OBSCURE STATUTES.

Manawatu Standard, Volume LII, Issue 244, 14 September 1932, Page 12

OBSCURE STATUTES.

METHOD OF INTERPRETATION.

WELLINGTON, Sept. 13. Obscure clauses in statutes have frequently been the cause of endless litigation, and parties have been to the courts to ask for interpretations of their meanings. Judgment in a case of the kind was delivered by Mr Justice Iteed in the Supreme Court arising out of the third party insurance under the Motor Vehicles Insurance Act, 1928. In the course of his judgment His Honour made the following interesting observations as to the guiding principles to be adopted in interpreting a statute claimed to be obscure.

“In interpreting a statute which is claimed to be obscure, the rules in Heydon’s case (an English case) are as in full force and effect to-day as they were when first laid down by the Barons of the Exchequer nearly 250 years ago. It was there said: ‘We have to discern and consider (1) What was the law before the making of the Act. (2) What was the mischief and the defect for which the Common Law (or the Statute Law) did not provide. (3) What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure thb diseaso of the Commonwealth. (4) The true reason of the remedy.’ “And all judges were enjoined 'to make such construction as shall suppress the michief and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for the continuance of the mischief, and pro privato commodo, and to add force and life to the cure and remedy ncoording to the true intent of the makers of the Act pro bono publico’.” His Honour proceeded: “Moreover our Acts Interpretation Act, 1924, provides that every Act and every provision and enactment thereof shall be deemed remedial and shall accordingly receive such fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation as will best ensure the attainment of the object of the Act and of such provision or enactment according to its true intent, meaning, and spirit.” It was later in the judgment that His Honour remarked: “Is not the contention here advanced an instance of ‘the subtle invention and evasion for the continuance of the mischief and “pro privato commodo” ’ that we are asked to suppress P”