Nelson Evening Mail. WEDNESDAY, MAY 16, 1917. SUBMARINES CANNOT DECIDE.

Nelson Evening Mail, 16 May 1917, Page 4

Nelson Evening Mail. WEDNESDAY, MAY 16, 1917. SUBMARINES CANNOT DECIDE.

- ■ TO TAKE -stock, as Mr Hilaire Belloc does in the last issue of Land and Water, is a. certain aid to reassurance and to confidence in a great defeat for the enemy. At our entry into the last phase of the war, in the midst of the ominous lull and silence which precede it upon both sides, let us take stock, says .Mr TjcHoc. The one prime element in the calculation-—which more and more rapidly is deciding all the rest —is the respective weight of numbers and material by land. It is modified, but only modified, by the enemy's last efforts upon our lengthy and perilous communications at sea. As to the land, the general situation is. now familiar. In the West the enemy is mastered. On the East he has a permanent and heavy superiority in material, countered only by supply to our Allies by oversea routes. The West is not only superior, but is growing in superiority. It has more guns, more shells, more railways, more rolling stock, more men, more food. It is very important that we should rrrasp this incalculable but very real fad or' in the Western situation, hec-iuse fooiis"h writing, and still, more foolish speaking, has produced in this country an impression the contrary of the truth. Subject to the enemy's superiority in -steel, which makes us partly dependent on neutral markets, we master him. We master him in men. in moral, in gun-power, and gun-handling, in tactical" method. It is because the communications of the Allies are maritime that the enemy finds one chance left upon which to gamble. Maritime communications are always perilous, always cumbersome and slow, always exceedingly expensive in men and mstevial. To-day these drawbacks are far greater than ' they were in the past, for three reasons: —The necessity of maritime communication is greater than ever before ; their length is greater than ever before ; their peril is greater than ever before. The enemy is not r nly beaten on the West, but he is in danger of a complete decision against himself in a very short time, because he is cutnumbered, outgunned, and outgeneralled. His .permanent superiority upon the East does not avail him towards a. decision, because the factor of space baffles him. His reserve for repairing wastage, even if he joins no new divisions, is exhausted in the course of the coming summer. Every effort he make's to meet his foes by making new formations is so much borrowed from, anticipated upon, the meagre resources of the immediate future. His one loophole, is the weak character of our lengthy, vitally necessary, and exceedingly exposed maritime communications. If he fails here he has failed altogether and soon. There are those who tell us that he deliberately desired to bring the United i States into the war in order to embarrass negotiations at the close of it. It may be so. There are those who tell us that the sudden determination to risk the hostility of the United States was undertaken' bv the Ilohenzollern dynasty so that, in tlie crash of the newly made and artificial North German, they should seem to have yielded only to an overwhelming combination. It may he so. There are those who tell us that"- the Prussians will shrink from the last consequences of such a policy, and will suggest compromises with nations still neutral upon the sea. It may be 'so. But all these affirmations and conjectures relate to something subsidiary to the main military pomt, which is tbi-= : —That bv land the enemy is in immediate and deadly peril. His only is a gamble bv sea. It is clear that, as part of the military problem, the unaided submarine weapon cannot be decisive. The margin between luxury and necesitv in imports, the power of importing 'ultimately by submersible*, the time still required to embarrass the supplies of Britain at all seriously; the ' incapacity to interfere with direct communications with France ; the potential adition of half a million tons o: shipping from the other side of the Atlantic - the progress of methods ior dealing with the new submarines—all these factors combined make it certain that serious military pressure upon hind (the I preparation of which he may hope in vain to hasten or impose) will come long before the menace upon our maritime communication could be .really decisive. The victory of the one side and the defeat of the other have been a matter more and more susceptible ol calculation as the war has proceeded. Ihe event is. at the present moment, more certain than it was, say. last October ; last October it was more certain than it was, «av last June. And this calculable victory is a victory for the. Alliance and a defeat for the Central Empires * hat is whv Prussia is desperate and has suddenly decided. in her desperation, to challenge the strcngest of the neutrals after keeping up to the last moment a bluff of stalemate in all her presentation of the case to that neutral. The vli> best proof of this on the moral side (that is, apart from the calculations ol effectives and resources) that Prussia is defeated is the fact that she ahonW have thought it necessary, during j three months, to abandon all her tiacli Sons, and to' declare herself incapab, e of victory, in order that the world might be persuaded of our incapacity as well. The blurf failed. Then, and only .hen, she suddenly turned round, and l -ava'-e The combination and the succession of those two methods a violent rage following upon a declaration ol stalemate, the second as sincere and 1 .- tile as the first was calculated and false are perfectly convincing to an>ine who has watched the working- ol ITI-balanced but cunning men m tne last stage of a hopeless resistance.

