Nelson Evening Mail. MONDAY, JULY 24, 1916. GERMAN PLANS ANTICIPATED.

Nelson Evening Mail, 24 July 1916, Page 4

Nelson Evening Mail. MONDAY, JULY 24, 1916. GERMAN PLANS ANTICIPATED.

IT will be remembered that some f~\v weeks ago very interesting remarks on the disposition of German forces made by Lieut.-Colonel A'Court Repington, the 'military correspondent of the 'Times. were cabled to us. The full text has now arrived by mail, and those who are following the progress of the war as closely as it is possible to do so, will find, his remarks of special interest, both for the fact, that they raise tho question whether the Allies' offensive has anticipated Germany's scheme and also for the light they throw on the vital question of German reserves. Colonel Repington's criticism of the War Office has at times appeared- to be unreasonable, but his admitted standing- as a military writer, aad the fact that ho has open to him sources of information not available to the ordinary writer, cause his comments to he seriously considered. It/may be concluded that whether the deductions he draws are correct or not. his basis of argument, unless expressly stated, is founded on fact. 'When this certainty does not exist, he makes the point clear to his readers. What' he said on the occasion stated above is this :—"The German hand is now almost completely exposed, and, though there are some good' cards; in it, we are satisfied that ours are better. The Germans have I'l9 divisions (a division is usually 20,000 men) in the West, 49 on the Russian front, and two or three south of the Danube. The Anstrians have 76 divisions in all. of which 42 fare .Russia, and 30 oppose Italy, The Turks ha\e 52 divisions, and, the Bulgars a dozen or so. We have 311 hostile divisions against us, but tho defeat of the German.. 119 in the West, or of the Austro-Grmean 91. on the Russian front, or of any considerable fractions of those two main groups, will bring the rest of the hostile confederation to its knee.-?. It remains true that it is the German army upou which all our other enemies lean for support, and if, from tho first, the amateurs of our War Council had recognised that, we could conquer all our enemies by conquering one of them, our enterprises would have been singularly simplified. Inasmuch as we have not struck with all our might at the common centre of gravity of the whole war, we have been unprofitable servants. It has been the dispersion of the efforts of the Allies that, has been our bane. "The German Staff make it a boast that •''their 25 divisions before Verdun have been opposed by 'sl "French. There have, of course, 'been 30 divisions of Germans ■fighting- at Verdun : but. whichever figure we take, no better proof could be afforded of the miscalculation of the German command than this instructive comparison. For 25 or 30 German divisions to attack an entrenched enemy, who has double the number of divisions at his command, is not an act of sanity, and/ wo can be sure that the only reason why Falkenhayn has not piled on more troops ' is that he has no more to pile. He has called up to Verdun the one and only German division at disposal i'- reserve on the whole of the Eastern front, and he has also probably brought up the few divisions from Serbia to try to make good. Ho can do no more without weakening the armies holding the rest of the line, uukss he has fresh formations in the interior of 'Germany to bring forward, and, though the writer cannot speak with assurance on this latter subject, it is certain that no such formations have yet been seen at the front. What is the German game now ? Probably he hoped to overwhelm Verdun and its defences, and then, sending his heavy batteries and surplus divisions to join the 40 divisions which he has north of the Somme, to overwhelm us in our turn. lit was pretty desperate strategy, but beggars cannot be choosers, and, as Clausewitz taught his pupil, Prince, it is sometimes necessary to do things, when the chances of suceeding are against us, for the excellent reason that we can do nothing better. We cannot, b. sure

(hat the- second' ad of the drama will' not now bo played, for the Germans have not moved a man from the British front during the. Verdun operation, despite tlieir crying need for men. It is a German interest t<> cover up the defeat at Verdun by some success elsewhere, and it may be true (hat the perseverance at Verdun is intended to foster the illusion that Germany is still the strongest, and rules the roost. We know better, and if the Germans are pleased to suffer a quarter of a million casualties in a nervous effort to hide from us the truth they are wasting tluir time. They have a floating balance of some 15 diviisons which they throw this way and that in the research for a decision, but such strategic reserves are not enough for (he war at its present stage, and it. is no use to pretend (hat they are. Naturally, tliis moving spectacle of the gallantry of the .French at Verdun, and the much less moving spectacle of the passivity of France's allies elsewhere, cause impatience in many quarters, and we i.u 'England are not exempt from this feeling. 'We are positively sick of seeing the initiative with the Germans, and ask wnafc our great armies in France are about. But this impatience should be curbed. We can only attack with success 40 strong German divisions, well entrenched, and provided with formidable obstacles 'and armament, when we have the necessary superiority to make success assured, and meanwhile, assuming for argument's sake, that the German figures for Verdun are correct, we hold up 40 German divisions, and enable 51 French divisions —we take the German figure—to exhaust 25 German. This suits us all — or, at least, all except the German—very well, and meanwhile we have our own ideas of what we shall do, and when we shall do it, and do not intend to allow the' Germans to choose our hour for us.'