The Northern Advocate Daily “NORTHLAND FIRST” Registered for transmission through the post as a Newspaper FRIDAY, MAY 10, 1940. What Will Mr Chamberlain Do?

Northern Advocate, 10 May 1940, Page 4

The Northern Advocate Daily “NORTHLAND FIRST” Registered for transmission through the post as a Newspaper FRIDAY, MAY 10, 1940. What Will Mr Chamberlain Do?

THE decision of the House of Commons, after hearing the Government’s defence of its conduct of the war, has made a deep impression on the nation. The fact that the Government secured a majority of only 81 has been construed as an indication that the House of Commons as a whole is not satisfied with the way in which the Government has directed Britain’s war effort. While the absence of approximately a hundred members of the House, who in normal circumstances might be regarded as supporters of the Conservative Party, robs the vote upon the no-confidence motion of some of the significance it would otherwise have possessed, the fact remains that those who voted for the amendment included a number of the Government’s own party. It is clear, from these developments, that the Government party is not solidly behind Mr. Chamberlain and the Cabinet, and there is growing a feeling that, in the face of dissatisfaction, prevalent in the country itself, there must inevitably be either a complete removal of the present Government or a strengthening of its ranks by the inclusion of Labourites and Liberals. The Country is awaiting with keen interest the decision which Mr. Chamberlain will make following upon the expression of Parliament’s opinion. Mr. Chamberlain, it is reported, is to see His Majesty the King today, and it is likely that an announcement will subsequently be made by him. The tone of the debate in the Commons left no room for doubt that members were very seriously concerned about Britain’s war effort. There was no suggestion that the Allies were incapable of securing eventual victory if the best use were made of the tremendous resources of Britain and France, ; .but there was expressed grave fear, which will be shared by everybody, that if more force and greater initiative are not shown the war will be prolonged and Allied prospects of victory reduced accordingly. Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. Churchill, who were the principal speakers for the Government, made speeches which deserve close study. The Prime Minister held that the Government, in so far as the war in Norway is concerned, took the only course open to it without violating Norwegian neutrality. Britain was obliged, he argued, to await Norway’s-invitation, which meant, of course, that Germany, disregarding such punctillious regard for moral obligations, established itself in all the points of Norway that really mattered. The possession of landing grounds and harbours on the southern and western coasts of Norway gave the enemy an advantage which the Allies were unable to take away. This statement was a mere recital of fact, but it did not touch the point at issue: whether the Government had done everything it might reasonably have been expected to do in readiness for countering an invasion movement it should have expected Germany to make. Mr. Chamberlain did not produce evidence to prove that this foresight and caution were shown, for it is on record that, after the occupation of Oslo, Trondheim and other vital points, an emergency force of something like 12,000 British troops was landed at two points to the north and south of Trondheim. The troops were territorials, and they were unprovided with the planes, guns, tanks and other mechanised equipment with which to face German forces lavishly supplied with those instruments of war.

Why was it necessary to make such a hazardous effort, when proper preparation, or the preservation of the fully-equipped expeditionary force the nation was led to believe had been prepared to assist the Finns, would have made the British counter to Germany a very different affair? It was on this point that Mr. Chamberlain failed to convince his hearers that everything had been done that might have been done. Consequently, the verdict of the House of Commons is understandable.

Mr. Churchill, whose words upon matters military or naval are invariably weighty, was evidently not happy. He proved himself a loyal supporter of his colleagues, for though it was to be. discerned that, if he had possessed dictatorial powers, he might have ordered a naval attack on Trondheim, he took full share for the policy adopted by the Government. He declared that the Cabinet acted upon the advice of its experts, whose advice he personally believed was sound. It is clear from information now available, that the British authorities, when faced with an emergency, took a gambler’s throw with dice loaded against them. Upon whom should the responsibility be placed ? That is the question which the country has to decide. Press and public are solidly of opinion that a drastic change must be made in the direction of Britain’s war effort. The call is undoubtedly for the creation of a coalition war cabinet, but whether that will result in the retirement of Mr. Chamberlain and his ministers remains to be seen. That there is urgent need for action is undeniable. A crisis always calls for a victim, but it is essential that in a matter which affects the very life of the nation, the national interest, not that of class or party, should be the dominating consideration. If that essential is remembered, the British people may be expected to make a wise decision. However deplorable the need for a discussion such as took place in the British Parliament may have been, it will be profitable if it fires the nation to a realisation of the tremendous task confronting it and brings greater dash and determination into the Government’s conduct of the war. That is the vital need.