CRUCIAL PROBLEM

Northern Advocate, 7 April 1927, Page 5

CRUCIAL PROBLEM

RELATING TO ARMAMENTS

GENEVA PARLEY,

OPINION SHARPLY DIVIDED

(United Press Assn. —Copyright.) (Received 9 a.m.) GENEVA, April 6. sffhe complexity and difficulties or the disarmament problem were reI vealed 'when the Preparatory Com- | mission began its discussion on naval

j armaments. Lord Cecil, in opening lV.ie dci bate, contested the French, viewpoint

j as expressed in France’s draft plan, ] that if armies are numerically limitj cd, so must naval personnel bo limiti ed. He said the British Government’s ' view Was that the proper way lo limit the. strength of a fleet was to limit the number, size and power of the ships. This Britain was prepared to do drastically and very completely but she saw no necessity for limiting the effectives, which would ’occur automatically with the decrease of tonnage. The French proposal Avould complicate the convention and render ratification less likely. He added that I navies could not be made more forj midable by increasing their man-pow-er beyond actual needs, j Lord Cecil finally sprang a surprise | by saying he was not prepated to disj cuss the point further, as he had tdcj graphed to his Government for fresh instructions.

j M. Boncour rather sarcastically remarked that this was the second time the discussion had been suspended owing to Lord Cecil’s necessity for ; getting instructions. He proceeded to I argue that naval, military and aerial 1 strength, coast defence and expodi- ) tionary forces were inevitably bound 1 up, and if a single category were ig- ■ nored wholesale deception would bo ! possible by camouflaging the nature iof certain forces. He recalled the | part played in war-time by sailors, 1 who were not merely employed as j crews, but as landing parties. The American and Japanese delej gates supported Lord Cecil’s viewpoint and the Germans and Swedes j approved M. Boncour’s. Pending receipt of instructions reIgarding effectives, Lord Cecil proceeded to discuss the limitation cf material. He emphasised that the | whole existence of the British Emi pire depended on the security of its 1 communications. The cessation of sea 1 borne commerce would mean Britain’s ! starvation; therefore, the question j was of vital importance to the Brij nh, whose programme envisaged an ) agreement which would forestall S naval competition, secure fullest pub- ' licity so that every nation would be 1 aware of the naval strength of its | neighbours, and strengthen the psy-

j chology of security by eliminating i the “surprise .element,”

! Lord Cecil contended that the limitation of the number of ships was more important than the limitation of tonnage, numbers being an essential element in the strength of a fleet.

Lord Cecil added that Britain was convinced that the only effective measure wms fixing the. number of ships in each category. Unless such was known, competition w r as inevitable and surprises possible. Mr Sato favoured limitation by categories, and he opposed fixing the size of ships in each category.

M. Boncour said France favoured limitation by gross tonnage, because she wished to retain the right of disposal of the smaller classes of ships according to her special needs. The Swedish representative suggested, firstly, the limitation of total tonnage by all nations; secondly, the categorical limitation of tonnage by the Great Powers; thirdly, the advance , publication of all naval pro-

This appeared to evoke a spirit of compromise and the Commission adjourned, on M. Boncour’s promise to submit a new proposal.