Nelson Evening Mail. FRIDAY, JANUARY 23. DE WET'S WAR BOOK SOME CURIOUS MISCONCEPTIONS.

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume XXXVII, Issue 18, 23 January 1903, Page 2

Nelson Evening Mail. FRIDAY, JANUARY 23. DE WET'S WAR BOOK SOME CURIOUS MISCONCEPTIONS.

II.! WE continue from Weduosday the notice and interesting extracts from General Christian De Wet's book on the Boer war. It ia worth noting that before he became a soldier Pc Wet was a butcher, like some other great guerilla generals. At one time he had the monopoly of the meat trade of Pretoria, De Wet repudiates the term "guerilla," and devotes a whole chapter to proving that he wasn't one. He says his mobility was a deliberate military policy, rendered necessary after: the fatal mistake of Cronje in " sitting tight" at MagersfonteinandFaardeburg. He explains the position as follows:— ■..-'.'•'■ * * * ■ De Wet claims to have speedily discovered the objects of the British in their frontal attacks, it being intended to give the impression " that they were able to attack us at any moment and to keep* us tied to our positions. In the meantime they were making preparations in another direction for the movement which was really intended— namely, the advance of Lord, Roberts with his overwhelming force." ; ■ -.* «■•:_■. • Cronje fdiscovered his luistajte ; ivhflti too late in spite of t lie Brit iV h \ lisaetei' at Magerßfoateiiv, and De , says that it Orpnje had not

obstinately held by his trenches and echanzes he might have escaped from Paardeburg, through a way opened for Mm near Stinkfontein by De Wet and Botha. The attempt to relieve Cronje is thus described : — *' What a spectacle we saw ! All round the laager were the guns of the English) belching forth death and destruction, wh'le from within it at every moment, as each, successive shell tore up the ground, there rose a cloud — a dark red cloud of dust." How to pierce the English lines of investment was the problem that presented itself. "General Botha and I," says De Wet, " then arranged that he should storm the houses, kraals, and garden walls of Stinkfontein, whilst X charged the ridges. And this we did, nothing daunted by the tremendous rifle , ire which burst upon us. Cronje's pitiable condition confronted us, and we had but one thought — Could we relieve him ? We succeeded in driving the English out of Stinkfontein, and took 60 of them prisoners. The enemy's fire played on us unceasingly, and, notwithstanding the fact that we occupied good positions, we lost two men and had several of our horses kil'ed and wounded. We remained there for two and a-half days — from the 220 d bo the 25th of February, and then were forced to retire. While evacuating our positions three of my burners were killed, seven wounded, and 14 taken prisoners.'' Having made a way of escape for General Oronje, De Wet urged him to take advantage of it, but as escape involved the abandonment of his whole laager Cronje stubbornly clung to his position, with what result is well known. * ♦ ♦ Do Wet describes the retreat of the Boers on Bloeinfonteiu after I'aardeburg as " the wild flight from Poplar Grove," He had determined to continue the struggle notwithstanding the disaster, "notwithstanding the fact that- many of the burghers appeared to have quite lost heart," and had to be kept together with the Bjambok. He had expected a firm stand at Btoomfontein ; but he was doomed to bitter disappointment. He says :-* M First one position and then another was abandoned by our burghers, who followed one another's example like sheep ; few mojde auy attempt to defend their posts, and iv spite of my efforts aud those of the officers under me they retreated to the north. Thus, without a shot being fired Bloemfontein foil into the hands of the English." It is worth noting that in describing Boer disasters De Wet is haidly a generous critic. Not only I does lie speak bitterly, and even . contemptuously of Cronje, but he if* also unsparing of storm and in- ] vective against the blunders of Prinsloo and other commandant?. • * * Keferring to Cronje's refusal to leave Paardeburg by the way De Wet | claims to have opened for him at | Stinkfonloin, the plan being a night ' attack and a breaking through, lie Wet says :- — •'Bitter was my disappointment. Alas ! my last attempt had been all in vain. 'Hie stubborn General would cot listen to good advice. - . . His obstinacy in maintaining his position must be ascribed to the fact that it was too much to ask him — intrepid hero that he was— to abandon the laager. His view was that he must stand or fall with it, nor iid he consider the certain consequences of his capture. He never realised that it would be the cause of the death of many burghers, and of indescribable panic throughout, not only at all the laagers on the veldt, but even those of Colesberg, Stormberg, and Ladysmith. . . Had he but taken my advice, and attempted a night attack, be might have avoided capture altogether."' Of Prinsloo, notwithstanding the fact that that commander was entirely, and, apparently, hopelessly environed by General Hunter'b forces, De Wet says :— " The circumßtauc3s of this surrender were so suspicious that it is hard to acquit the man who was responsible for it of a definite act of treachery ; and the case against j him all the more grave from the fact that Vilonel, who was at that time serving a term of imprisonment for an act of high treason, had a share iv the transaction." « a ■ Lord Roberts comes ia for some very severe criticism. He is blamed for the disaster at Sanaa's Post, when General Broadwood's guns and convoy were captured by the Boers. It is explained that the battle occurred within seventeen miles of Bloomfouceii', whence Lord Roberts might have sent reinforcements at once fi'boi his 60,000 men. The excuse that the wires were cat and that intelligence could not be Qonvcyedia repudiated by De Wet, wljo says that the booming of the guns mnst have been heard at Bloemfontein, the fighting occupying four hours, De Wet also blames Lord Roberts for not sending reinforce- ! ments from Reddersburg to Mostertshoek, only five miles away,, when De Wet captured over 800 Irishf Rifles. * * * * In regard to the blockhouse eystem, De Wet tersely describes it under a chapter which might be headed " Blockhouses and Blockheads." Ho denies that the blockhouse system of operations exercised the least influence in bringing about the surrender. He says: — ; <c The English have been constantly boasting in the newspapers abjet the advantages of their blookbQQges, but they have never been able to give an instance of a capture effected by. them. On the contrary, when during the last stages of the war it happened, us it often did, that iht,y drove Home of oar nion ajgajnst ono or other of the gi'eat blockhouse lines which then intersected the country, and it became necessary for us to fight- our way through, w£ generally succeeded in doing so, and that with fewer casualties than when they concentrated their forces and formed a circle arouii.d us. ' De Wet further alleges that the cost of the blo:khoufos was money thrown away, and that the system prolonged the war by three months. It has been proved, however, that by the aid of the blockhouses the area of conflict was much circumscribed and our forces were able at last to "corner" the commandoes. Do Wet bases his contempt for the blockhouses on tb© eaue wi& whrcjj he himself got through some of them. But he overlooks the fact that other Boer commandaut£f were not as " slim " as he, and had not reduced Parthian tactics to a fine art add a science. Botha has a very different idea of the value of tha blookhouses, for he said at Vereeniging :— bouses. We could cross andrecross the tiouutry as we wished, and harass the enemy at every turn. But now things wear a very different aspect,

We can pass the blockhouses by night, indeed, but never by day. They are likely to prove the ruin of our commandoes." ■.■ • • • In a final notice of De Wet's book of the war it is intended to give us account of the earlier disasters to the British arms, and to refer generally to the record of Boer operations after the fall of Bloemit'ontein and Pretoria as conducted chiefly by De Wet on the system of "strike and run."