Manawatu Evening Standard. Circulation, 3,300 Copies Daily. MONDAY, JUNE 10, 1907. THE BANKSIDE RAILWAY COLLISION.

Manawatu Standard, Volume XLI, Issue 8306, 10 June 1907, Page 4

Manawatu Evening Standard. Circulation, 3,300 Copies Daily. MONDAY, JUNE 10, 1907. THE BANKSIDE RAILWAY COLLISION.

On Saturday the decision of the Railway Department regarding the collision of trains in Canterbury at Easter time was made known. The circumstances surrounding this serious accident are worth recalling at this juncture. Officially the affair was described as follows: —"On Thursday, March 28th, a volunteer special vas timed to leave Timaru at 8.15 p.m. .... It was timed to pass the passenger train 153, running on Thursdays only, leaving Christchurch at 10.45 p.m.,, at Bankside. No. 153 overlooked this crossing-place at Bankside, and in consequence collided with the volunteer special about half a mile north of the Rakaia Bridge." It was naturally a matter of the greatest surprise that such a collision between crowded trains could take place without injury to life. The prompt application of the patent brakes, however, was a redeeming feature of the accident, otherwise, says the engine-driver in evidence, "not a soul would have remained alive."

The enquiry had to apportion the blame for the mishap—how far the men in charge of the train were culpable and whether the present system under which the men work was in any way responsible. The Court which made the enquiry was composed of high railway officials, with a Stipendiary Magistrate as president. It was certainly an invidious position for these officials to be placed in—to be the judges of their own system—and when the constitution of the Court is considered, its decision, placing all the blame on the driver and guard, will not be surprising. But that decision will naturally cause some uneasiness amongst the public, for the evidence disclosed great faults in the railway system. In order to show in what way that system is deficient we propose to quote some of the evidence. The witnesses called by the Department proved that the practice with regard to special trains is to have them marked upon ''train diagrams," which show where the trains have to cross. "The crossings were indicated upon the special advices by a bar and the number of the train to be crossed. The advices were checked by two officers, and when correct were copied and issued. A train notice-board was used to post such notices on; they were posted also in a train notice-book, in which every member of the staff had to sign for the advice at the time he received it." On behalf of the men, evidence was given that the room

where the notices were posted, was "small and badly lit, and the notices could hardly be seen"; that there were eight or nine different notices on the board; and that "the notices were'put anywhere on either wall," as well, as on the board. It was not | disputed, however, that in the present case notices were given to both the driver and the guard, and duly signed for. "The circulars that were signed," said the driver, "were marked 'which we have read and understand.' It was impossible to understand them. . . . He put his notices in his pocket, and when he got to Bankiside he had no idea that the volunteer special was on the line." The driver, who had the reputation of being a most reliable man, further deposed that he went to see the notice-board and examined the walls. He found nothing affecting his train. Later, while oiling and taking in water, the foreman brought him a circular. The driver was angry and said he had no time;.to look at it. The foreman said he did not think it affected witness, and witness put it in his pocket. He had to coal, oil and water the engine, and it was impossible to do all. this. He had to take risks, as all engine-drivers did, in the way of letting things go. For instance, he omitted examining his tools, which was a big risk if his engine had broken down. He was unable to oil the bogies, and left that work to be done at Ashburton. When ho met the guard, the latter went to the stationmaster, who came with a pocketbook and read out the numbers of the circulars. There were a great many more numbers than witness had circulars for. Witness checked them and the stationmaster said the guard and he were all right.

This evidence gives some idea of the haphazard manner in which our railways are conducted. Two points stand out clearly—that the instructions given to the driver were not easily understood and that the driver had no time to read them. The responsibility for both these failures must fall on the Department. If the public is to be as safely conveyed by train as it has a right to expect, a considerable amendment in these two respects will be necessary. Some engine-drivers are undoubtedly more slow of understanding than others, and this only goes to show how imperative it is that the instructions should be simple and easily understood. Further, the conditions under which they work should be such as will eliminate all risk to the public. The failure of the enquiry to say anything about this aspect of the Bankside railway collision ought not to be passed by. The Minister should without delay appoint an independent commission to go into the whole circumstances.