DEFENDING THE EMPIRE THE GRACEFUL SWAN

Manawatu Times, Volume 63, Issue 174, 26 July 1938, Page 10

DEFENDING THE EMPIRE

THE GRACEFUL SWAN

Military and Navy Requirements

Lieut.-Commander Kenneth Edwards, who served in the Royal Nary from 1920 to 1932, and is now Naval Correspondent of a newspaper, has written an interesting book on Naval Strategy under the title "The Grey Diplomatists.” This excerpt from his book deals with the military and naval requirements of Empire defence.

JTOE two decades which have passed since the later stages of the Great War have altered the whole face of the Mediterranean. Only one factor remains unchanged. The Mediterranean still forms the British Empire’s great trade artery. Can the British Empire retain the security of the great trade route, or of the fortresses which guard it? From the point of view of Empire trade, the Mediterranean is not absolutely essential. On the other hand, closure of this route would certainly Involve a dislocation of trade which urould prove most serious. Military and naval requirements, fcowever, make free passage of the Mediterranean absolutely vital. The military requirements are no less important because the reason for Biem lies far from the Mediterranean, treat Britain would be in sore straits K the southern coast of the English Channel fell into enemy hands. Tens »f thousands died to keep the Germans >ut of the Channel ports during the treat War. The safety of the ports ►n the south side of the English Chancel rests, in the first instance, upon the French Army. The strength of Ihe French Army depends upon the tree passage of reinforcements across Ihe Mediterranean, from the vast reservoir of man-power in French North Africa, to Marseilles. It is not too much to say that the irhole fabric of Empire naval defence rests upon the ability of British warihips to pass through the Mediterranean. The great British naval base at Singapore was formally opened on February 14th, 1938. The completion pf the base sees an immense strengthening in the defensive position of the British* Empire. But a naval base is cot much use without a fleet. Where fe Singapore’s fleet to come from ;hould emergency arise? From the Mediterranean. That is the strategy to-day. In a few years the battleship strength of Ihe Royal Navy will have been materially increased. Then the long-pre-pared system of Empire defence will Ce completed. There will be three ■lain fleets. One will be in home waters. One will be in the East, rhe third will be in the Mediterranean—not in order to menace or annoy Mussolini or anybody else, but because Ihe Mediterranean is the strategic ♦entre. From the centre, reinforcenente could be quickly sent to either lank if they were threatened. Simimrly, the flanks could, if need be, retoforce the centre; as was, in fact, lone during the emergency arising out cf the Italo-Ethiopian dispute. The Mediterranean must remain the open road of Empire strategy. But can Great Britain keep open that sea road? Will not Mussolini succeed in making the Mediterranean a marc clausum? Six times in the history of England has the British Navy itood between a would-be naster of Europe and the attainment of his ambition. Charlemagne, Charles V., Philip IL of Spain, Louis XIV. of France, Napoleon, William IL of Prussia —all aspired to world dominion, and all were checked by British sea-power. Should Mussolini lose his head, it seems probable that history would repeat itself and that he would join the distinguished company. One factor of imperial defence which has exercised British opinion has been the defensibility or otherwise of Gibraltar. The plain facts with regard lo Gibraltar are that the defences had been allowed to decay for several years prior to 1935. But in that year new defences were pushed forward in positions which made their destrucbv an enemy virtually impossible. Or all British colonies, Gibraltar, by reason of its configuration and the meteorological conditions over the

Rock, is the least susceptible to air attack. In the event of a definite threat to Gibraltar, ii would be the surrounding country, rather than the Rock, which would be worthy of sympathy. The lack of an aerodrome at Gibraltar may be discounted. Catapult launching of aircraft is making tremendous strides. Besides, the Royal Navy has five efficient aircraft carriers in service, and a further five under construction. Gibraltar is likely to be far more an anxiety to an enemy of the British Empire than to the British Empire itself. Malta suffers from being close to Sicily, and therefore within easy range of Italian air attack. The defences have, however, been rapidly improved in the last few years. Officers who have recently returned from Malta state positively that the island can give as good as it gets. It must be remembered, also, that air attack, however damaging, cannot annex territory.

In discussing Malta, one must take notice of Pantellaria, Mussolini’s newly fortified island in the Malta channel. If it were possible to say of any island that it would be untenable in time of war, one should be able to say it of Pantellaria. Nothing more than a volcanic rock, with bad harbours and a very scanty water supply, Pantellaria i 3 within comfortable bombing range of aircraft from Malta and from the French Tunisian naval and air base of Bizerta.

In the Eastern Mediterranean the position is not so clear. The AngloEgyptian Treaty allows Great Britain to maintain forces in Egypt for eight years only. In Palestine the mandate system is in the melting pot. The British Government denies that any efforts are being made, or will be made, to convert Cyprus into the large naval and air base for which its strategical position seems to fit it. One thing, however, can be predicted with certainty. .Unless the British Empire is overcome by supreme decadence it will never relax its grip upon either the Suez Canal or the oil pipeline at Haifa.

There is an interesting reverse to the picture of Great Britain’s grip upon the Mediterreanean Italy is in a strong position, but Mussolini has acted in a way which has given to Great Britain hostages of good behaviour. It has been said in the House of Lords that “the Italian strategical situation in the event of a major war is extraordinarily weak, because she has three large armies in Spain, Abyssinia, and Libya, reprepresent half a million hostages to fortune, and, but for a naval miracle, those forces would be instantly and irrevocably cut off.’* Mussolini derives, in Italy, strength and power from the “new Roman Empire.” He must know that to fly in the face of the British Empire would be to write “Finis” to his new empire. Even supposing that Italy could close the Mediterranean to British shipping for a few months, this would require Italy’s whole effort, while it would take little effort on the part of the British Empire to close the approaches to the Mediterranean, and in particular to cut off Italy from her new “East African Empire.” Wars are not won so much by effort as by adherence to the principle of “economy of effort.”

So far as it is possible to pronounce any judgment upon the Mediterranean situation of to-day. one must admit that the position of the British Empire is strong—and getting stronger month by month under the gigantic rearmament programme.

Italy, since she has acquired an East African Empire, has greater reason for friendship with Great Britain than ever before.