It will !be seen, that the correspondent loads the whole of the old Council on to our shoulders, in the hope, apparently, that we will endeavour to tarry it, and he then tries to show what a very sorry package it is. All this has nothing to do with the point at issue—old Councillors will he able to enlighten Cr. Carlisle oa the past work — as our remarks, as will be seen above, refer only to "some old Councillors who had the backbone and honesty >o statedefinitely that the rates should be raised." The correspondent seems to doii'bt that such remarks wen'' made, 'Curiously enough, he looks no fart Tier hack tlu'ii ut few weeks .beforo the election. We have pleasure in referring him to two meetings of the old Council. First, on 20th November, 1915, Cr. Moffatt is reported as follows : The Mayor had told them they would 'be shot out if they voted to increase the rates. But the ratepayers expected them to do £1 worth ot' work with 15s, and borrow the difference at 5£ ; per cent. They should tell the peopte straight what .the position was, what the only sound policy was. and if they did not like it they could get somebody else. Secondly, it may further help the correspondent, to get a better grasp of the position, if we quote some reported iema.rks of the Council proceedings of 19th May. 1916 : The Mayor said the increase in the rates (referring to proposed increase of one penny suggested bv the "Finance Committee) was not sufficient. Cost of working would be .greater this year, and there were several new items of expenditure to, he faced. They, had had a cheeseparing job last year, and did they •want the same this year? At the same time he must say that the streets were in very good order. Itwas for the Council to say whether thin crs were to be cut down again or the rates increased by another penny. as he thought they should. Cr. Kampson moved that the estimates be adopted. Cr. Moffatt agreed with the Mavor that it was necessary to have another penny put on the rates. Cost- of material and labour had- cone up. TTe moved a-n amendment that the rate be increased by another penny. That, would give them a chance of a. margin. .tad perhaps enalble them to reduce the overdraft by £4OO. which in itself should be a'matter for satisfaction to the ratepayers. It was no satisfaction to him to move as he was doing, but circumstances necessitated it. It only meant 3s 4d on a £4O tenancy. After further discussion, the amendment was .put, Crs. Mercer, Moffatt, Harrison and the Mayor supporting, and Crs. Hampsoti. Robertson, Watson, 'Pitt. We-bley. and Piper opposing. (It. is only right in fairness to thfe old and the. new Councils that we should point out that between the time, of -Cr. Moffatt's suggested increase of tworjence (a penny on the

Finance Committee's proposed increase) niid the present Council's increase of fourpence. there has been the Belgian /contribution, equal to about a ltd rate, and the extensive flood damage.)

Now, since we have I."ken the tronb'e fo onote the above remarks reported iiv the "Mail, will Cv. 'Carlisle contend that, say, ex-Cr. Moffatt (as he has most frequently, avprhapp. referred to the necessity- for inei-easin.E; the j-ntes) has had a fair deal? The point is importaivt. for. as we stated' yesterday. "What inducement is h for a man to enter pr'blic life, if. he takes a real stand in "the true interests of the neop'.e. he is turned down by the electors, ard others "•ho stat,e TT'eas-mt irrnossiirriuies-—in this ca.se proved impossibilities by their own action^—are returned?"