Nelson Evening Mail SATURDAY, APRIL 20, 1907. GENERAL KUROPATKIN & THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR. REVELATIONS AND CRITICISMS.

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume XLII, Issue XLII, 20 April 1907, Page 2

Nelson Evening Mail SATURDAY, APRIL 20, 1907. GENERAL KUROPATKIN & THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR. REVELATIONS AND CRITICISMS.

IN spite of the censorship exercised in St. Petersburg, General Kuropatkin's history of the Russo-Japanese war has become accessible to the outside world. The book was actually confiscated by tho Russian Government, for in Russia there is no sense of sportsmanlike fair play. The great and patriotic Kuropatkin, well advanced in years, with tho well-deserved honours of a lifetime his own, instead of retiring on his laurels, felt his country's need of him, and weut to Manchuria in command of the Russian forces. No human being .could have averted the disasters that overtook the army — its foes were from within — corruption, disorganisation, ineptitude. Yet Kuropatkin was recalled, his fame sacrificed. To vindicate himself, he wrote his history of the war; whereupon his ungrateful masters seized his book and denied him the only redress he could obtain. However, a copy, or the manuscript, has found its way out of Russia, and it is securing the circulation which is its right. The work, says a Petersburg correspondent, writing on February 14, is remarkable for its historic value, as the closing chapter of the war from the pen of the Commander-in-Chief, and for the merciless criticism of men and measures which in Kuropatkin's estimate swept Russia and its army to defeat. The book consists of three bulky volumes, respectively devoted to the battles of Liaoyang, of the Sha river, and of Mukden. Voluminous general orders, statistics, reports, and other documentary matter with "conclusions" constitute most amazing revelations of disorganisation, and incapacity, and Bven of disobedience of specific and urgent orders by certain General officers , entrusted with high commands in the field, notably General Kaulbars, r

against whom a formidable indictment is framed, saddling upon him the. entire responsibility for tho defeat at Mukden. # a * # * General Kuropatkin attributes the failure of Russia in the Manchuria campaign to a variety of causes. But lie bases his principal reasons on a comparison between the warlike spirit of the Japanese, their preparedness, and their valour, which he says had never been sien in previous wars, and the disadvantages of Russia, such as the single-track railway, which had to carry all her troops and munitions far from her base. Japan had the lliil.lllrlcal superiority necessary in assuming the offensive, together with comploto discipline and organisation; whilo tho Russian forces were hopelcsslv jn confusion and at crosß_ £ ur no6os. Commanding offices ivero disobeying orders ; the troops had no coliAdertcd; rti.il their morale was lowered by tlio cOntinuqiiß news from home of internal .Iroliblos and insults alia, re^roachfis against the Army in general- . The writer,pathetically declares "ihat. if Russia had been united and ready to make necessity to safeguard Her 'dignity . and integrity, the valiant Russian Army would have striven till the foe was subdued"." # « * # * The Mukden, volume opens with a sketch of the early events-. of the War, showing thiit there were divided, counsels from the outset over the defence of Port Arthur. During the^arlier period of tho ' campaign the General wrote to the Emperor: "Our task must be not to permit om troops to be beaten in detail, but. gradtiallj! to (Strerigthen them dhd. ,l-fej. arts qtirsplveS for an advance, We must begin it with sufficient forces, and not until we have all necessaries for an uninterrupted France during - CDliiparatlvely ' long movement." Kuropatkin shows how his efforts to realise this were checkmated by the " deficiencies of the army and the lack of transport and artillery horses. He eays'thab ifl reviewing the Russian troops he noticed, a. significant lack ot strength, especially. ■in the officers, among reservists, many, pf wh'oili were old and tlie. majority /'heavy, clumsy, or un'dersized." 'Company commanders <lid not know their men, and among 'them were many who had just been appointed to commands, and were quite unfit for their work. The nerraiive throughout iS a 'dismal t'ctrbkpect of unpreparedness, disorganisation, and cross purposes. The disaster of Lioa-yang was due largely to lack of great effort by the troops and to the need of more capable handling by their leaders. In the retreat from Llao-yang to Mukden the troops lost their heads and gave way to panic. The indecisive result of the battle of fehf. river is acounted fof its follows :— "First, lack of skill displayed by the eastern army chief in handling the large force entrusted to him." "Second, absence of firm handling of their troops by leaders of western attachments/ "Third, unsuccessful tactics dnd lack ,of, energy j of. the.'fei.Un AHliy Corps cotnhiander, * wHo i-et ivell tiiinecessarily from the bank of the Sha river without even warning his neighhour commanding the First Army Corps." "Fourth, unsuccessful operations of the commander of the 31st Infantry Division, who several times unnecessarily retired his troops." "FiTih, insufficient firmness of many troops who left their ranks under the pretext of carrying wounded to the rear, or without any pretext." "Sixth, lack of co-operation of units of the Sixth .Siberia." Corps.' 1 "After all, Port Arthur. Kuropatkin describes his plan fdr a great turning movement, and blame for its failure is thrown on General Grippenberg. "It is regrettable," says Kiiropall-iri, "that a fortnight WlcV'S Ilie commencement of our 'Advance the chances of success were ' overturned by certain orders of General Grippenberg, which revealed to the enemy the nature of nur intended ,movements." » 4 • • « • To show how inept were i*ie generals of the Russian army, Kuropatkin says 'it was impossible for the reverse at Sandepu to be otherwise than a reverse. Not only were the. troops unprepared — the leadfetS did not know whero tK«.y Were. The environs and fortifications of the village of Sandepu had not been studied, and no sketches of the ground had been prepared. As a result the artillery had fought for a whole day against Bastadge instead of Sandepu, and occupie^d it, actually thinking it Sandepu. The commander actually reported to Kurbpalkin the occupation ot Saildepu,. When he had actually got into Bastadge to the westWard by mistake ! The outer wall of Sandepu was mistaken by the Fourteenth Division for the redoubt inside, and the division Retired under the notion that it was not strong enough to make a capture ! Stackelberg, noticing that Sandepu was not taken, in spite of the order twice given by Grippenberg to stop the advance, did not find it possible to obey, and after a very hard battle took the greater part of Sandepu towards the evening, but at dawn was attacked by superior forces and forced to ret; e." • • • • ft a The r istake at Sandepu, and the failure of ( - rippenberg to report to Kuropatkin r.t a critical juncture — the impossibility of instructing Grippenberg when he and Kuropatkin met, owing to the former's deafness — made a failure of the first attempt of the Russians to adopt offensive tactics. . The reverse cost Russia 10,000 men. At- that time, the Japanese were still held in contempt by "the generals. Such disregard and disrespect of a resourceful enemy were noticeable throughout the whole war on the part of almost all the higher officers on their arrival at the front. But after the first collision this contempt gave place to an almost equally extreme over-estimation till the Japanese troops established a panic throughout all arms. It is impossible in the space at command to deal as fully as it deserves with Kuropatkin's work. But translations are already being made, and presently even Russian censorship wiii not be able to prevent the world learning the true history of the Manchurian debacle. Even as the shameful story of the Baltic Fleet and of Stoessel at Port Arthur has come to light slowly but surely, so also will Kuropatkin's self-vindication reach the hands o£ the great reading public that forms international opinion. It is due to a great and patriotic R,ussian that this should be so.