MEDIATION UNLIKELY

Manawatu Standard, Volume LIX, Issue 265, 9 October 1939, Page 9

MEDIATION UNLIKELY

BY PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT. CIRCUMSPECT ATTITUDE. CRITICISM OF FUEHRER. (United Press Association.—By' Electric Telegraph.—Copyright.) NEW YORK, Oct. 7. At Hyde Park to-day President Roosevelt indicated that he is not ready to respond to intimations from Berlin that Hitler is willing to let the President mediate. Mr Roosevelt’s secretary' told the Press: “The President authorises me to inform you that there is nothing to say on the matter.” The Berlin correspondent- of the New York Times states that the speech did not give any hint as to whether Hitler is anticipating early mediation by a neutral State, but neutral diplomats believe that Hitler would accept unconditionally- an armistice proposal from Mr Roosevelt. It is also contended that the small neutrals are in a favourable position to unite and nominate an acceptable mediator. In Washington informed circles believe that Mr Roosevelt is unlikely to propose an armistice unless lie is officially assured in advance that Britain and France will accept. It is indicated that he will not lend himself to a move by Hitler for throwing the onus for the continuance of the war on Britain and France. < Surprise is expressed at Germany s readiness to accept an armistice proposal from Mr Roosevelt in view of his reaction to tlie previous peace appeals. PRIOR CONDITION. Senator Pittman in Washington expressed the opinion that ally peace move by Mr Roosevelt must bo preceded by clear evidence that the belligerents themselves have made efforts for peace. He added that if on the evidence it appeared that the idea might he accepted Mr Roosevelt would not hesitate to make appropriate suggestions. “This does not mean that Mr Roosevelt- will intervene or consent to arbitrate,” he added, “It would ,bc taking on too much responsibility.” It is widely believed that Mr Roosevelt would act for peace if a favourable opportunity presented itself, but, manifestlv, that opportunity is not offering at present. Diplomatic circles consider it-is obvious that Mr Roosevelt will not act without discovering in advance the reactions of all the belligerents, possibly submitting a series of questions designed to establish the extent to which they' would go at a conference toward adjusting their differences, thus providing a tentative agenda if a conference is feasible. ° “SPEECH AN ULTIMATUM.”

Meanwhile, public opinion as expressed by the Press has hardened further against Hitler’s speech. It is reflected in reactions like that of the Scripps-Howard World telegram, which comments in ‘an editorial from its favourite angle of American isolation: “We haven’t teen asked to intervene,” but it publishes a cartocui headed: “Let them reject my outstretched hand,” showing a fist clutching a blackjack. Similarly, the New York Soil, ing, “Is history being repeated ? reproduces on its' front page the famous cartoon of August, 1915, in which the Kaiser, France, Britain, Russia and Italv are playing poker, with the Kaiser, behind a pile of winnings, exclaiming. “If only I could quit now. The New York Post declares that the speech is an ultimatum, not ottering peace but requesting surrender. It says that United States intervention in" the peace offensive would be tantamount to joining Russia and Germany. If the United States transmitted or made suggestions it would acquire a contingent interest in carrying out the peace, which might mean that the United States would !?» involved in a war. It adds: “The United States cannot take tiie initiative without becoming a silent partner in conquest and " The New York Times in its editorial savs it believes that acceptance of Hitler’s terms is not within the realm of practical politics while the British and French Governments are as at present constituted. “The British and French delegates to any conference would have to represent governments other than those making the commitments at present standing in British and French names,” it states. WHY HITLER WANTS PEACE. “Hitler’s sincerity in claiming he wants peace is unquestionable. He has already won the prize of Poland. Why risk its loss? Moreover, it has consistently been his rule to quarrel with his adversaries singly and, if he must, fight them singly. He needs peace liecause he has good cause to doubt his own confident assertion that Germany can survive a long blockade; because he knows that the Germans have been schooled in >a belief that a real war, and especially a long war, is unthinkable ; and tecause he lias reason to fear the ultimate anger of the Germans on discovering that they have again taken the dark 1181167 -of disaster and been made to’suffer as in 1914-1918. r , “The only explanations of the speech, which failed in its apparent purpose to prepare the ground for prompt peace, are that Hitler, still miscalculating the strength of the British and French purpose, was convinced that after his heady triumph lie can have peace on his own terms or, alternatively, that he has abandoned all hope Of peace and made the speech for home consumption.” Close friends declare that Air Roosevelt is ready and willing to aid in the re-establishme.nt of peace when the opportunity arises, but the Nazi requirement of acceptance of the Polish partition as the pre-requisite of an armistice is a barrier to a peace move by tho United States.

