Nelson Evening Mail. TUESDAY, MAY, 30, 1916. THE IMPORTANCE OF A BALKAN CAMPAIGN.

Nelson Evening Mail, 30 May 1916, Page 4

Nelson Evening Mail. TUESDAY, MAY, 30, 1916. THE IMPORTANCE OF A BALKAN CAMPAIGN.

It is reported from Salonika in connection with the crossing of the Greek frontier by the Bulgarians that everything points to an important movement in- Greek Macedonia, This recrudescence of activity in the Balkans turns attention to German ambitions in this part of the world. There are, says Mr P.. W. Seton-Watson. in the April Contemporary Review, three stages in the Pan-German plan—first, the creation of "Mitteleuropa." a great Central European State-organism of 130-150,000,000 inhabitants as an economic and' military unit; second, the realization- - of the dream of "Berlin-Baghdad" by the inclusion within the political and economic sphere of influence of the new Zollverein of all the territory lying* between the Hungarian frontier and. the Persian Gulf; and third, jhe achievement of naval .supremacy and world power. Britain is faced 1 by the alternative of opposing this programme or accepting it as'inevitable. This writer is very careful Ito impress upon his readers that though the inevitable nature of Britain's participation in land operations ';ii the West has long been obvious to almost everyone, !the equally urgent and overwhelming need of countering the Germans in Eastern Europe is even today not sufficiently realized. It is still possible, he says, to bear. the argument i-.bat if tho Germans could be exp?l!ed from Belgium and Northern France—nothing is fiaid of ino methods to be employed—our aim in the war would be achieved. The important point to remember., is that in one of its main aspects 'this Avar is the decisive, struggle of Slav and German, and upon it depends the final settlement of the Balkan and Austrian problems. The authority quoted points out that on the manner of this settlement and' on its completeness depends, in turn the question whether ■this war is to be followed by staple peace in Europe or by the creation of an armed camp, stated in another form, the main task which faces the AWies is that of releasing thirty-five million Slavs and Latins whom Germany is to-day ruthlessly exploiting and who are compelled to shed their blood in a quarrel which is not theirs, and agairost their closest friends and kinsmen. It is only by their emancipation that the effectual obstacle to German aggression can be created, and Germany- restricted to those natural limits within which she would cease to be a danger to the peace of Europe. The essential preliminaries then are 'the expulsion of the Turks from Europe and the disruption of the Halsburg Monarchy into its component parts. On its ruins new and vigorous national states will arise. The great historic memories Of .the past will be adapted to modern economic necessities. Poland, Bohemia and Serbia will ibe restored to the- wmmon/ wealth of nations, and in their new form will constitute a chain of firm obstacles on the path of German aggression. As a second line behind these Slavonic States, the -writer goes on to point.out, we should aim at creating an Indepeudemt "Hungary, stripped''of its oppressed nationalities and reduced to us true ■Magyar kernel; and Greater Koumaiiia, consisting of the- present kingdom, augmented by the [Roumanian aistriets oi Hungary, Bukowiiia, and Bessarabia. Beiiiiiu. tnese again would stand Greece and Bulgaria as national States, the latter purged of her evil desire to exercise hegemony over the Peninsula. Finally, liussia would control Constantinople ana the Straits, thus restoring tiie Cross to its true place upon the Golden Horn, and at tne same time , satisfying, the longing and need for an access to the open, sea which has underlain Prussianpolicy for at least two centuries. Mr Seton-Wiatsou; then goes on to make some weighty observations regarding Austria-Hungary. The alarmist, he begins, will seek to oppose such a programme by the argument that it involves assigning the German provinces of Austria, to.'Germany, and thus aggrandising an enemy 'whom it must be i out aim. to weaken by every means in our power. Such arguments are, however, entirely specious. In >the first place there is no power on earth which could keep the Germans of Austria and of the Empire apart, if they determined to unite, and it is quite impossible for us to lay down a principle of nationality as the basis, of settlement, and then to deny it to the most powerful and corn-

pact of all the European nations. Moreover, jn it-he event of our victory—and all speculation is worthless in any other event—Germany will presumably lose

the greater part of Alsace-Lorraine and Posen; and thus any accession of Austrian territory would leave, her virtually where she was before. -But the decisive reason is ithe fact that the sole alternative to the completion of German national unity is the survival of AustriaHungary, and in present circumstances this can- only mean the lattei's reduction to complete military, political, and economic vassalage to Germany. The events of the war have amply demonstrated the Dual Monarchy's dependence upon German discipline and organising (talent, and if for no other reason, this dependence will tend to increase more and more rapidly, as the result of economic exhaustion and imminent bankruptcy. Possible failure in other directions will only strengthen Germany's •hold upon the Monarchy, which,, according to the Pan-German plan., is regarded :as a fertile .field for German colonisation.

In other -words, Ave are faced by the alternatives of breaking up Austria-Hun-gary—in which, case Germany obtains an addition, of nine million inhabitants, but is restricted to her natural limits, and is surrounded by new and virile national States—or of permitting its suKfival and thus securing to Germany the final assertion of political control over its fiftyone million inhabitants, and thus indirectly mastery of Central Europe and the control of the- Adriatic, the Balkans and 'Constantinople.