Britain Must Be Strong

Manawatu Times, Volume 61, Issue 47, 26 February 1936, Page 5

Britain Must Be Strong

Keynote ©t Wide Survey of World

Affairs

Desire For Peace in Abyssinia

(British Official "Wireless). RUGBY, Feb. 2-1

A wide survey of the international outlook was made by the Foreign Secretary, Mr Anthony Eden, in his eagerlyawaited speech in the House of Commons this evening. The speech fell into three parts. The first part dealt with the Italo-Ethiopian question, in the handling of which an Opposition speaker, the Rt. Hon. H. B. Lees_ Smith (Labour), had charged the Government with dilatoriness; in the second part of his speech Mr Eden offered observations on certain subjects not directly related to this dispute; and the speech closed with a review of the international situation as a whole. “Whatever course events may take, the one essential element is that Britain must be strong.” This was the keynote of Mr Eden’s speech. # . , r _ n . . Mr Eden sat between the Prime Minister, Mr Baldwin, ana Mr J. Ramsay MacDonald, and spoke from notes which lie used merely as a guide to fluent thought, and for liis principal declarations, as when he said that the chances of averting the catastrophe of a recurrence of the "World War are slender unless Britain is strong and determined enough to play her part. What the House wanted to know was the Government’s own attitude on oil sanctions, but no light was thrown on that. Mr Eden said that the Government had not completed its examination of the experts’ report.

Mr Edeu recalled that within ten days of tho outbreak of the war Italy had becu declared au aggressor by a uumber of States on the League Council and that the decision has been ratified and approved by 50 States members of tho Assembly. A committee had been set up which proposed four measures to bo applied against Italy. What was remarkable übout that record was its rapidity rather than its dilatorincss. Gradual Exertion of Pressure

It was clear that financial sanctions and the refusal to accept Italian exports by States members of the League could not be mado immediately effective. Their object was gradually to reduce the purchasing powers of the aggressor State. It was surely clear from the efforts which had been made in Italy that tho significance of these sanctions was fully realised there. Tile effect of them was, in fact, continuous aud cumulative, and must ultimately have au important influence in achieving what was tho main objective of the League, namely, cessation of hostilities. Criterion on Oil Sanctions

Tho League was now considering sanctions involving a commodity the supply of which was to a great extern in the bands of non-members of the League. “To my mind oil is a sanction like any other, and must be judged by the same criterion—whether its imposition will help to stop the war, for that is the object which every nation at Geneva has before it,” said Mr Eden. “It is in that spirit that Governments must examine it and como to their decision.” Meanwhile the Government had departed neither from its original decision in principle regarding oil sanctions taken last November nor tho decision to co-opcrate with others in such collective action as the League may decide upon in this dispute. Moreover, it remained the policy of the Government to maintain steadily collective resistance to aggression. It would be guided in every decision by the spirit of the Covenant itself. “There can bo neither weakness nor wavering in this course until peace is signed,” he declared. "Tho fact that the League is not omnipotent should not make us weaken in our support of it. Though it caunot achieve everything, it can achieve much. In the past twelve months it has grown in authority and prestige, and with prestigo comes power. There are still those who regard the League as dangerous, but nobody who knows anything of foreign affairs would regard it to-day as negligible. Full British Support Wanted

“When I return to Geneva to resume discussion of further sanctions I wish to say with the full approval of this House, clearly and unequivocally, that the British Government and this country, whilst taking thoir full part with others in the imposition of sanctions, desire first and foremost to see peace establised on a just basis between Italy and Abyssinia. If both sides were even now to accept the good offices of the League, of which they are full members, I am sure that there would bo no hesitation among their fellow-members in agreeing that the machinery of the Committee of Five is still available:’ ’ League as Peacemaker.

Proceeding, Mr Eden referred to the constructive aspect of tho League as distinct from its negative aspect as a policeman —its task as conciliator and peacemaker. All desired most to see a satisfactory settlement of the ItaloEthiopian dispute. He recalled the report of the Committee of Five appointed by the Council last September to examine a possible basis of settlement satisfactory to all members of the League. Unfortunately its terms were

not at that time accepted by the Italian Government, but in the view of the British Government that report still represented tho basis upon which any further attempts at conciliation should be made.

