Tells of R.A.F's Handicaps

Northern Advocate, 9 May 1940, Page 5

Tells of R.A.F's Handicaps

The Secretary for Air (Sir Samuel Hoare) said that from the cutset the R.A.F. suffered under a most heavy handicap.

“We inflicted three times the losses on the German Air Force that they inflicted on us,” he said. “Ijn the course of 15 hours, 30 German machines were put out of • operation.” The Germans were in control of all the strategic aerodromes in Central and Southern Norway, where it was very difficult to improvise new landing places, he added. From the very outset, the R.A.F. was suffering under a very heavy handicap, remote from its bases, while the enemy had his bases on the spot, was operating on interior lines of commum'cation, and had many refuelling points between Germany and Scandinavia.

Everything Possible Done. While faced with the task of winning a foothold for the fighters in Norway, everything possible was being done to reduce the scale of the air attacks upon British sea bases. In the face of these difficulties there was no delay. Reconnaissances were made, and, taking the first night when the weather was possible for flying, intensive bomber attacks were started upon the aerodromes in Norway, on one of the key aerodromes in Denmark, and on one of the key aerodromes in Germany. Since then, day after day, and night after night, ;in the face of terrible weather conditions, and all the difficulties involved in the long flight backwards and forwards across the North Sea, these intensive attacks upon the chief points in the German position were made with definite. and marked results. They were able very materially to reduce the scale of air attacks on Brit--1 ish bases, and inflicted upon the German. Air .Force three times the losses suffered by the R.A.F. Lessons of Operations. After giving a stirring account of the experiences of pilots and airmen in these difficult and dangerous operations, .Sir Samuel Hoare discussed the lessons of the operations. The central issue was not to underrate the power of air bombing, and to realise the devastating effect when there was no counter action against ■the bombers.

! From the very first the air danger was realised, and the necessity of air bases in Norway from which the fighters could operate was apparent.

If Movement Had Succeeded—! He said that If the pincer movement between Namsos and Andalsnes had succeeded, the Allies should have got an airbase, but it did not succeed, and, in view of the scale of German bombing attacks, the maintenance of sea bases without a fighter force became impossible. No impartial judge would say it would have helped to have sent more aeroplanes or more troops. As long as the Allies could not maintain sea bases, the. effect of sending more aircraft would be to make the situation worse. On the other hand, he did not accept the other conclusion that, having no airbases, they should have done nothing. No responsible Government would have stood still in the face of the Norwegian appeal and the issues at stake. Had to Take Risk. “Inevitably we should have taken the risk,” he continued. “As to the, question: Is Germany’s air power invincible?—where we had fighters we had shown how well they can cope with the German bombers. “Eight months of war have shown the superiority of the British fighter over the German bomber. The operations Show that strong air power must be met by still stronger air power. “The fact that over hundreds of miles of the North Sea, night after night, we could maintain heavy-scale attacks, or inflict great damage upon two points of the German air attack, and, although it was a case of bombers very often being pitted against fighters, that we could take much heavier toll of their machines, showed the strength of British air power—in quality unsurpassed but in quantity not nearly big enough. “But production is gathering momentum. The figures for last month are by far the best we have ever had. The momentum is now gathering speed.” There w.as no foundation for rumours that a British squadron arrived in Norway without petrol and machines and was betrayed before it went into action, said Sir Samuel Hoare.