Mr Eden on British Objectives

Manawatu Times, Volume 61, Issue 74, 28 March 1936, Page 5

Mr Eden on British Objectives

Frank Speech on International

Affairs

Honouring of the Nation’s

Signature

(British Official Wireless).

IUJGBY, March 26.

The House of Commons was crowded tins afternoon tor the eagerly-awaited statement by the Foreign beeretarj, Mi. Anthony Helen, at the beginning oi the'donate on the international situation. Tne galleries were lull. Among the diplomatists and distinguisheu ioreigners present were the T’ronch and the German Ambassadors and Mr. Aor man Davis, American delegate to the A aval Conference.

TTei'acing his statement-with the explanation that he proposed to use frankness and freedom unusual in a speech on international affairs, m order to put the situation and its problem before the British people in a clear and true perspective, Mr. Eden declared that tney must distinguish between what might be national sentiment and what were, for good or ill, national obligations.

Alter a review oi' the history oi the demilitarised zone as a factor in f rench security, and a recital of the German failure to observe the procedure Jaid down in freely-negotiated treaties, he said he believed the judgment of the British people—even those who thought Germany had a strong case—was to deprecate that she had chosen to present it by force and not by reason.

Turning to the position in Britain, no read Article 4 ut' the Locarno Treaty, and reminded the House Unit the country .was not rrccly and happily placed as an arbiter, but was a guarantor with deiinile commitments.

•'I want in all bluntness to make this plain to the House, ’’ he said; "I am not prepared to be the first British Foreign Secretary to go back on the British signature.” At the same time they were bound by Article 7 of the Locarno Treaty itself to seek by conciliation to bring about peaceful agreement and understanding. Coming to the Hour-Power proposals designed to bridge the period before negotiations, the Foreign Secretary repeated that the proposals were not an ultimatum or a dictate, and if the German Government could offer alternative sugggestions the British Government would be prepared to take them to the other Powers for consideration, but it must be appreciated that without some constructive contribution from the German, side the task of those whose soie aim and ambition was to start negotiations would be almost impossible. The middle part of Mr Eden’s speech was devoted to an explanation of British contributions to the security o! Franco and Belgium provided in the Four-Power proposals, and particularly to a clarification of the suggested staff conversations. The first, eontri Lution was for a period pending negotiations; the second would be part of flic general agreement which they hoped would come out of tho negotiations, and the third was in the event of a breakdown of tho negotiations. The first was designed to compensate loss of security suffered by France and Belgium, and would bo strictly limited and clearly defined by obligations under the Locarno Treaty. Staff Conversations Comparing the proposed technical couvcrsatious with Stall discussions before 1914, Mr Eden made the point that the latter were unaccompanied by political understandings, and consequently their implications were indeterminate, whereas the conversations now would be for a specific and limited purpose already defined by political agreements. Wherever Stall' conversations were mentioned in tho proposals it was clearly shown that they applied only to a ease of unprovoked aggression. He hoped these conditions would never arise, but he was confident Unit they were much less likely to arise l'f the British position was perfectly clear. In the case of an undertaking into which Britain- was prepared to enter as portrt of a final settlement, guarantees between the Bowers of Western Europe would be reciprocal, and Britain would receive us Well as give guarantees and share in the security as well as in the risk. The new guarantees woud be open to all lb: Locarno signatories, including Ger many, and similarly open to all would be the suggested supplementary Bluff conversations.

Summing up the effect of tho assurances given to France and Belgium in the event of failure of conciliation Mr Eden said that except in respect of parts of Europe covered by the < Locarno obligations, Britisli engagements were precisely the same as those ( of any other member of the League of Nations, and in respect of tho area covered by the Locarno Treaty there ■was no new' commitment but only arrangements for moi'e effectual fulfilment of commitments already existing. The Government’s objectives, Mr Eden continued, were threefold:— First, to avert danger of war; second, to create conditicns in which negotiations could take place; and third, to bring about the success of these negotiations so that they might strengthen collective security, facilitate Germany’s return to the League, and in a happier atmosphere allow those larger negotiations on economic matters and arms limitation which were indispensable to the appeasement oi Europe to take place. What were the chances of fulfilling that programme? Much clearly dc pended on licrr Hitler’s proposals next week. “Wo • know that the Chancellor, who has, f believe, appreciated the efforts which the British Government lias made, will understand with what anxiety Europe awaits these proposals, lie can be assured that, so far as we ure concerned, thov will be received

with au open mind and a keen desire to make the best use of them to bring about a permanent pacilieation id Europe. ”

