What Brusiloff has Done.

Manawatu Times, Volume XL, Issue 13523, 6 October 1916, Page 2

What Brusiloff has Done.

ENEMY'S LOST INITIATIVE. (By Stanley Washburn in "The Times.'') HEADQUART7ERS, . S.W. FROI\ T T, Aug. 4. Exactly two months have elapsed since the beginning of what must be considered the most remarkable Allied movement since the begining of the war. These operations, extending over a wide front much of which is the most difficult terrain imaginable, viewed broadly, have continued practically without intermission for mare than 60 days, which is a greater period of ceaseless fighting than any offensive except that of the Germans against Verdun, which is not a proper analogy. RESULTS REVIEWED.

It seems proper at this time to summarise what this achievement up to, date represents. Most important of all, it is definitelly resulted in taking away the initiative from the Germans and Austrians on all fronts, and utterly destroying whatever programme they had planned for the summer. It has caused the diversion towards Russia of troops from Italian and French fronts, laying the foundation for opportunities elsewhere; it has brought about great defeats of the Austrians, and it has convinced the Germans that their boasted superiority has finally vanished. They are now obliged to fight approximately on equal terms with the Russians, their single remaining assets beinng their superiority in guns, munitions, and railway facilities all of which will have evaporated within another six months, excepting only the last, which must always be considered.

The recapitulation of tlie Russian captures makes it possible to form some estimate of what these past two months have dome for the Allied cause. At a time when the Germans and Austrians are beginning to feel a scarcity of men, and especially officers the Russians in their advance, which at certain points approximates 55 miles, have taken three generals, 7067 officers, 330,000 soldiers, and 504 guns, including over 50 heavy guns, 1200 machine-guns, and miscellaneous war booty too great to enumerate. At a conservative estimate this represents, including killed, casualties, missing, and losses from other causes, approximately three-quarters of a million of the enemy's organised effectives, with the enemy still struggling frantically on all fronts to bring the Russian advances to a halt, even if but temporarily. It is impossible for me to state the Russian lossses, except to say that from the strictly military point of view they can have no effect whatever on the Russian cause. I believe I am not exaggerating when I say that the Russians could bear double this summer's losses for five consecutive years without apprehension of running short of men, while another such blow as Brusiloff's would undoubtedly utterly finish Austria and further reduce Germany's visible supply, which already seems to have shrunk to. a point where future sustained offensives will be difficult, if not impossible. AUSTRIA FAILING, BUT GERMANY STRONG.

After being nearly two months continually on this front I have'reached two conclusions regarding the enemy. The first is that, wit hone more sweeping movement, an optimist may fairly hope that Austria will be forced to collapse; the second is that the Germans are not near collapse, and though they may lose Kovel, Brost-Litovsk, Warsaw, and even all Poland, there may well remain a year of bitte\; fighting. It is true the Germans have lost, some of their arrogance, and their confidence in themselves is somewhat reduced, but they are still a long way from collapse—at any rate, from any military point of view—and if such a collapse is coming from internal political causes, t is impossible to express any opinion upon that here. During an early part of this campaign their greatest cause for anxiety was the food situation within Germany, bu twith this year's crop harvested this problem will be dissapated, and wil lprobably not again be an important consideration before next spring. It must be remembered that the Germans, even if forced this year to retire from Galicia and Poland will already have harvested all the crops, and if they retire they will undoubtedly take with them all the emat supplies likewise. It soems logical to believe, then, that <ho war must be ended on the bat efields by remitting efforts and slow but steady advances, until the enemy is exhausted and no longer able to fill up with men. The Kussian and the Western advances have shown clearly that the Germans can be digested step by step, but they cannot be swept aside, as has been the case with the Austrians. The surest means of ensuring victory, and that whichc will most utterly discourage the Germans, is for preparations to be made to continue the war for two more years, if necessary