Nelson Evening Mail SATURDAY, MARCH 9, 1912. NAVAL STRATEGY.

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume XLVII, Issue XLVII, 9 March 1912, Page 4

Nelson Evening Mail SATURDAY, MARCH 9, 1912. NAVAL STRATEGY.

CAPTAIN MAHAN'S NEW BOOK. ALL these who have read Captain Mahan s bock entitled "The Influe nee of Sea Power upon History," which was published twenty years <igo, and which still stands wood to-dav, will welcome his latest work. "Naval Strategy." It is hardly necessary to dwell upon the capabilities of the writer, who approaches the subject- notonly with literary power, and a fluentpen, but also with expert knowledge as a seaman. These qualities, combined with his skill in deduction, have Tong established him as the leading naval critic of the time. The book represents

an extension ot a series of lectures delivered to the United States War College at. intervals between 1887 and 1911. In view of the stupendous developments that have taken place during that time, it- seems, at first sight, a rather useless task to bring the whole period down into practical form.. Within that term oi years there has been an enormous revolution in naval warfare—not in the principles which rule strategy, as the author is careful to point out, but in the development and application of those principles.

Captain Mahan enumerates, for instance, the disappearance of the ram from consideration as a weighty factor in tactics, and. on the other hand, the progress of the submarine, the immensely increased range of the automobile tor pedo. and the invention of wireless telegraphy. These, in brief, are the facts enumerated. The submarine and the greater range of the torpedo must necessarily place a far greater strain on blockaders, while as for wireless telegraphy, which is as yet merely in its. infancy, how can one, he asks, predict any limit to its developments? A significant example of its use is related by the author when he reminds his readers that Togo was enabled to await Rozjhestvensy at Port Arthur securely at anchor, whereas, if he had had to rely upon a scouting system, dependent- upon flags or lights for the transmitting of information, lie might havo had to keep nearer the line of the enemy's route at the probable disadvantage of remaining at sea. That concentration is the great factor in strategy, on sea as well as on land, is, in a few words, the chief lesson which Captain Mahan emphasises in this book. His argument against the division of fleets is ifliat if an enemy finds either section, he is in largely superior force-, and therefore at an advantage ; and in proof of his contention, he points to the experiences of the Dutch and British in 1652-1654, when there was this division between the North Sea and the "Mediterranean, and of the Russians in the war with Japan, when, as he submits, their fleet was destroyed by the Japanese chiefly because it was divided between the Baltic and Asiatic coasts of Russia.

Hence, his advice is that two things should not be attempted at the same time, unless the force at command, is evidently so superior, that there will bo cledrly more than «nough for each, and, to Support this conclusion, he quotes the dictum of Nelson, when, ill sending two frigates upon some expedition, ho charged their captains.: "If you meet two enemies, do not each attack one. Combine both on one of tne enemy. You will make sui\- of the one, tmcl you may also get the other afterwards ; but, whether the second escape or not, your country will have won victory and gained a ship." Captain Mahan then goes oil to reveal the growing importance of naval strategy. Since 1397, when the European situation was considered to be "sound, there lias been remarkable growth on the part- of Germany, in industrial commercial, and naval power, and coincident with this German development has been the decline of llussia, the stagnation in France, and the closer alliance of Germany and Austria. This situation, he points out, has forced Cimit Britain out of the isolation which the balance of power' permitted her, an forces its lessons for America, as well as for the nations of Europe. But going on to deal with the principles of naval strategy, which is Captain Mahan s special*subject, he refers to the fact that war i* a business of positions, not so much on account of the positions, themselves, as of tho men who utilise them, and in coining tho aphorism that m ' inv: ,l war the flee*, itself is the key position of the whole situation, he repents merely from another p-Miit ot view the truism which applies to these lands—that if the fate of the country is to be decided in naval conflict, the battic will b- I'ou'jht, not- on these coasts, but. thousands of miles away.