‘‘l think it important that we should make it clear what kind of objective the League should in our judgment have in mind whilo it persists with sanctions,” said Mr. Eden. “Sanctions, unwelcome as they aro to all of us, are nothing more than a means to an end. In this case the end is a settlement in accordance with League principles, which ' will establish normal relations between the parties on a lasting basis. I hope that tho report of tho Committee of Five will be neither forgotten nor set aside. Mr. Eden then emphasised that the Government had not withdrawn from Sir Samuel Hoare’s proposals in regard to colonial raw materials, and was willing to examine the subject. Collective Security. The Government was of opinion that the moment was unfavourable for revision of the League Covenant, and it did not intend to make proposals on the subject. Britain was firmly attached to collective security, conditional upon the system being powerful enough to deter any would-be aggressor, whether from within or without. In the second place Britain was strong enough in policy and in arms to play a full part in collective security. The chances of averting a world war were slender unless we were ready to play our part to tho full.

Mr. Eden said that the House must face the issue. "I personally regret,” he said, "the increase in the expenditure on armaments, but re-armament to strengthen collective security is the cheapest form of rc-armament, cheaper than re-armament within the pre-war system of alliances, and cheaper than re-armament in isolation. Europe has to choose between co-operation and disintegration. Britain’s most pressing task is to bring a measure of confidence to Europe. It is to that task that we are applying ourselves in detail.” Anxiety For Future. Passing on to examine the international situation as a whole, Mr. Eden said it would be idle to deny that there was widespread anxiety as to the future. “It is an anxiety not minimised, though it is mitigated, by the reflection that the course which the country pursues in the next year or two may well be a decisive factor. It is no great tribute to the collective wisdom of the world that now, IS years after the close of a war which those of us who were of au ago to fight in it were assured was a war to end war, we find ourselves confronted with tho same problems, dreadfully similar in character and in portent, to those of the year 1914. It seems that in addition to the ordeal of war itself the war generation has thrust upon it tho task of finding sufficient wisdom to prevent a recurrence on an even greater scale of suffering. This is clearly statesmanship ’s most urgent task. How is it to be accomplished? Not, lam convinced without the full and active co-opera-tion of this country—a _ co-opcration which can best bo exercised, and probably can only effectively bo established, through the machinery of the League and of collective security. This country is firmly atUcned to that policy because P believes it is the policy most likely to ensure the maintenance of peace.

‘‘lf this country is to play its full part in any system of collective security two conditions are indispensable. Firstly the s„ -item should be truly collective and so powerful as to deter any would-be aggressor, and secondly, that this country should be strong and determined enough in poli'y and in arms to play its full part therein.” Press Comments Received Tuesday, 8.25 p.m. LONDON, Feb. 24. The News-Chronicle endorses Mr. Eden's speech as a sound statement of Britain’s general policy but draws attention to the vital necessity of keeping abreast of the oil question. It adds that the Government’s duty at Geneva is to demonstrate that we intend to tako the lead and enforce a programme which the vast majority of Britons support. We possessed but threw away American aid when a blunder was made in connection with the Hoare-Laval

negotiations and subsequent vacillation raised doubts regarding our sincerity. The Sun-Herald says Mr. Eden ©ay.

not be a good man going wrong but he is a good man going dangerously oasy. Britain prefers Mr. Eden in his vehement moods. The Times interprets Mr. Eden’s speech as a statement of Cabinet policy as well as his own. The Manchester Guardian regards Mr. Eden’s speech as disappointing. The export of oil to Italy ought to have been prohibited at the start.

Italian Reactions MR EDEN MISINFORMED. Received Tuesday, 8.50 p.m. LONDON, Feb. 2-1. The Daily Telegraph’s Rome correspondent says Mr Eden’s speech caused surprise as it was expected he would be more uncompromising towards Italy. The official reaction, according to the Government spokesman, is that Italy disagrees that the oil sanctions resembles others. On the contrary, oil is a sinew of war and therefore an oil sanction would be a military sanction. Consequently, Italy reserves complete liberty of action .if it is imposed or present sanctions intensified.

Mr Eden’s hint of a possible resumption of peace discussions, was received with mixed feelings. Italy would not refuse to consider the proposal but would demand direct negotiations with Emperor Selassie owing to General Badoglio’s success and in expectation of a similar success, and also because the sanctions have not been effective. Mr Eden’s statement about the matter was due to misinformation. Italy regards the refusal to publish the Maffey report as an indication that passages Signor Gayda did not print were derogatory to Britain.

The Times’ Rome correspondent says the Italians believe Britain’s cautious attitude toward sanctions will be increased by Senator Borah’s speech and especially by the criticism of motives which induced the League to declare that Italy was the aggressor. Political circles emphasise that Borah’s reference to insidious propaganda confirms their allegations .that Britain brought pressure to bear on United States for the purpose of persuading her to join in the sanction^