Another condition of success was a calmer and quieter atmosphere. They were, lie believed, only at tho beginning of a period which must be at the best one of most critical international negotiation, and there were few general observations which he thought a British Foreign Secretary ought to make. How Nations Will Bo Judged “1 do not intend to approach the problems of tho immediate future with the idea of being bound to the divergent policies either of Franco or of Germany," said Mr Eden. “Our policy is the Covenant and our membership of the League. We know our obligations and wo are prepared to fulfil them. But what is uppermost in my mind, and, i believe, uppermost in the minds of tho great mass of British people, is that we must persist iu our search /or peace on au enduring foundation. ft' we arc Lo achieve that we shall need help from all. I would like to say to Franco, ‘Wo cannot ensure peace unless you are ready to approach with an open mind the problems which still separate you from Germany,’ and i would like to say lo Germany, 'llovv can wo hope to enter on any negotiations with any prospect ot' success unless you aro prepared to do something to allay the anxieties in Europe which you have created"’ The British public, whose one aim is peace, whose one ambition is European settlement, whose one political objective is support of the League, will judge other nations by the spirit and extent to which they co-operate iu this task.” Mr Eden concluded with a plea for a united policy and a common purpose, and support, irrespective of party, for efforts to maintain peace, t-J strengthen tho League, to uphold the sanctity of treaties, and, above all, to seek without respite to fashion from the troubled present a future which may lie free from tho haunting fears that shadow our own times." Clearing the Debris SOME MOVE BY GERMANY ESSENTIAL. Received Friday, 7 p.m. LONDON, March 20. When Mr. Eden sat down at the conclusion of his speech in the House of Commons, Mr. Baldwin patted him on the back, while the House cheered, .Mr. Lloyd George's speech is regarded as being among tho greatest of his career, though full of contentious matter. He described a military pact as the ‘‘shortest eut I know to the ghastly mechanical carnage of modern war—raining bombs on cities.” The Daily Telegraph's diplomatic correspondent says Mr. Baldwin was nble to impress Herr von Ribficntrop with the gravity of the situation and the necessity of making an advance to the Locarno Powers’ viewpoint. It is felt, in British circles that Mr. Baldwin's personal representations might prove effective. tt is gathered that Government- officials in Berlin are already engaged in considering how far I they can comply with tho British suggestions and are concentrating their attention less on vague generalities of the ultimate security system and more on the needs of the moment. Berlin interprets Mr. Eden's statement. as a justification to the House of Commons of British policy. Official circles reticently describe themselves as interested listeners, but the unofficial view is that Germany cannot undertake not to fortify the Rhineland, because unprotected troops would be useless. The Times, in a leader, regards Mr. F.deu's speech as his best, because it was the most spontaneous, since he became Foreign Secretary. Britain demands that Germany shall see for herself tfiat some German move is indispensable to clear the debris of the old treaty from the site of the new. She cannot be the only Power to refuse to share in the preliminary construction. The Sun-Herald news agency says that the verdict when Mr. Eden resumed his scat after a speech which the nation had been long awaiting, was that it was one of the finest utterances from a British Foreign Secretary for years. He never onec attempted to hida anything to show preference for one

