JAPAN AND THE ALLIES

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume XLIX, Issue XLIX, 6 January 1916, Page 3

JAPAN AND THE ALLIES

BARON IvAT'Q ON QUESTION OF MILITARY AID. I _ I Baron Kato, ex-Foreign Minister of 0 ;p all (cabled the Tokio correspondent of "The Times" on September 9), spoka at a reception at Himcji on diplomacy and foreign; affairs, with particular reference to the proposed despatch i>i Japanese troops to Europe. He said : "The present condition of the Empire is as difficult- as it is interesting. Among some politicians Japan's participation in the carnage in Europe is advocated, but the realisation of such a. course is a plain impossibility, to say nothing of the complete absence of a proper 'casus belli.' According to military experts, in order to render Japanese reinforcements really effective a large number of soldiers must- be despatched, for which purpose, however, Japanese vessels are too ( limited in transport capacity. 1 his difficulty mught be, overcome by a special agreement with the Allied Powers for the supply of their own transports ; but another, and sti'l more serious, difficulty, is the financing of such a- step. "The expenditure required for sustaining Japanese reinforcements in Europe would amount to thousands of million veil per annum. How is this enormous sum to 'be raised ? In order to maintain the authority and honour of the State we must put out of consideration all idta of fighting at- the expen.se of others. Going a step farther, and assuming that Japan- resorts to loans for the purpose, how will she raise or redeem such loans.' In short, Japan's participation in the actual hostilities in Europe is impossible both in practice and principle. "How is the Empire, then, to assist the Allied Powers? The best and only wav is to supply them with munitions of war. According to press reports, the Government seems to have -been approached by the Allied Powers with a request for the supply of ammunition on a large scale. It will be beyond the power of the Empire, however, to. undertake such huge supplies as completely to satisfy the Allies' requirements, but what Japan can do she will do. "As to the fyture development of the European situation, ithe fact is indisputable that Germany must- suffer final defeat. It is also *to be admitted that, -,having lived in -a comfortable atmos- ; phere°of' peace for so many years, Great Britain -seems to b& a little slow in bringing her po\ver into full- play. For example, while the aristocracy are volunt.mi 1 v going to the front for the sake of 1 their counttry, the majority of the people are apparently quite unconcerned. It is when Englishmen really rise to the occasion that- the country will come to pla v the most significant- part in the war.

"Among some sections of the Japanese public Germany's power is over-estimat-ed. The impression gains ground in some quarters that the Germans will win the final victory, and will then wage a war of revenge upon this Empire. It needs no great wisdom or foresight to see that such fears are entirely groundless^' ."Special emphasis must be given to the fact that the Japanese ought to rise above-making diplomatic questions political party weapons, if they are really sincere in their desire to attain diplomatic success. In the press of late much has been said of what is called 'pub.ic diplomacy.' "While this deserves consideration in theory, yet certain limits should be observed. {Diplomacy often requires secrecy. It is a great mistake, and may becorne a great danger, for the people to insist on the disclosure of diplomatic affairs, which they may do when intoxicated by the talk of popular diplomacy. In order to ensure diplomatic success a more prudent attitude on the part of the press and the public is as imperative as the unity of the Government and people is necessary."