FUTURE OF SANCTIONS.

Manawatu Standard, Volume LVI, Issue 168, 17 June 1936, Page 10

FUTURE OF SANCTIONS.

Tiie Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr Neville Chamberlain, when he delivered a speech at a political dinner in London on sanctions appears to have caused something of a sensation. He is reported to have said, “It is no use shutting our eyes to realities. Sanctions have been tried and failed.” This is a sweeping'statement, and is by no means literally true. Italy’s economic status has been seriously affected by sanctions limited in scope thodgh they have been, otherwise Signor Mussolini would not have appealed again for the lifting of sanctions. Where the members of the League of Nations failed was in not including oil in the economic sanctions. It was oil that enabled Italy to successfully invade Abyssinia. Without oil her aeroplanes and tanks would have been useless machines. To the extent that the League did not include oil in sanctions it failed in its purpose. Although Mr Neville Chamberlain appears to have been expressing his own personal opinion on the matter and ' not that of the British Cabinet, nevertheless it seems apparent that the Chancellor expressed the trend of British opinion on the subject.

If sanctions are to be lifted, how is Italy to be punished for her breach of the Covenant? Is she to get away with her ill-got-ten gains? Is she to be allowed to retain the conquered Abyssinian territory? These are problems that the League of Nations must face and deal with next month. It may be considered desirable to allow Italy a strip of Ethiopia to satisfy the vanity of Benito Mussolini, but to give her all the country occupied by Italian troops, and allow Italy to establish a “Kingdom of Abyssinia” would be an abrogation of the League Covenant. If Italy secures possession of the whole territory what is the use of the League to the smaller nations? They might just as well abandon the League and save the costs. The League must be reformed; that is admitted on all sides, but as yet we have no indication of the nature of the reforms that are in the minds of leading statesmen. It is obvious that economic sanctions, though they may cause a great deal of inconvenience, are in themselves insufficient to stay the progress of an aggressor, as. has been proved in the case of Italy. If the League is to continue and be an effective instrument in maintaining world peace, then it must be endowed with such powers as will enable it to enforce its decisions. If the League is to keep the peace of the world it rmist have at its call adequate military forces. In every civilised community, at any rate in all British countries, the presence of the police tends to maintain law and order which means peace. The League needs to have force at its command and the knowledge that force would be used would prevent any nation from adventures in breach of the peace of the world. The other side of the picture—and unfortunately there is a reverse side —shows that the very efforts to achieve peace may bring' about war, especially if powerful nations are' not unanimous in their ideas concerning the extent to which sanctions should be applied, and even take a mild view of a particular act of aggression should policy indicate that course. This element has been particularly noticeable in the Italo-Abyssiuian dispute. It seems, therefore, that the use of force to ensure peace depends on the great nations agreeing; on a course of mutual action, and students of world politics will say that that highly necessary unanimity is meanwhile outside practical possibilities.