Nelson Evening Mail. THURSDAY, JULY 6, 1916. OPERATIONS ON THE EASTERN FRONT.

Nelson Evening Mail, 6 July 1916, Page 4

Nelson Evening Mail. THURSDAY, JULY 6, 1916. OPERATIONS ON THE EASTERN FRONT.

ai was .not to .be expected! .that the Russian- offensive, on the' Eastern, front would succeed as rapidly as was the case in the surprise stages ofy the attack—nor was it hoped- that- this would be the case, for -there is always great danger, and especially is this so in the East, Test any . forward movement should exceed -itself. Most of the set-backs on the Fastern front ,have resulted from a victorious army -not knowing where to stop. 'W!"hi Ist iit- may be easyto keep t'he er.Omy en the run for the time there is always the danger of the advance out-rmining the resources and -facilities for transport. But in this instance the advance does- not appear to have proceeded- too far, .a.nd judlgiwg from the cable message®, the Russians are 'able to deali -with the concentrations the Austro-Germans have now -been ia>bl : e to bring a'gainst them. In an offensive conducted on- so wide a front the critical isteg-e comes after the initial breaks in the enemy line have beeint ,-miaide. The aittackers have then to withstand the Teinforced counter-at-tacks that., are bqiynd to follow unless the enemy armies are "utterly defmoralisedi; tbev have to make good positions won, and tihey have to consolidate all their gains ini such a way that -they can with -safety continue .their advance. ( to 1 the strategic objectives which they had ! in view. • , j As 'has been previously! pointedl out. three rents were torn in the Ausitro-German lines of" defence:—one in | the Lutsk region, the second between j Bnczacz on the. Lower St-rypa and the: Dniester, a;nd the third to the north ;of 'Czernowitz, between the Dniester and the Pru:th. The Russian objective apparenttl'y is to seize important railway centres like Kovel and Lemberg, and by this roearts force the retreat of troops still re si ailing frontal attacks to the north of the Lutsk breach and on t-liei Middle Stryp-a and elsewhere. It is ini Bukowina where the .Russian®, i't seems, have ibeen most successful. General von Pflanzer's -army! was not- only put in full retreat, but also divided. Part of has been driven westward' past which has been taken, "while anothei portion liaisi been making south' ior 'Dorna Watra, in the ex'treme south■west comer of ißnkowma, 'whence it could, effect a. wd-thdlrawal rtluro-ugh t-he passes of the Eastern Carpathians. A third section has been pushed! close to the Roumanian frontier. In dealing with the .possibilities on the southern portion, of the Eastern, 1 ront., Mr E. I*. Allan -points ouit that, the southern Russian- movement will doubtless' be combined with a movement from tne Strvpa ■upon Lemb'sirg from the \Vest. He mentions that on its lower course the Strvpa, like the other northern, tributaries of the. -Dniester, runs through deep-cut canyons. This canyon formation begins some little, distance to the north of B'uczacz. and consequently between Bu'czacz, -where -there is a good crossing, and 'the Dniester, there is scarcely a. sin-cle crossing of tho Strvpa really practicable for ip-ilitary purposes. Above the deep canyon formation The river runs for some miles between firm banks that are not very high. Above this length of firm but comparatively low banks the river lias marshy tlat country; on either side. Hence, it is •upon thet stretches just above the canyons I'hat tiho 'best points for an ad vance ire to be found. Therefore the Ryussians have been faced witli tlib- necessitv of carrying Austrian positions on -the iStrypa immediately to the north of Bucaacz." And is. Avhere . the

enemy, realizing the? value of the positions, has- largely concentrated his forces. | Mr Allan: considers that General Brus- j fiiloff hopes to compel the withdlrawa:! of the enemy from the Tarnopol and Upper I ■Strypa lines bv enveloping- them from (the south 'through an extended Buczacz breach and from the north by an ad- { vance of the southern wing of his i armies coming through the Lutsk breach. And it is -through the Lutsk gap that the Riussians have made most - progress, next to that achieved in Bukowina, and t'he strategic importance of the advance from Lutsk is far greater than that of an advance in Bukowina. • Througih the Lutsk breach the .Russian forces at once began a three-fold roovaiient One was in a northerly and north-westerly direction, to strike at the enemy positions on and- between -the Styr and Stotckod Rivers, both tributaries of the Pripat, andi to push along the Lutsk-Kovel rail- | way, to Kovel. Against the northerly and north-westerly movement from tihe Lutsk gap the enemy 'has- presented a ! stulbborn defence. The second movement through the Lutsk -gap was along the roads leading -to Vladimir Volynsky, a railway ' terminus of strategic value in: the Upper Tiu-g Valley. This, too, is now strongly opposed by the Russians. The third 1 movement through the gap has fo far produced the best results. It is along the D'ubno-Lemiberg railway. How long it wiJI take the Russians to reach the important railway centres of Kovel a Hid Leniber.g remains to be seen. Strong forces have ! been concentrated against them, but their progress lias not been stopped', andi whilst the operations m-av take some Li-nte, there seems to be no reason why they should net be successful.