British Command Must Learn Lessons Of War

Northern Advocate, 27 May 1941, Page 10

British Command Must Learn Lessons Of War

With the evacuation of Greece the situation in the Mediterranean and the Middle East takes on a more sombre hue. Five months ago things in this part of the world looked black indeed, writes E. M. Macalpine from London to the “Daily Telegraph.” We were menaced by a huge Italian army which had invaded Egypt as far as Sidi Barani, and which strongly held all coastal towns stretching back to Tripoli. The Italians had driven us back from the Kenya border of Abyssinia; they had penetrated the Sudanese frontier at several points, and had wrested British Somaliland from us.

They were even threatening Aden and our communications in the Red Sea. Complete Change Then as if by magic the situation completely changed. General Sir Archibald Wavell, with Australians in the van, cut through the Italian army in Libya like a knife through butter, only resting when the whole of Cyrenaica was ours. Simultaneously the South Africans, Indians and Gold Coast troops started to drive the Italians completely out of their East African possessions. They not only recaptured British Somaliland, but mopped up Italian Somaliland, Eritrea and Abyssinia. Northwards, across the Mediterranean, the Greeks repelled the Italian invasion, driving them back across Albania. Reversed Then within a month the situation was completely reversed. Through a blunder—derived from self-satisfaction, lack of initiative, or inability to learn by experience—we threw away our gains in Cyrenaica by allowing German mechanised troops to cross from Sicily. We found ourselves hard-pressed at the very moment when we were going to Greece’s aid to meet the new German thrust from Bulgaria. We swung Yugoslavia into the Allied line too late for her to be effective, and she was overwhelmed. Threatened in Libya we had hurriedly to revise our Grecian plans, so cutting down our forces that what seemed to he a good fighting chance of success became a project foredoomed to failure.

Suez Menaced

So fast has the situation deteriorated that we now find Suez menaced, Palestine threatened, and even Iraq’s rebel Government Is cocking a snoot at us.

The Navy, which has done such valiant work clearing up the Mediterranean, may now have to fight for its very existence in that sea. A recital of these events is profitless unless we can draw a lesson from them. The first of these lessons can be summed up in a word —mechanisation. What happened in Benghazi—all excuses about lack of men or material aside—can simply be stated as a failure to appreciate the speed and scope of mechanisation lias given the Germans. . . .

We relied on “300 miles of waterless desert” between Tripoli and- Benghazi. Forgot Our Besson Having that mentality which belongs to the last war, we were caught napping even after, in our own splendid advance, we had demonstrated that deserts are not unsurmountable obstacles. The second lesson, in the words of Australia’s Prime Minister (Mr. Menzies), is: “We can’t play around with this war. We must give up any idea that we can approach it in amateur fashion. Everyone must be professional on this job.” Behind these statements is an implied criticism that finds many echoes here. There is a wrong psychological approach to the task we have ahead. We talk of “total war,” and in the next breath bring up that absurd historical cliche, “We lose every battle but the last.” Professional Job This parroting of contradictory phrases reveals a lack of real understanding, and this in turn leads to the employment of amateurs on what Mr. Menzies describes as a “wholetime professional job.”

This leads to the sort of Cabinet changes we have just seen. Meanwhile the nation remains only partially organised, with private interest everywhere clashing with national need. The third lesson we might draw from Greece is that wherever we can meet the enemy on anything like equal terms we can lick him. His victory in Greece cost him dear in men and materials, although he was opposed by a numerically inferior force. “Must Show Realism,” Just as at sea the Navy showed the Italians it can blow them out of the water even when outnumbered, so the British and Anzacs showed the Germans they can stop them in their tracks if given half a chance, and without even that half-chance can escape from under their noses. We must make our strategy fit our strength in the field. We might have taken Sicily; we might have grabbed Sardinia; we might have bombed Rumanian oil wells; and we might have struck against Hitler from the air before he got his troops and supplies peacefully manoeuvred into position in Bulgaria. Indeed, some believe we might have bombed Italy right out of the war several months ago. '-After Dunkirk we did marvellously, but then we slackened off. It is time we did it again, this time on a permanent basis.