WARNING TO HAWAII

Manawatu Standard, Volume LXVI, Issue 15, 15 December 1945, Page 7

WARNING TO HAWAII

GEN. MARSHALL’S EVIDENCE. WASHINGTON, Dec. 14. “General Short was given a definite alert order before the Japanese attack and I feel that, when you give a command to a high officer, you expect it to be carried out,” said General Marshall, former Chief of Staff of the United States Army, at the Pearl Harbour, inquiry.

“It was my own responsibility to the Secretary of War. I was responsible for the actions of the General Staff and I was responsible for this. A very tragic thing occurred. I am not attempting to evade that at all.” General Marshall added that he had no knowledge of any information before December 7 definitely pointing to attacks on Pearl Harbour. When General Marshall finished Ins evidence, the chairman (Senator Barkley) said the 'committee .wished him in his new mission the same high success that he had Achieved in other fields. General Miles, former .chief or Military Intelligence, said it was hours after the attack before they could ascertain what had happened in Hawaii. Partly because of this, no additional alerts were sent to General Mac Arthur in the Philippines. MESSAGE NOT DELIVERED.

General Miles accepted full responsibility for not delivering to Genera, Marshall on the night of 1941, the first 13 parts of the Japanese diplomatic message which wound up the next morning with the four teenth part that spelt war. The first 13 parts did not indicate the Japan ese intentions and he did not consider it necessary to arouse General Marshall that night. Representative Gearheart, a member of the inquiry committee, said he had been informed by someone who went through the attack that Hickham Field, Hawaii, was on full air alert from December 1 to 6,' but without explanation the alert was called off the day before the attack. He asked the committee to get the relevant documents. , , T ~r The Secretary for the Navy (Mr Forrestal) told the Senate Merger Committee that it was a terrible tragedy that the secrets of the Japanese code-breaking had been publicised. “We were playing a Pacific War poker game with a mirror behind another man’s hand,’.’ said Mr Forrestal. . Asked how such things as code disclosure could he avoided in future, Mr Forrestal said it was one of the penalties, or he should say, one of> the corollaries of the democratic system of government. ARMY ALLEGATION DISPUTED. An official Navy summary introduced as evidence at the Pearl Harbour inquiry disputed the allegation contained in the secret Army inquiry report which stated that the Navy had intercepted the “Winds execute’’ message, disclosing Japan’s intention to make war on Britain and America. The summary said Admiral Stark did not know of any such message. Admiral Leight Noyes, head of Naval Communications, said the Navy Department had never intercepted the message. The summary added that General Marshall testified he was aware that the Japanese had established a model for the “Execute” message, but he had no knowledge that it had ever been used. ... Discussing the setback which befell General MacArthur in the Philippines 24 hours after Pearl Harbour, General Marshall told the committee that General Gerow telephoned General MacArthur shortly after the attack. The latter referred to the fact that Japanese reconnaissance planes had been coming over. General Marshall added that a very heavy air attack was later made on Clark Field.