THIN ALLIED LINE

Manawatu Standard, Volume LXV, Issue 31, 5 January 1945, Page 2

THIN ALLIED LINE

QUICK ENEMY BREAK-THROUGH

DIVISIONS KEPT FORWARD.

(N.Z. Press Association. —Copyright.) (Special Correspondent.) (Rec. 2.10 p.m.) LONDON, Jan. 4. "When the weather was suitable von Rundstedt struck at a weak spot in the American line and, largely clue to our policy of keeping divisions well forward, he found, lie had at once burst through into the comparatively vacant rear areas," says Mr Alan Moorehead in the Daily Express, discussing Allied strategy.

He praises the reaction of the Americans and goes on to comment: "For many months now' we have abandoned the use of surprise in our planning. We have simply packed troops up to the line and slogged ahead in fairly obvious directions."

He says there is much support for two ideas: First, the appointment of a field commander, British or American, would do a great deal towards getting quicker decisions and more adaptability into the line ; and, secondly, the need one day to mount and supply one definite spearhead to pierce the German front and exploit beyond. Other correspondents also comment on the fact of the Supreme Command being too far back and on the dispersal of Allied strength. It is pointed out that if the earlier system of the fighting command being in the hands of a specialist like Field-Marshal Montgomery, as in Normandy, had been maintained the setback might have been averted. At the same time it is" generally remarked that there is every confidence in General Eisenhower.

Discussion on these lines seems fairly general, but messages from New York declare that the chance of Feijd-Mar-shal Montgomery being promoted to commander of the Allied land forces under General Eisenhower are "remote".

On other questions "Stratcgicus" in the Spectator remarks: "What was at fault was the absurd self-confidence which characterised the Allied outlook ever since the exploitation of the Battle of Normandy, and the tendency to be convinced by one's own propaganda." He asks what, save this selfconfidence, can explain the ease with which the Germans concentrated in secret and then overran some 70 miles of Allied front.

Correspondents on the Western Front and in Switzerland are expressing the opinion that the Germans "fooled" the Allies about their petrol shortage, and, by using horse-drawn traffic, deliberately built up a reserve for the offensive, which' is aimed at capturing enough Allied petrol and oil to sustain the drive through to Antwerp. It is declared that petrol was in fact one of the chief objectives of the offensive, ■but there is no dflubt that after three months o,f hoarding the Germans had enough for the present battle plan. Berne reports state that observers in Berlin are convinced that the Germans had far greater stores of petrol than the Allies believed, while synthetic oil is still being manufactured. At the same time the Wehrmacht is "thirsty" for petrol. It is likely that questions on von Rundstedt's offensive will be asked and answered when the House of Commons reassembles on January 16.

Sec "Strategy of Allies".—Page 5