Nelson Evening Mail. MONDAY, MAY 14, 1917. ALLIED STRATEGY IN THE WEST.

Nelson Evening Mail, 14 May 1917, Page 4

Nelson Evening Mail. MONDAY, MAY 14, 1917. ALLIED STRATEGY IN THE WEST.

ALJLi eyes are turned' towards the West-] ern front at the present time, and news of further developments is awaited with ] the greatest interest. Everyone knows that this is the time of one of the war's greatest crises, and decisive results may oe near at hand. The German submarines are endeavouring to weaken the i striking force of Britain and France hi the West, but bad as the losses are, there is valid evidence that the Germans will not succeed in this respect. In 1 tracing the gradual development of the I plan by which the enemy is being both

weakened and pushed back in France it fs possible to form some idea of what is likely to happen in the future, always providing, however, that no new features are introduced, and this is always possible. At the same time, while making no attempt at prophecy, and Dearing in mind that possibilities alone ar e being considered, it may prove helpful to trace what has been done, and observe what a continuation of similar i tactics may mean. After the triumph of the Somme, the disappointment of the Aisne, the extension of the trenches lines to the sea, and the repulse of the German thrust for Calais, the Allies, as the Telegraph explains, found themselves "up against it" in more senses than one. They found themselves everywhere opposed by the great L-shaped line. | which formed until lately the German 1 front in the west. They had proved that they could hold that'line: Verdun I was only an additional. proof. It bef came now their buisriess to break through j it or bend it back, not for the sake merely of gettiog the enemy out of Belgium "and France, but with the double object of doing that and smashing Germany's military power. Without moving forward they could do neither of these things. The talk about killing Germans without moving forward was I part bunkum and part bluff, to cover the } fact that the mechanical means so necessaryi to the tremendous undertaking ! ahead were not yet ready. Loos, I Chapelle, the two French and one BriI tish Artoi's thrusts, the Champagne must ! all be considered, whatever may have i been hoped from them at the time, as j mere trial and preparation work ; a beJ ginning was made on July 1, 1916, on j iSomme. The German front, being I L-sbaped, it was decided, one may in- | fer, to make so great a,dent in one or both sides of the L,that. those sections of the enemy front which were contiguous with the sides of the dent should be left in the form of great salients too dangerous for the enemy to. hold. .It may be that before the enemy's Verdun thrust compelled--France to" strengthen her defence in that region, it was inwnde,4 to attempt twin thrusts, the) French pushing up in the Champagne as well as the French and British on the ISomme. .At any rate only . one thrust .was delivered, the Allies acting in' co-operation, against the lower part of the shaft of. the L, on the Somme. The result .we- nave seen lately in the Gpeat Retirement, for the Ancre thrust merely continued the work begun on the Somme." The two great enemy salients now created had to be drawn in.

So far past operations have been l briefly stated. At present- the Gei--mansare trying- hard to stop their own retirement, and the British and French are striking- heavily at each end of the lino, as well as doing a good deal at various other sectors. The line in question, as is well known, is bounded on the north by a point .-\bove Lens, and on the south at Auberive, east of Rheims, in western Champagne. To keep up th e fighting on so large a .front would amount to the abandonment of the wedge-thrust principle, that has produced such important results, in favour of the old method of frontal' attack. Frontal attack involves the dissipation along a wide frontage of power which, if concentrated at one or more -points on that frontage, might be sufficient to break or -r-uish in the enemv's line. It means, as the Telegraph, points out, abandoning the attempt' to obtain the extremely important indirect results which follow from the creation of salients too dnn-2ei-ous to be held. If, therefore, the Allies proceed with the course they have followed hitherto, if no new factor interferes with it, and if the enemy's resistance does not crack' up in the middle of things, one would f exnect to -see the intensity of the struggle slacken soon except at a fdw points. , At these points there will be, in fa : ct is already at some, a redoubling'of intensity. Efforts may be expected to drive great wedges into the enemy's front, in order to produce in it or bulges from which the enemv wj'ould' find it necessary to retire. If this /happens. it will mean that the Allies are aiminor at bringiag about a succession of enemy retirements. TJaon is of extreme importance to _ the Germans.' for if the}"' are forced to leave it by wedges driven in by the British from the north-east or by a wedse driven in bv the French from the south, a very

large tract of country will have to be given up also. There' are several lines of defence that the Germans may take

up, but the Allies may repeat the process of driving in huge wedges and thus force one.retirement after another. These lines, will not' b> lightly"given up, 'and the aim is to so weaken the enemy as to cause 'his retirements to get out of hand, and once this occurs the end will not be far distant.