ITALIANS DISTURBED.

REFERENCES TO RUSSIA:POLICY IN BALKANS. NEW YORK, Oct. 8. The Rome correspondent of the NonYork Times states that the Italians) must see the end of the Rome-Berlin Axis in a military sense. Herr Hitler only spoke of the Italian-German pact as “idealistically and politically very close.” The Italians do not sec that HenHitler has offered a peace acceptable • to his enemies, and they are disturbjed at the threat of a dictated peace in | his last offer, and also at the reference to Ruesian-German reciprocal aid in the east and south-east, logically i meaning that Russia and Germany [consider themselves the arbiters of tlio i Balkans, in which Italy is vitally concerned. 1 But most puzzling to the Italians is tho Fuehrer’s slight references to , Italy. The deductions to be made from j this aspect of the speech are so ( startling that one is not entitled to make them. On the basis of what was said and . unsaid, it is possible that Herr Hitler j did not want to embarrass Italy. If .he pictured her as Germany’s firm ally he would have forced Italy into some in- 1

itiative. This interpretation gives a clue to what Count Ciano told Herr Hitler, which was that Italy would not act at present, and that it would be unfriendly to speak of lorcing her to action. OFFICIAL UNCONCERN. Whatever the Italian Government’s analysis of Herr Hitler’s speech may be, the newspapers show that officially Italy considers lier relations with Germany are unchanged. In practice, however, it is impossible lor Italy to ignore the altered factors in the European situation and their effect on Ita-lian-German co-operation, which will show itself as time passes. In the meantime, the surface is unruffled. The newspapers do not mention the Balkans, or, more ' significantly, Russia, except, curiously, the semi-official Relazioni ] nternazionale, which is quite unfriendly to the Russians. It seems from his speech that Herr Hitler is determined to establish a new order in South-Eastern Europe. His fundamental intention appears to be to institute a German-Soviet partnership to supervise an enormous exchange of populations and the rectification of the boundaries of at least some of the Balkan countries. He appears to have raised additional difficulties by contradictions in liis statement.

First, he undertakes to guarantee the present Hungarian frontiers and reaffirms recognition of the Yugoslavian borders. At the same time, he asserts that he has not anv intentions against Rumania. It would appear impossible to exchange the 1.900.000 Hungarians living in the latter two States without amending the frontiers. particularly as Hungary is small and crowded. FUEHRER’S PROBLEM.

Secondly, lie has not asked the Balkan States what their attitude is. II lie upsets their status quo lie will stir lip a hornets’ nest. Every country proudly teaches its children how it once held the hegemony on the peninsula. Even if the partners do not clash, it. is difficult to see hoiv improving the lines of demarcation could avoid bringing Russian influence to the Adriatic on account of the traditional Moscow attitude toward fellow Slavs. The possibility is not exactly pleasing to Italy. Hitler found arranging tlie disposition of 210,000 Tyrolese a tremendous undertaking. _ How will he deal with the German minorities alone in South-east Europe, who number 1,700 000? A large proportion of these have been there for three centuries, and some do not speak German. Hitler either must give up a large number or start one of the most complicated exoduses in history, which would bo more complicated by not- having the majority of the'Balkans backing him «PMILITARY MISSION. ROME, Oct. 7. General Ternnchi’s military mission has returned to Japan after visiting Italy and Germany.