FOREIGN INTERESTS IN CHINA

Manawatu Times, Volume 64, Issue 174, 26 July 1939, Page 12

FOREIGN INTERESTS IN CHINA

Large Fortunes Have Been Made. Privileges Enjoyed In Concessions

'J’HE Japanese blockade of Tientsin ordinarily would be regarded by most of the Chinese as a quarrel between two interlopers, states an overseas exchange. In recent years particularly, the foreign "concessions” of various important centres have been resented and resisted by the Chinese, who have demanded their cancellation.

' cracy like China, and the Tokio Government has not hesitated to make propaganda capital out of the slogan, “Asia for the Asiatics.” In 1936 the Japanese sent goodwill missioners to the main trading centres of China to goad the Chinese into action against the so-called "white master.” The Japanese diplomats were not entirely successful, and a few months later the Sino-Japancse undeclared war started. Next to American, British interests are greatest in China, and then comes Japan. In Tsingtao, for instance, which was before the World War a treaty port ceded by China to Germany, and after the war was ceded by the allies to Japan, the Japanese had established the greatest textile mills in China. In Tientsin, Peiping, Amoy. Swatow’ and Canton, notably, the Japanese had invested on an enormous scale, and, because they are Asiatics and neighbours, they have always insisted that it is their right to enjoy certain trading privileges without being subjected to competition by the white foreigner. In Shanghai, for instance, the Japanese were able to so impress the other foreigners in this most important concession that the international settlement of China's principal trading metropolis was by 1935 virtually under the control of the Japanese. Naturally, things were not shaping according to the desires of other foreign interests in China, and they were showing signs of resentment at the Japanese attitude when the Chinese themselves took a hand, and a strong hand at that, for it was the hand of Chiang himself.

As Japan is now the aggressorinvader, however, and the general question of foreign rights in China stands in abeyance, there will be no question of China's attitude in the dispute between Britain and Japan. Moreover, one of the immediate issues is the fate of four Chinese whose surrender by the British authorities is demanded by Japan. Foreign finartcial interests in the Far East generally, and in China particularly, are enormous. Large fortunes have been made by virtue, to a very great extent, of the extremely favourable trading privileges which various Chinese Administrations have, during the past 100 years, granted to the foreigners who desired to operate in their territory. These facilities took many forms, but, as a foundation for trading, the Chinese would allocate a portion of some city which became the foreign "concession,” and subsequently such "concessions” have been referred to as “international settlements.”

Within those concessions the foreigner is his own master, and is subject to the jurisdiction of his own Government’s representative. He did not even have to pay income tax to the Chinese Government, but the Chiang Kai-shek regime is altering that very peculiar position by making all foreigners pay taxes just as all Chinese have to pay them. However, until six months ago the foreigner was not obliged to pay this tribute.

As far back as 1926, when Chiang Kai-shek became generalissimo for the first time, he gave a pledge to his followers that he would not relax his efforts to rid China of foreign exploiters and make China, in fact, a selfgoverning and sovereign State. This cry was "China for the Chinese.” There are 470,000,000 of them.

Now comes the news that the Japanese are taking a high hand in the matter of privileges which have been enjoyed by the foreigners in the "treaty ports” and in the "concessions.” A treaty port is similar to a concession for all practical purposes. The Japanese have always claimed that any concessions to the white foreigner were anomalous in a self-governing demo-

In Chiang’s manifesto, which he has never altered, there is a pronouncement on the concession question generally. The leader points out that such concessions were made at times when China

was not being properly governed, and when the writ of the Government did not run in many areas, so that trading was hampered, and foreigners balked at the enormous risks they had to take to do any business at all. So far, so good, admitted Chiang, but with the establishment of sound administration, wtih the proper policing of the whole country, with the stabilising of the currency and the suppression of piracy, surely the time had come when China icould be relied upon to take good care of everyone within her territory, and this she guaranteed to do by international agreement. The foreigners, however, were not impressed, though the British attitude was undoubtedly the most reasonable. Briefly, it was this: Yes, China, we admit your claims for complete sovereignty in your own territory, and we are willing to come under your jurisdiction in most things. But we cannot submit to your judicial system, which, as yet, is not in codified form, nor is your jurisprudence defined. Put your judiciary in order and we will then submit to you in every particular.

To that, Chiang Kai-shek offered no objection, but he was careful to reiterate time and again that the day of the "concessions” had closed, and it could never dawn again in that form, although he did indicate that reciprocal trade treaties might be so arranged as to make the abrogation of the concession privlege not such a very great hardship.

Thus', with Japan trying to trade on the policy of "Asia for the Asiatics,” Chiang Kai-shek came back strongly with the much more popular policy "China for the Chinese.”

Some of his followers have gone further than that, for they have declared that the moment the Sino-Japanese conflict is over they will sweep away every concession ever granted. In this they are supported by Russia. Under the Czar, Russia had extensive interests in China, but after the revolution the Soviet gave up every concession, maintaining that they wanted the Chinese to be supreme in their own land.

Simply and shortly, the position can fairly be stated thus—concessions, like the “white - vaster,” are out of date in that great Asiatic country, and whatever Japan may do to-day for her own advancement on Chinese soil will be undone to-morrow. It may be a very distant to-morrow, but the Chinese, with a cultural background of 5000 years, do not measure time as Westerners do.