Problems Facing Britain

Manawatu Times, Volume 64, Issue 184, 7 August 1939, Page 2

Problems Facing Britain

NAVAL OFFICER LOOKS AT THE PACIFIC

Lieutenant-Commander Kenneth Edwards, R.N., is naval correspondent to tho London Sunday Times and in a book he has written on the comparative strengths of world navies, their individual strategies, and tho problems of oach possible sphere of naval activity. “Uneasy Oceans” is a good title and its contents provide food for thought and, sometimes, mental mal de mer. He traces naval history since the Great War; the wise and statesmanlike naval Treaty of Washington signed in 1922 by war-weary pens; and the unwise and unstatesmanlike Treaty of London in 1930 that sowed the seed of the Tree of Appeasement and allowed Britain to lose her great naval strength which in palmier £ays could cope with any two-Power combination.

The Treaty of London, ho contends, was instrumental in starting the naval armament race of to-day. The capital ship building holiday which commenced in 1930 and ended in 1936 left Britain with 15 ships, 11 of which were over age (30 years), tho United States with 15 ships, seven being over age, and Japan witn nine, only four of whieh were old vessels. The cruiser position was worse. In i9lB Britain had 109. At tho London Conference the Admiralty claimed that 70 was the irreducible minimum consistent with peacetime requirements. Mr. Ramsay McDonald agreed to 50. LieutenantCommander Edwards vigorously condemns this blatant case of political opportunism. ‘ ‘ Tho Prime Minister who, only a few months before, had vigorously declared ‘ that the Navy is US’ had subordinated it to idealism and political expediency.” To Feed Britain Great Britain requires 150 ships a day to feed her. The Merchant Service, unsubsidised and uncarcd for by successive Governments, suffered in numbers and in tonnage. In 1931 only seven small escort vessels were laid down in the Royal naval dockyards. Mr. Stanley Baldwin, too, smoked his pipe of peace and kept his eyes shut to trends and developments abroad. In 1935, at the time of tho Abyssinian crisis in the Mediterranean, all available destroyers were despatched to the danger zone. This effort left the Home fleet with one obsolete destroyer working as a tender to an aircraft carrierl Dicing the September crisis of last year an anti-aircraft gun disappeared from the War Museum in London and reappeared mysteriously on a ship at sea. •Such was the cost of planting seeds of the Tree of Appeasement and having beautiful thoughts and lovely ideals, honest and sincere thought they might be. Pacific Peril It is comforting now to be told that despite the reduction in size, the British Navy to-day is wonderfully efficient and well-equipped with guns and ships. It is comforting also to know that the menace of the submarine has been reduced by effective modern defence devices. Tho author dovoles several chapters to the respective strengths and strategies of the naval Powers. Certain details are interesting. Japanese warships are heavily gunned; on occasions they have been over-gunned. The secondary armaments of certain Japanese battleships consist of 20 5.5in. guns, compared with tho 12 sin. of tho American and 12 Gin. of the British. Italy’s Gin. gun cruisers are very fast, being capablo of from 35 to 37 knots. The French have a submarine, tho Surcouf, which has a displacement when on the surface of 2880 tons. She carries a small seaplane in a water-tight hangar, and is armed with two Sin. guns and 14 torpedo tubes. Russia, weak in other craft, had in November, 1938, 134 submarines and 30 building. Sho also has immense minelaying capabilities. The Pacific in Wartime Lieutenant-Commander Edwards in part 3 of his book devotes himself to the probable eventualities of war in the Mediterranean, in tho North Sea, in the Baltic, and continues on to visualise a war between tho United States and Japan and possible results, and a war as waged between Great Britain and Japan and possible results. He finishes with a discourse upon an imagined world war between the triangle of Japan, Italy and Germany and a possible combination of Powers contending against them. He is confident that Britain and her allies could copo with the threat in the Baltic, Mediterranean, North Sea, but in certain circumstances he is most discomforting about the ability of the British Fleet to deal with the threat in tho Pacific Ocean; a drive south by the Japanese. Admittedly the Singapore base, cutting across the communications

of the south, would be a deterrent, but the British ships available in the Pacific could not hope to deal with the Japanese fleet which might be brought against them. Nor could Singapore De relied upon to hold out for ever against the full force of the Japanese Navy. In the event of attack the British admiral in the Far East would realise that one of the first objectives of the Japanese would be the oil supplies of North Borneo. British submarines, therefore, would operate in the Sulu Sea and ofl the north-west coast of Borneo. Singapore is the strategic key to tho whole Far East. The British admiral would concentrate his force there, using hi* submarines and mine-layers to make the approaches as dangerous as possible for any Japanese expedition. We cannot expect Uncle Sam to be deeply concerned with pulling British chestnuts out of fires. That America came into the Great War at all should be a matter of surprise and of lasting gratitude. There has been much foolish talk and much misunderstanding sine* 1918, but no decent-minded, thinking Britisher can have any tceling other than a great depth of appreciation. There may be a fire in the Pacific, and, if so, our chestnuts will be in it. Will Uncle Sam’s?

If Japan thought the British Empire too pre-occupied elsewhere she would move south. Her first objective would be British North Borneo, for oil, and her second Malaya, for strategic pur poses. Her third objective would be Australia, in order to provide space for her population. She would be careful to avoid the Philippines in order not to disturb America. The Japanese Empire would then stretch from Kamchatka to New Zealand. Japan would dominate tho Western Pacific. Australia and New Zealand would be occupied by a prolific race, rendered ambitious by a great sweep of success, and, what is more, working under wage conditions unacceptable to most other countries. U.S. Loss of Trade America’s first hatch of chestnuts would be economic ones. She would lose her trade with Australasia and Asia, in 1935 it amounted to almost a billion dollars. She would loso her world markets, and more particularly those ot South America, whero the European “axis” Powers are even now penetrating commercially and politically. Tho commercial rivalry which would certainly spring up between America and the great Japanese Empire would soon assume proportions in which the United States would be fighting for its economic life. From that stage to actual war is a short step. Thus America’s second batch of chestnuts is defence, defence of a coastline ranging from 7deg. north latitude to 55deg. south latitude, against an enemy attacking from the shelter of tho Pacific islands. Canada, too, would havo to bo defended. The forocast of theso dangers is logically and earnestly expressed, but it is difficult to appear altruistic towards the plight of Uncle Barn’s chestnuts when ours will be into the fire first. But the threat is there, and it is directed to wards the Pacific and all the nations of its shores.--“It is no use hiding the weakness,” says the author. “It is there for every man to see.”