ENEMY OUTFOUGHT

Manawatu Standard, Volume LXV, Issue 134, 8 May 1945, Page 5

ENEMY OUTFOUGHT

- ECLIPSE OF GERMAN MIGHT. i ADVANTAGE STEADILY LOST. [ [By Brigadier J. G. Smyth, V.C., M.C., L formerly at India (Training - Directorate) and an instructor at the ; Cainberley Staff Codege, England. Tic lias seen service in India and Burma, and commanded a brigade at Dunkirk.] The whole art of success in war is ’ said to consist iii concentrating; super- ! i ior numbers of men and material at •‘the decisive point. The German General Staff started World War il with the great advantage of having immensely superior numbers. Ana yet, 1 despite the fact that they had the tools, they failed to finish the job. And now they have the humiliation ' of seeing the Allied Forces, whose leaders they regarded with contempt, tri--1 umphant within the frontiers of the . Reich itself. The present war has shown that, although superior forces are essential tu final victory, there is much more in successful generalship than merely having an advantage in numbers, it is in the ability to (1) concentrate force at the decisive time and place; (2) handle that force to Die best effect on the battlefield ; (3) know when to take risks; (4) know when and where to give ground—“iteculer pour mieux sautcr”. The British leaders started the war from very inauspicious beginnings. They had to fight their earlier campaigns under every form of handicap. But, by great foresight and careful planning mi and off the battlefield, their present advantageous position was bui'lt up. During every phase of the war—-in tho making of plans, ill fighting with inferior forces, then with equal forces and finally with superior forces—British generalship lias proved markedly superior to German. TWO BIG MISTAKES. I am not trying to make out thatGerman generalship is of a low order. That would be a poor compliment to the Allied leaders. The German General Staff—thanks mainly to political obtuseness between wars—had been allowed to fashion by 1939 the most powerful and highly trained instrument of war flic world had ever seen. Granted that they were rushed by Hitfei into using it four years beiore they wanted to, it was still of overwhelming strength. But they failed to risk their all in an invasion -of Britain alter Dunkirk, whereas the British leaders — ed and equipped division in tlie country—took the very great risk of sending what tanks they had to the -Middle East. They had already appreciated the supreme importance of the Mediterranean theatre. The German General Staff left the taking of Egypt to Mussolini —and in doing so made perhaps their biggest mistake of the war. The German invasion of 'Russia in June, 1941, was certainly a grave strategical error; but, toi that. Hit.'ci is prooably more to blame than the General Staff, in their conduct of tiie [Russian campaign, however, German generalship was severely at fault. Tlie German Army lmd been created for mechanised speed, it was iii such fashion that it was used to strike its iirsl crippling blows against the Russian army in the summer of 1941. But, having achieved great initial success by their concentrated panzer attacks, the Germans then proceeded to try to hold vast areas of Russia by spreading their troops out over a thousand miles of front. This was playing into the hands of the Russians, with their unlimited resources of manpower, and it finally resulted in disastrous retreat for Germany on the Eastern Erunt. ROUT OF ROMMEL. In fact, by tlio middle of 1942, it was obvious that the German General Staff had disregarded the principle of concentrating the superior numbers they possessed at decisive points, instead, their armies in the W est were spread all over Europe. Britain’s Generals, on tlie oilier hand, used their still- slender resources to the greatest effect, and by the winter of 1942 had concentrated superior air and land forces in the Mediterranean theatre. That, in itself, however, was not sufficient. Rommel had enough troops. He was confident and iiusiied with success. But, in iittle over six months’ fighting, his army was completely routed. The combination of Alexander, Montgomery and Tedder —under the supreme direction of Eisenhower —outfought and outwitted the German Generals at every turn. Indeed, in Alexander and Montgomery—two outstanding British commanders of the present war —two Generals have been produced of more skill and imagination than any that have arisen from the Y\ chr-

maclit. Later on, Alexander proved in Italy that numbers alone do not bring success. He outfought and outgenernllcd Kesselring from the toe of Italy to tho Gothic Line in country which particularly favoured his enemy. The decline in German generalship during the latter phases of the waxlias been most marked; but we must remember in all fairness the disadvantages the German Generals have laboured under—crushing air inicrioritv and inejit political interference. “complete ascendancy. And finally I come to the so-called “Second Front” operation and tlie Battic of France which elided so disastrously for Hitler. The planning and tho conduct of this whole operation was as brilliant as, anything in the whole history of warfare. Allied generalship brought off with complete success the most hazardous type of operation known to war. Montgomery made Rommel conform to his moves, and outwitted him at. every turn. .But- it is probably in air warfare that the German General Staff lias been most completely outgencralled.. It was by very courageous, long-sight-ed jilanning that the Allied leaders gained comjfiete . ascendancy over the once all-powerful Luftwaffe. The creation of tho Allied Airborne Army alone is a triumph of generalship when one remembers that, as far back as 1939, Germany had already a considerable number of highly trained airborne trooiis —and Britain had none at all. The German General Staff will offer many excuses for Germany’s defeat. They will offer all except the real one. And that is simple enough—they were outplanned, outgeneraled and outfought.