MANAWATU EVENING STANDARD POHANGINA GAZETTE. Circulation, 3,200 Copies Daily. WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 23, 1905. BRITAIN'S NAVAL ATTITUDE.

Manawatu Standard, Volume XLI, Issue 8071, 23 August 1905, Page 4

MANAWATU EVENING STANDARD POHANGINA GAZETTE. Circulation, 3,200 Copies Daily. WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 23, 1905. BRITAIN'S NAVAL ATTITUDE.

In view of the discussion that has been proceeding for vsome time past.iv regard to the advisability of strengthening British, naval power in the Pacific, it is interesting to note that the Australia a squadron, during a recent debate in the House of Commons, was described by Mr Pretyman, secretary of the Admiralty, as " ships of no inconsiderable value." This is interpreted to mean that in the opinion of the Home Go" vernment the Australian squadron is sufficiently strong, this opinion being justified by Mr Prctyman's statement that " the Admiralty is satisfied that it is doing enough for British interests in the Pacific." Under the circumstances it is worth while to give a little additional attention to the terms of this announcement, and to reproduce the discussion which, led .up to it. Sir John Colomb, one of tlie most persistent advocates of large naval expenditure' especially in the construction of powerful battleships, said he saw everywhere warnings to the British Empire to keep up its naval strength at a sufficient standard to meet all possible contingencies. He had always protested against the idea of being content with a " Two-Power" standard. The triumph of Ji^jan showed that in- a war for a naval power that was unprepared there was no recovery ; a reverse was a final catastrophe, and there were no means of remedying it. The question'now was, What power was going to be master in the Pacific ? America was making an extraordinary increase in its naval power in the Pacific, and questions might easily avise there affecting the policy o£ Japan, the. United States and Great Britain. Were we preparing for that contingency ? He welcomed the Japanese alliance, and we should regard .with dread, and horror a rupture with theUnited States. But alliances were not always lasting, and ruptures took place between the most friendly nations. Were we preparing for the time when our interests and those of 'Japan aiid America might cease to be identical? The power that ruled the Pacific would also rule the Indian Ocean and theAtlantic, for the sea was one. -Finally., he asked wliat the Admiralty was doing to awake the colonies with seaboards, in the Pacific, and with greater interest* in that ocean than the Mother Country, to a sense of their duties and responsibilities in the maintenance of a free sea-

Sir John Cjlomb's line speech was not particularly pleasing.to tho Liberals, ■who as a party liave given ample evidence of their ignorance of. .British interests in the Pacific, and of a deter, mination to be troubled, as little as

possible concerning them. One of their number, Mr H. E. Keariey, the member for I)evonport, voiced their opinions by stating. that' he did not tliink England would at present be either alarmed or anxious about, " or even interested in," the questibn 'of who was to rule in the Pacific. Mr Gibson Bowles one of the ~ financial: authorities of the House of Commons, ..who has made a reputation- for intelligent interest in naval questions, spoke of the "practical abandonment"/ by- the Admiralty of stations in-the and JS"orth Atlantic. He supposed this, was done on the strength of th? Alliance with Japan and the>understandmg with the United States (an extremely vague understanding which, it may be remarked, does not in the least affect American ambitions in the Pacific), but, like Sir John Colomb, he evidently did not attach any exaggerated value to British relations with; either of those countries. ' ■ Mr. Pretyman's reply recalled the easy optimism adopted recently by the Prime Minister in. his speech .on the defence of England and the military, position in India. He began by finding- fault with the term " command of the Pacific." It was used rather loosely, he said. . The Pacific was a considerable area, and we should hardly sjpeak of its mastery. There was "a considerable fleet" on the China and Australian stations, the . two points where there were British interests which " mi{{ht require defence." It could hardly be " seriously .suggested that beyond that it would be. necessary for us to Jkeep a large force in the Pacific, in order to attempt to obtain what was called the mastery of the Pacific." He did not think Great Britain desired the mastery of any sea beyond this —that British commerce and interests should go there .without fear or favor, and have equal opportunity with those of. other nations. To suggest that we desire to obtain the mastery of the Pacific or any other sea might give a false impression, which ho desired to remove. The ships we had on the China and Australian stations were " sufficient, not only for British trade and interests to-day, but, us far as could be foreseen, for a very long tomorrow." ■-.':■• . ,:

Thus the Americans, Germans and Japanese are practically-invited to go ahead and take whatever action of a strategical character may suit their ultimate purposes in Pacific waters.