nation more than another, but gravely declared: "I don't view the future with a light heart.” Prolonged cheers followed his statement: “I am not prepared to bo the first British Foreign Secretary to go back on Britain’s word.” It is generally agreed that Mr. Eden convinced most waverors who feared that the White Paper involved additional commitments. Tho spoech is expected to have important reactions on the Continent, particularly as it was the first plain-spoken utterance of British policy for a considerable time. Warning by Lloycl George LONDON, March 20. The House of Commons debato was continued by Mr. Hugh Dalton (Labour), who in the course of critical observations on the details of tho FourPower proposals, declared that the country, which would not support an exclusive Anglo-French military alliance, would support a sturdy organisation'ot' collective security through the League. Sir Archibald .Sinclair (Liberal) paid a tribute to the Foreign Secretary s handling of the critical negotiations, and supported his policy. Mr. D. Lloyd George reminded the House that the French view of the White Paper is different from Mr. Eden’s. They believed they had a military convention. Thcro ought to be no ambiguity about a subject involving the lives of millions of young men. Mr. Lloyd George criticised the staff conversations and recalled the circumstances in 1914, of how the Kaiser sent a message to the Tsar: ‘‘l cannot negotiate unless you slop mobilisation.”

With oratory which held the House spellbound, Mr. Lloyd George issued a warning against a military compact resulting in power at a moment oi crisis passing from Governments lo the military.

Sir Austen Chamberlain said that unless something could be done lo restore confidence in treaties no new treaties would bo possible. Herr Hitler made plenty of reassuring utterances, but what was lacking was reassuring acts. Herr Hitler offered 25 years of peace, but Germany was already bound under the Kellogg Pact never to use war as an instrument of policy. Mr. Winston Churchill said that whenever I-lorr Hitler talked of peace Germany made a new advance towards war. The violation of tho Rhineland was a menace to Holland, Belgium, and France. ‘‘When the Rhine is fortified, as I assume it will be,” ho said, “it will leave Germany free to sally eastward or southward. All States which are alarmed at the growth of German armaments ought to combine in pacts of: mutual assistance under tho League Covenant and give Germany a guarantee of inviolability of German soil: that, if anyone offends Germany all will turn against the offender; and that- if Germany strikes anyono all will defend the victim. What is wanted is not a war encirclement of Germany but a peace encirclement.” Proofs Wanted of German Sincerity RUGBY, March 26. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr Neville Chamberlain, will wind up the debate on international affairs. Thero is general agreement that particular emphasis will be laid on the fact that to meet tho immediate situation what is urgently required is some contribution by tho German Government 'designed to repair confidence, which was disturbed by the German coup dc force, and thus help to overcome tho difficulties of the interim period. Longrange proposals, it is felt, cannot at the present juncture serve this purpose. The Times says: “It is highly important that the German Government should realiso in advance tho sincerity with which British opinion sympathises with the claim to equal rights, and is prepared to accept the desire felt at this moment for a firm and lasting peace, which is tho main theme of the preliminary statement brought by Herr Ivon Ribbcntrop. On the other hand, it is no less important that the German ' Government should realise its obligations to restore by some means or other the confidence of Germany’s neighbours, which was so rudely shaken by the events of March 7.” The News-Chronicle says: “Britain requires more than Herr Hitler’s mere word that ho intends peace. Ho lias still to prove his sincerity, and the proof must be substantial. He has turned down the Locarno Powers’ proposals. He must offer in their place convincing alternatives.” German Democracy ‘‘Greatest Power in World” Received Friday, 7.40 p.m. BERLIN, March 26. The election campaign is gathering speed and power. Hitler made his eighth speech in the huge machinery hall at the fairgrounds, Leipzig, where in 1930 he declared that heads would roil when ho came into power. Indicating 'himself and tho German people as representing the greatest power iu the world, namely German democracy, Hitler to-day declared: “I reply to those who urge symbolic action as a. token of our honesty, 'Don’t insult 67,000,000 people. We won’t tolerate it.’ Those who seek gestures of symbolism will see both on election day.” General Goering, speaking at Karlsrhue, said: “We ask France, ‘Have we insulted or harmed you or even harmed your honour by sending a few German battalions into German territory? Do you really want peace?’ to French exscrvicemcn I say, ‘Grasp the German hands above the heads of your own Government. You will not live to see us attack you, but if you attack us, the ground will be strewn with dead. If France does not intend to attack Germany, it is needless for her to worry about what the Gcrmaus are doing in their own country.’ ”