrestricted submaj rine warfare," enjoined by the mili;j tai-y leaders, was driven into reti're- ! j ment.' Dr Michaelis. his successor, a nonentity and a stop-gap. speedily fol- | lowed him. Count von Hertling, the Bavarian, has beenl singularly unobtrusive, and now Herr von Kuhlmann, the Foreign Minister, has not only declared that- Germany does not strive after world-domination", but has expres's*ed his conviction that it is impossible to end the war by military means. The disappointed Pan-Germans received this statement with fury. So also, it is reported, did the Kaiser. Hence Herr von Kuhlmann has beenl busy in explaining that he did not say what he i>s reported to have said, and Count von Hertling has been countersigning the recantation. The most serious para- ' graph in the German Foreign Minis*ter's original speech was that in whiVh ho expressed the belief that 1919 would not see -the end of the war. The German people could not be expected to agree t£ that statement without demur. They need peace too urgently. Their economic situation is too critical. A Foreign Minister who cannot promise peace before the end of 1919, and who declines to/ confirm the PaniGerman View that Germany can win the war whenever she likes, is of no use to Germany at the present juncture. Hence there was an outcry for Herr von Kuhlmanrß's dismissal, and it has been heeded. Herr von Kuhlmann. who was 'Councillor to the German Embassy in London in 1914, before the war, was untiring in his efforts to secure the neutrality of Great Britain. Having .failed in those efforts he saw Great Britaihi enter the -war, and he is now more than even convinced' that victory cannot be achieved by Germany in face of the

armed opposition of Great Britain. Herace he desires peace —in order that Germany may have a breathing space in which to collect her energies, for the next war. But. as it would be an admission of d'efeat if Germany asiked for peace, the German Foreign. Minister is driven to resort to a characteristic strategem. He expresses a hope that Germany's enemies will approach Germany with an. offer of Pan-Germans of course raise a howl of

indignation at that proposal, for .they see that it is in effect an intimatibn

by the German foreign Minister that Germany is anxious for peace. If she is anxious for peace, she know s that it can. be obtained . from -the 1 Allies

only by retiring from the territories that she has invaded and occupied And (that is what the Pan-Germans are determined not to do. Probably thev realise, along with the military leaders, that a retirement from the occupied territories would be an admission of failure, and that an admission of failure would' probably bring about a popular, upheaval and a cataclvsm that might engulf not only the PanGermans and the militarists' but also the dynasty. The cleavage between the Foreign Office and the War J>4-

partment in Germany has been vividly accentuated by this incident, but- it is not likely to be brought to an end even by the resignation of the Foreign Minister, because the icause is not personal. It lies far deeper than that. It is to be found in the totally different view that the German statesmen have taken of the war as compared wjth the German soldiers. Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg (opposed . unrestricted submarine warfare, because he foresaw that it would bring *in the United States on the side of the Allies. His retirement wap brought about by the militarists, but. the event proved that he was right. Herr von Kuhlmann. the Foreign Minister, who sees the forecast of .yon IJethbann-Hon-wegg verified, and the American troops pouring into France in spite of the confident predictions of the German military leaders that the Americans were a. negligible factor, experiences'.'a growing conviction that the sooner peace comes the better it will be for Germany. Hence he throws onfc an> oblique invitation to the Allies—rsaying the face of tho Foreign 'Offioe by putting his invitation in the form of a pious aspiration that the Allies will approach Germany—because he realises that, if the Allies can once be persuaded to agree to an armistice and a.ttend a. conference, it will be impossible for the war to be renewed. Germany would-, in that case, stand on the territory that she occupies, or the greater part of it—which would make her the dominant Power in the world—arid defy the AMies to incur the opprobrium of recommencing hostilities. This view of' the remarkable proceedings in the Reichstag would suggest that the manoeuvre of Herr von Kuhlman was merely a new form of the German "peace offensive." Von Kuhlmann displayed great flexibility and astuteness in his work in England—and also in Ireland —before the war.

I He -worked every possible point to secure the .neutrality of Great Brit--1 ain. "Ho ha« been working every possible point to bring about a peace by negotiation, which would enable Germany to retain possession of her illpotten gains, without further fighting. The overture has been "made oni the eve of a further offensive by the German armies, and under the threat of that offensive. But such a "peace could not be lasting, and- the 'Kaiser apparently realised that there was no hope of Great Britain falling into the trap, for as soon as the speech was made he demanded a. recantation), thereby ranging himself once more on the side_ of the Pan-Germans and the militarists against the Foreign Office. These events tend) to show that- the Kaiser now realises fully that the fate of himself and of his dynasty is bound up with the policy of the Pan-Germans amd the militarists. The desire of the Foreign Office for a rapprochement. an accommodation, with the Allies, as a temporary expedient to be csust aside as soon as l conditions? for renewing the struggle would be favourable, would, if fulfilled, be fatal to the Hohenzollerns. Hence the war nrnst go on, and Kuhlmanin must go out, because its continuance is imposed upon the belligerents, not by the Allied: statesmen, whose termsi are (known," but by the German militarists, who are the de facto German Government, and whose very existence depends the war ending in a military victory fouj Germany.